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Abstract 
 
In this study I argue that Richard Rorty’s anti-representationalist philosophy arises 
from a misguided belief that realists are compelled to argue that we need a single and 
exclusive “mirror-like” form of representation to capture reality.  I argue that Rorty 
fails to appreciate the fact that realists do not have to absolutely identify reality with a 
particular mirror-like representation of it and nor do they have to fall prey to an 
invidious distinction between reality and the various ways that we do represent it.  I 
argue that we need not associate realism with the kind of absolutism that Rorty 
associates it with.  To illustrate this I challenge Rorty’s attempt to claim that Nietzsche 
also rejects realism and interpret Nietzsche’s perspectivism as a form of realism.  I 
also challenge Rorty’s anti-representationalism in the context of his political 
philosophy.  In order to do this I assess the role that Rorty assigns to the poet in his 
liberal utopia by examining the work of Sylvia Plath and Tony Harrison.  I also 
discuss the various positions that Hilary Putnam has adopted in order to explore 
different possibilities within realism and representationalism.  I conclude that 
Putnam’s internal realism concedes too much to Rorty and that his earlier external 
realism is a better alternative. 
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Introduction 
 
Hilary Putnam has said that it is the besetting sin of philosophers to throw the baby 
out with the bathwater.
1
  By this he means that each new philosophical movement is 
often so antithetical to the last that any kernel of truth that might be carried over is 
continually lost.  Over the central issue of realism we swing back and forth from some 
version of antirealism and appear incapable of capturing the whole truth in a single 
vision.  This study of Richard Rorty is, to a large extent, a description of this pattern 
of recoil.  This is not to diminish Rorty’s contribution to the debate.  Rorty has done a 
lot to convince us of the contingency of many of our philosophical convictions.  
Indeed, it is his refreshing determination to pull the plug on some of the least helpful 
that advances the debate and draws many to his writing.  The problem is that some of 
this old metaphysical bathwater distorts his own vision to the extent that he ends up 
advocating something very close to idealism.  Rorty describes himself as a pragmatist 
philosopher so by way of introduction I would like to say something about this 
connection.  To my mind the defining attribute of Rorty’s position is his anti-
representationalism - which is his claim that our beliefs and our language do not 
represent anything.  This assertion can be traced back to its roots in pragmatism by 
considering how that movement was characterized by a suspicion of certain 
metaphors that we tritely employ when describing the relationship that our true beliefs 
have to reality. 
                                                          
1
 Putnam, Hilary, The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body and World (New York: Columbis University Press, 
1999). 
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In his lectures on pragmatism from 1906, William James argued that our true 
ideas are not always a straightforward copy of reality but are often an approximation 
that allows us to summarize our experiences and “get about among them by 
conceptual short-cuts”.  A true idea is any one “upon which we can ride, so to speak; 
any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any 
other part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor”.2  
The truth is not bound to reality with the fidelity that might be expected by those who 
imply its mirror-like correspondence because our more conceptual (as opposed to 
“sensible”) ideas do not copy their object.  Our concepts comprise a kind of short-
hand for practical purposes and they often bear a loose resemblance to reality.  The 
term “concept” itself, for example, is a metaphor at root.  It is more like an imprecise 
tool than a copy or reflection of reality.  For Rorty, the metaphor of tool-use offers an 
alternative to the whole tradition of representationalist philosophy.  Rorty sees in this 
metaphor a way to dissolve the debate between realism and scepticism.  According to 
him, it is the whole nest of metaphors to do with mirroring that creates the debate in 
the first place.  The solution is to train ourselves not to use those metaphors.  By 
regarding our language as a set of tools (rather than representations) we can shake off 
the debate between realism and scepticism.  Rorty regards the standard of realism to 
be unrealisable anyway because (with James) he claims that it is hard to make sense 
of the idea that our beliefs are mirror-like copies of reality.  
Of all the terms and contexts that can be used to characterise Rorty’s 
philosophical position this study will treat Rorty as principally an “anti-
representationalist”.  That term encapsulates the fundamental point of departure that 
                                                          
2
 William James, “What Pragmatism Means” in Pragmatism and the Meaning of Truth (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1978), 27-44, p. 34. 
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motivated the disillusionment with the philosophical tradition that he announced so 
provocatively with the publication of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature in 1979.  
His arguments in favour of pragmatism, postmodernism, anti-realism and 
ethnocentrism all flow from that point of departure.  For Rorty, the whole notion of 
representation - used by philosophers to describe our epistemic relationship to reality 
– is inherently flawed and ought to be abandoned.  With that notion goes the idea that 
our beliefs can ever “correspond” to reality.  According to Rorty, it is not possible for 
us to make sense of such correspondence.  All philosophical attempts to do so 
(stretching all the way back to Plato) are incoherent and rely on an idealised 
conception of the mind as a “mirror” that reflects reality without imposing its own 
stamp.  My criticism of Rorty’s work will largely concentrate on the reasoning that he 
offers in support of these claims.  It is a feature of Rorty’s style that he often enlists 
the arguments of others while re-contextualising those arguments in order to bring 
them into line with his own.  He sees himself as justified in doing so precisely 
because he denies any obligation to accurately represent the kind of original authorial 
intention that might restrict him.  Much of my work will involve recovering that 
original authorial intention.  One thinker who will play a prominent role in this work 
is Friedrich Nietzsche.  Rorty presents Nietzsche’s thought as if it largely confirms the 
anti-realist conclusions of his own argument.  Rorty’s interpretation of Nietzsche 
takes his early unpublished essay “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense” as a 
summation of Nietzsche’s account of our relationship to reality.  I will show that 
subsequent developments in Nietzsche’s thought belie this claim.  Nietzsche 
developed some crucial arguments to the effect that we can reject the idealised 
conception of realism that Rorty rejects without abandoning realism and 
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representationalism. 
Over the course of this study I will refer to various pieces of Rorty’s writing 
that span the period from 1972 to 2007 but I will treat Rorty’s work during this time 
as a consistent argument.  The focus of my criticism will be Rorty’s narrow 
conceptions of realism and representationalism and those conceptions do not change 
significantly.  Rorty’s writing goes through changes of context and terminology as he 
develops his argument and extends its applications but its core claims remain the 
same.  The ideas of realism and representationalism that Rorty casts off have their 
roots in Plato’s allegory of the cave and that allegory remains canonical for Rorty.  
Plato imagined the mind transcending the contingencies of the practice of 
representation and achieving absolute “mirror-like” correspondence with reality 
through contemplation of the Forms.  Whenever Rorty defines realism he does so in 
terms that hark back this ideal of absolute correspondence.  As far as Rorty is 
concerned, realism is forever compromised by our inability to achieve the kind of 
realism that Plato described.  As long as we remain “cave-bound” it is better to reject 
Plato’s picture altogether and deny that our thought is intended to represent reality in 
the first place.  Plato’s picture is central to Rorty’s conception of realism and I 
question Rorty’s adherence to it in the various contextual and terminological guises in 
which it appears in his work.  My intention is to explore a less absolutist conception 
of realism in order to show that we can accommodate the sense of contingency that 
Rorty wisely imparts on us without abandoning realism. 
Rorty often states that philosophical argument revolves around competing 
incompatible descriptions of the world.  According to Rorty, it is wrong to think that 
argument takes place against the background of a shared objective conception of the 
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world that we all naturally assent to.  Much of our argument involves the attempt to 
persuade each other of the virtues of our particular description of the world and we do 
not have an overriding objective viewpoint that we can use to demonstrate our 
accuracy.  Our arguments in favour of our particular description of the world often do 
not rely on our accuracy.  They often rely on other virtues such as increased 
coherence, practical efficacy or even hopefulness.  Rorty’s own argument is intended 
to persuade us of the virtues of a world in which realism and objectivity are no longer 
sought.  Rorty advocates an inversion of the epistemic hierarchy that Plato describes 
in The Republic.  For Roty, it is those who are able to create persuasive pictures of the 
world that are most valued.  There is no room for the philosopher who attempts to 
transcend contingency.  Such “metaphysical” philosophy is based on a misguided 
view of the mind as a mirror that can reflect the intrinsic nature of reality.  Rorty tries 
to elevate the role of creative art in his utopia and claims that literature is a more 
legitimate form of argument than metaphysics because it does not rely on a dubious 
claim to objectivity.  Literature often deals with more contingent matters and can 
record our everyday lives while exploring matters of philosophical import.  As a 
student of literature I can appreciate the value that Rorty’s finds in it.  Rorty is right to 
acknowledge that art is a valid form of critique.  In order to honour this 
interdisciplinary spirit I have chosen to use the work of two poets in order to present 
criticism of Rorty’s vision of a poeticised liberal utopia.  In his political philosophy 
Rorty makes the literary artist the prime advocate of his liberal outlook.  In response I 
offer some literary voices that suggest Rorty’s utopian liberal vision is more 
problematic that he suggests. 
This strategy of sticking close to the argumentative framework that Rorty 
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offers is also evident in the way that I focus my discussion on philosophers that Rorty 
also discusses.  Much of Rorty’s argument is couched in the form of exposition.  He 
identifies what he calls a “holist and pragmatist trend” in contemporary analytic and 
continental philosophy that he believes his own anti-representationalism reflects.  
Rorty acknowledges that his expositions often take licence with their original source 
material and so it is instructive to consider what is lost as a result of Rorty’s 
manipulations.  Once again, Rorty’s highly specific conceptions of realism and 
representationalism inform his argument.  Rorty precludes any realist interpretation of 
philosophers who depart from the kind of Platonic absolutism that he associates with 
realism.  This is evident in his treatment of major influences such as Thomas Kuhn, 
Donald Davidson, W. V. O Quine, Friedrich Nietzsche, Hilary Putnam and Jacques 
Derrida.  I discuss these figures while questioning the narrow interpretative 
parameters that Rorty offers.  I do not spend much time discussing subsequent 
developments in contemporary philosophy because my aim is to concentrate on 
exposing the internal weaknesses of Rorty’s work.  One contemporary philosopher 
that I do discuss is Roy Bhaskar.  An important feature of the realist school of thought 
that Bhaskar founded is its accommodation of the sense of contingency that Rorty 
regards as being anathema to realism.  It is an important development in light of my 
criticism of Rorty because it shows how realism can proceed once the narrow terms 
that Rorty sets for it have been shaken off. 
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Chapter Outline 
 
In the first chapter I will explore Rorty’s account of what representationalism is and 
examine the line of argument that leads him to reject it.  Rorty’s description of what a 
representation must be like is often highly specific.  It is often based on the metaphor 
of the “mirror” and conceives of the standard of correspondence as a demand for an 
identical copy or “likeness” of reality.  Rorty’s pragmatist description of language as a 
tool (as opposed to a representation) is in large part motivated by the lack of the 
mirror-like identity relation that philosophers have often presupposed exists between 
our language and reality.  My counter-argument will bear down on Rorty’s narrow 
account of what a representation must be like and suggest that it can be widened to 
include un-mirror–like things, one of which is language.  One of the implications of 
Rorty’s narrow conception of what a representation must be like is that he interprets 
realism as a demand for a representation that is identical to reality in an absolute 
sense.  This would be a reflection of the way reality is “as it is in itself” unmarked by 
the form and contingency of representations.  According to Rorty, our inability to 
attain such an absolute conception of reality creates a distinction between appearance 
and reality that invites universal scepticism.  It is this universal scepticism that Rorty 
seeks to dissolve by denying that our language is intended to correspond to reality “as 
it is in itself”.  In this respect, Rorty’s anti-realism has much in common with Kant’s 
idealism.  The purpose of showing this is to illustrate the fact that Rorty’s rejection of 
realism and representationalism draws on the very arguments that it seeks to dissolve.  
Rather than challenging the terms of the debate between realism and scepticism, Rorty 
ultimately merely uses the problem of scepticism as justification for his anti-
  12  
representationalism.  I finish off the chapter by arguing that Rorty’s dogmatic 
conception of what philosophical realism commits us to has roots in an association 
that he makes between realism and Platonism.  Rorty interprets philosophical realism 
as an attempt to reduce our representations of reality down to a single, essential and 
absolute representation as if all other ways of representing reality must then be treated 
as mere appearance.  I begin to suggest that a less reductionist and less absolutist form 
of realism is a better alternative to Rorty’s form of anti-representationalism. 
 In the second chapter I introduce Nietzsche into the debate.  I start by offering 
an account of Nietzsche’s intellectual career that illustrates the partial nature of the 
reading that Rorty offers.  Rorty presents the argument of Nietzsche’s early essay “On 
Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense” as a summation of Nietzsche’s thinking on the 
subjects of realism and representationalism.  The argument of the early Nietzsche is 
similar to Rortry’s because it also interprets realism as a wish to transcend the 
contingencies involved in the practice of representation.  I try to show that Nietzsche 
was not content with the idea of a dichotomy between appearance and reality for very 
long.  Nietzsche went a long way towards conceiving of a relationship between 
appearance and reality that does not invite Rorty’s variety of scepticism.  Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism is a form of realism that refuses to portray reality as something that 
belies appearances.  According to the later Nietzsche, reality appears in our 
representations despite the contingency of those representations.  In this chapter, I also 
compare Nietzsche’s earlier argument with the argument that W.V.O Quine puts 
forward in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”.  Quine is another figure that Rorty enlists 
in his rejection of realism and representationalism and comparing Quine’s arguments 
to the early Nietzsche’s helps to illustrate the narrow terms on which Rorty’s rejection 
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of realism and representationalsim is based.  At this point I introduce Donald 
Davidson’s criticisms of Quine in order to put pressure on these narrow terms. 
Davidson casts doubt on the claim that the act of conceptualisation must always be 
treated as something that makes reality remote and mysterious. 
 In chapter three I consider the central position that Rorty’s theory of metaphor 
has in his account of our intellectual and cultural life.  Rorty draws on the account of 
metaphor that Nietzsche gives in “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense” in order 
to undermine the priority and authority that is traditionally given to literal uses of 
language.  According to Rorty, it is the creation of inventive metaphors that explains 
our intellectual advances.  We do not advance by achieving ever more accurate literal 
descriptions of reality.  Rorty denies that our literal uses of language accurately 
represent reality.  He argues that they are just metaphors that we no longer regard as 
metaphors.  The purpose of arguing for the ubiquity of metaphor is to deny that our 
language is intended to be realistic.  Our language is always characterised by an act of 
contrivance that compromises its absolute, mirror-like realism.  Rorty elaborates his 
theory of metaphor using what he claims to be a Davidsonian account of the 
difference between the literal and the metaphorical.  Davidson argues that metaphors 
have no meaning other than the literal interpretation that we give them.  Rorty 
interprets this claim as a belief that metaphors impact our language by changing what 
we take to be literally meaningful.  According to Rorty, our intellectual advances 
occur as a result of such “acts of imagination” and not as a result of coming to 
represent reality accurately.  I seek to challenge Rorty’s reading of Davidson in order 
to confront Rorty’s insistence that a belief in the importance of metaphor must put us 
at odds with realism.  I then argue that Rorty’s notion of the unrealistic nature of 
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metaphor is further evidence of the debt that his argument owes to a Platonic 
conception of realism. In order to challenge this conception of realism I consider 
Aristotle’s theory of metaphor as an alternative.  I also draw out some of the positive 
consequences of entertaining a less absolutist conception of realism and 
representationalism as an alternative to Rorty’s anti-representationalism. 
 In the fourth chapter I consider Rorty’s account of metaphor as it relates to his 
theory of personal identity and his denial of the idea that we share a common human 
nature.  I explain Rorty’s account of individual autonomy which he describes as an 
achievement that is attained though a practice of “self-creation”.  According to Rorty, 
the autonomous individual has to create new metaphors that carve out a distinct 
identity that is free from the hegemony of conventional “literal” self-descriptions.  
Rorty conceives of such autonomy as something that not everyone can achieve.  It is 
only “strong poets” who are able to “use words as they have never been used” in order 
to confound received ideas of who they can be.  Rorty recognises that this 
individualism might cause a problem to a society that seeks to promote solidarity on 
the basis of shared values.  In order to solve this problem Rorty insists on a separation 
between the private and the public spheres.  I offer an example of the project of self-
creation - through an interpretation of the poetry of Sylvia Plath - in order to explore 
the plausibility of this separation.  I also examine Rorty’s denial of the reality of a 
common human nature and offer doubts about our ability to maintain solidarity given 
that denial.  In the absence of a real common human nature Rorty places great 
emphasis on the role of the creative artist in the creation and maintenance of a sense 
of solidarity.  With this in mind, I also enlist the work of Tony Harrison in order to 
assess the central role that Rorty gives to the poet in his liberal utopia. 
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 In the final chapter I seek to elaborate further the less absolutist form of 
representationalism and realism that I regard as a better alternative to Rorty’s anti-
representationalism.  In order to do this I enlist the help of Hilary Putnam.  The 
various positions that Putnam has developed over the course of his philosophical 
career (from his early external realism to his later internal realism and more recent 
commonsense or natural realism) offer a basis on which to explore various different 
possibilities within realism and representationalism.  Putnam’s internal realism, for 
example, has much in common with Rorty’s anti-realism because it also seeks an 
alternative to the kind of absolutist realism that is the counterpart of scepticism.  I 
argue, however, that Putnam’s internal realism is too close to Rorty’s position.  
Putnam agrees with Rorty that a rejection of metaphysical realism requires a rejection 
of the idea that our descriptions of reality can capture reality’s intrinsic nature.  
According to both philosophers, the idea that our descriptions are able to capture 
reality’s intrinsic nature must be abandoned once we have acknowledged the 
contingencies that determine our descriptions.  I argue that this claim is based on a 
narrow conception of what capturing the intrinsic nature of reality must be like – a 
conception that is taken from the metaphysical realism that they seek to avoid.  I 
claim that we need not conceive of the intrinsic nature of reality as something that 
belies our representations.  The intrinsic nature of reality is something that can appear 
in those representations despite the contingency of those representations.  On this 
basis I argue that Putnam’s earlier external realism has more to recommend it as a 
basis for conceiving of a form of philosophical realism that escapes the kind of 
absolutism that invites scepticism. 
 So far, in this summary, I have sometimes prefixed the terms “realism” and 
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“representationalism” with the term “philosophical”.  This is in acknowledgement of 
the fact that Rorty does not deny that the concepts of realism and representation have 
ordinary senses that are perfectly acceptable.  It is precisely the philosophical 
“mystification” (to use Alan Malachowski’s term) of such concepts that Rorty objects 
to.  This is something that Malachowski emphasizes in his book The New Pragmatism 
in order to defend Rorty against those who accuse him of reinforcing the scepticism 
that he seeks to dissolve.
3
  For example, Malachowski takes Putnam to task for the 
following accusation levelled against Rorty: 
 
What I want to emphasize is that Rorty moves from a conclusion about 
the unintelligibility of metaphysical realism (we cannot have a guarantee – 
of the sort that doesn’t even make sense – that our words represent things 
outside themselves) to scepticism about the possibility of representation 
tout court.  [...] Failing to inquire into the unintelligibility which vitiates 
metaphysical realism, Rorty remains blind to the way in which his own 
rejection of metaphysical realism partakes of the same unintelligibility.  
The way in which scepticism is the flip side of a craving for an 
unintelligible kind of certainty (a senseless craving, one might say, but for 
all that a deeply human craving) has rarely been more sharply illustrated 
than by Rorty’s complacent willingness to give up on the (platitudinous) 
idea that language can be used to represent something outside language.  
While I agree with Rorty that metaphysical realism is unintelligible, to 
stop with that point without going on to recover our ordinary notion of 
                                                          
3
 Alan Malachowski, The New Pragmatism (Durham: Acumen, 2010), pp. 92-95. 
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representation (and of a world of things to be represented) is to fail to 
complete that journey “from the familiar to the familiar” that is the true 
task of philosophy.
4
 
 
In response to Putnam, Malachowski argues that it is wrong to think that Rorty’s anti-
representationalism is equivalent to scepticism because doing so implies that Rorty 
takes our philosophical “craving for an unintelligible kind of certainty” seriously.  It is 
precisely such a craving for certainty that Rorty seeks to deflate by treating realism 
and representationalism (and philosophy in general) as optional.  The problem with 
this defence of Rorty is that it does not challenge the implication that the mystification 
of our ordinary concepts is something that philosophy cannot avoid.  Despite his 
respect for the ordinary uses of terms like “realism” and “representation” Rorty seems 
to exclude philosophy from ever making sense of them. Rorty suggests that so long as 
we do representationalist philosophy we are committed to either absolutism or 
scepticism.  It seems to me that Putnam is correct when he admonishes Rorty for 
“failing to inquire into the unintelligibility which vitiates metaphysical realism”.5  
This failure is the reason that Rorty’s anti-representationalist response frustrates 
people like Putnam.  The purpose of my thesis is to inquire into this unintelligibility 
and explore the possibility of arriving at a more intelligible account of representation 
and realism. 
 
                                                          
4
 Hilary Putman, “Realism Without Absolutes” in Words and Life, J. Conant (ed.) (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1996), 279-294, p. 300. 
5
 John McDowell also argues along these lines. See his ‘Towards Rehabilitating Objectivity’ in Rorty 
and his Critics, edited by Robert B. Brandom (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 109-122.  
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Chapter 1 - The World Well Lost or Better Regained? 
 
Only the man who comprehends the relation between representation and 
represented, in that arduous but rigorously scientific way characteristic of 
the epistemologist in the last century and the philosopher of language in 
this, can be transcendental in the required sense.  For only he can 
represent representing itself accurately.  Only such an accurate 
transcendental account of the relationship of representation will keep the 
Knowing Subject in touch with the Object, word with world, scientist with 
particle, moral philosopher with the Law, philosophy itself with reality 
itself.  So whenever dialecticians start developing their coherentist and 
historicist views, Kantians explain that it is another sad case of Berkeley’s 
Disease, and that there is no cure save a still better, more luminously 
convincing, more transparent philosophical account of representation.
6
 
 
Do Appearances Deceive? 
 
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature Richard Rorty takes issue with a traditional 
idea of philosophy as a fundamental discipline that is tasked with understanding the 
foundations of knowledge.
7
  This idea casts philosophy as a unique non-empirical 
                                                          
6
 Richard Rorty, “Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Esssay on Derrida”, in Consequences of 
Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 90-109, pp. 96-97. 
7
 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton University Press, 1980). pp. 131-164. 
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investigation into the mind that aims to understand how we are able accurately to 
represent reality.  Rorty classifies such epistemology as part of a mistaken picture 
which “holds traditional philosophy captive”.  This picture is of the mind as “a great 
mirror, containing various representations – some accurate, some not”.  Rorty 
proposes that the idea of the mind as an inner realm of “vision” in which the world is 
immediately present to consciousness has encouraged philosophers to think of 
knowledge as a form of “mirroring” that depends on a relationship of accurate 
correspondence between the mind and reality.  This has lead philosophy to set itself 
apart from the rest of culture and pursue the line of investigation into how such a 
relation of correspondence may (or may not) inform and justify our knowledge claims 
and methods of inquiry.  Had this picture of the mind not taken hold of the 
philosophical imagination then, according to Rorty, “the notion of knowledge as 
accuracy of representation would not have suggested itself.”8  The mind, conceived of 
as a mirror, is a philosophical invention that is in need of dismantling, Rorty argues, 
because it distracts us from appreciating the linguistic nature of belief and the social 
nature of justification.  Rorty proposes an alternative view of knowledge that regards 
the justification of a belief to be an agreement between people rather an agreement 
between the mind and reality.  We should abandon epistemology, according to Rorty, 
because it is not possible for us to seek an epistemic relationship to reality that 
escapes this linguistic and social context.  The epistemological boundary that Rorty 
describes does not amount to a denial of the existence of an extra-linguistic reality.  
Rorty simply denies that our language can be thought to have the kind of 
“correspondence” to such a reality that epistemologists have traditionally attempted to 
demonstrate. 
                                                          
8
 This and the preceding two quotes are from Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 12. 
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A problem with the attempt to conceive of the mind as a mechanism of 
representation is that we do not seem to be able to agree on a definitive philosophical 
account of how this mechanism works.  Since Descartes’ theory of “clear and distinct 
ideas” there have been many modern epistemologies that have attempted to provide a 
foundation for knowledge and inquiry.  Each has tended, however, to be marked by 
the contingencies of the time from which they arose.  The upshot of this is that every 
attempt at a comprehensive epistemological account of the mind’s relation to non-
linguistic reality has failed to provide us with a convincing and hence lasting model.  
For Rorty, the historical and cultural contingency of philosophical reflection (and of 
thought in general) is an indication that the idea of the Mirror of Nature that has 
motivated philosophical enquiry is merely a fantasy.  If we acknowledge this then we 
are at a point in our philosophical maturity at which we ought to abandon it with the 
same confidence with which many in the West are abandoning religion in favour of 
secular life.  This analogy with the decline of religion and the growing secularization 
of the West is one that Rorty returns to again and again in his work because he equates 
the desire for a theory of representation with a desire for the kind of transcendence 
that religion aspires to.  He describes the attachment to the idea of the Mirror of 
Nature as an attachment to the idea of being in touch with something greater and more 
enduring than the contingent language and culture that we inhabit.  Rorty argues that 
once we fully accept the contingency of the way we live and talk we will no longer 
see any need for the kind of epistemology that tempts us with the offer of 
transcendence.  We will be content to seek agreement with one another by simply 
exchanging linguistic propositions without concern for their correspondence (or lack 
of correspondence) to an independent reality. 
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 When considering what it is about the idea of the Mirror of Nature that makes 
it problematic Rorty turns his critical gaze towards the concept of representation itself.  
The purpose of a theory of representation is to overcome scepticism by explaining 
how our representations correspond to reality.  It is, however, in the nature of a 
representation to “stand for” whatever it represents and this puts any representation at 
a remove from its object.  By conceiving of the mind as a system of representation we 
put it at a remove from reality and raise the question of how we can know that its 
contents correspond to that reality.  The model of the mind as a system of 
representation forces us to distinguish appearances from reality and encourages 
scepticism regarding our ability to know reality “as it really is”.9  Rorty cites 
Descartes as the inventor of the modern conception of the mind as a system of 
representation.  In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature Rorty contrasts Descartes’ 
conception of the mind with Aristotle’s in order to illustrate how Descartes redefined 
the concept of perception in order to facilitate scepticism: 
 
The substantial forms of frogness and starness get right into the 
Aristotelian intellect, and are there in just the same way they are in the 
frogs and the stars – not in the way in which frogs and stars are reflected 
in mirrors. In Descartes’s conception – the one which became the basis for 
“modern” epistemology – it is representations which are in the “mind.”  
The Inner Eye surveys these representations hoping to find some mark 
which will testify to their fidelity.
 10
 
                                                          
9
 Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, Philosophical Papers, Volume 1 (Cambridge: 
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Body Problem Ancient?” in Mind, Matter and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of 
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In Aristole’s model, the mind becomes identical with the object of perception so there 
is no question of a lack of correspondence between them.  As a result, scepticism does 
not have the same traction in Aristotle’s model that it has in Descartes’.  That traction 
is gained by treating the mind itself as fundamentally representational in nature.  So 
long as we conceive of the mind as a system of representation we maintain a lack of 
identity between the mind and reality that creates the problem of how to assure 
ourselves of their correspondence.  Without such assurance we are committed 
(according to the argument of the Meditations) to scepticism regarding our ability to 
generate accurate representations of reality.  In the Meditations, Descartes argues that 
if we could find some idea that gives us this assurance we could bring scepticism to a 
halt and establish a secure foundation on which to build our knowledge of reality.  
Rorty’s attempt to change our philosophical frame of reference so that we no longer 
think of cognition as a form of representation is an attempt to set this problem of 
certainty aside.   
 One might argue that in rejecting the concepts of representation and realism 
Rorty makes too large a concession to the threat of Cartesian scepticism.  Given that 
Rorty regards his work to be continuous with the pragmatist tradition in philosophy it 
is interesting to compare Rorty’s response to Cartesian scepticism with that of Charles 
Sanders Peirce (one of the founders of pragmatism).  Peirce shares Rorty’s misgivings 
about the correspondence model when understood in terms of a relationship between 
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appearances and a remote metaphysical reality (or “thing-in-itself”).11  However, far 
from taking those misgivings as a reason to reject realism, Peirce denies that we 
should regard the problem of universal scepticism with the kind of seriousness that 
makes it corrosive to our sense of realism.  Peirce’s definition of a belief as something 
that must be judged according to its practical consequences leads him to surmise that 
universal scepticism is not a serious proposition that any person is able to entertain in 
a sustained way when faced with the concrete concerns of life.  Unless we are 
consistently willing to act (and talk) as if appearances are illusory and reality is a 
compete mystery to us then we can disregard scepticism.  Peirce is hence opposed to 
the kind of wholesale scepticism that Descartes pursues in the Meditations because it 
takes doubt to an absurd extreme.  Peirce’s position is an interesting contrast to 
Rorty’s because it suggests that the concept of representation is not necessarily 
wedded to the problem of scepticism if we have no genuine or specific reason to 
doubt that the content of our minds is able to correspond to reality.  Peirce implies that 
Rorty’s rejection of representationalism and realism is an unnecessary concession to a 
pseudo-problem.  The fact that our language and understanding are subject to change 
and contingency is no reason to worry that reality might be a complete mystery to us.  
Peirce argues that although we may come to change much of what we currently think 
we are not prevented from coming to know reality more and more as we test and 
modify our understanding through scientific inquiry.  Pierce’s position raises the 
question of whether Rorty’s rejection of representationalism and realism is really 
necessary.  Is there, then, really a problem inherent in the concept of representation 
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that requires us to discard realism and representationalism?  
 Rorty’s argument against realism and representationalism is often premised on 
the notion that there precisely is a problem inherent in the very notion of the practice 
of representation.  He often argues that in order for a representation to correspond to 
its object both object and representation have to satisfy the implausible requirement of 
being identical to (or “mirroring”) each other.  For example, in order to discredit the 
idea that language represents reality in Contingency, Irony and Solidarity Rorty argues 
along the following lines: 
 
The suggestion that truth, as well as the world, is out there is a legacy of 
an age in which the world was seen as the creation of a being who had a 
language of his own.  If we cease to attempt to make sense of the idea of 
such a nonhuman language, we shall not be tempted to […] claim that the 
world splits itself up, on its own initiative, into sentence-shaped chunks 
called “facts.”  But if one clings to the notion of self-subsistent facts, it is 
easy to start capitalizing the word “truth” and treating it as something 
identical either with God or with the world as God’s project.12 
 
Here Rorty imagines that realism requires us to believe that our true linguistic 
statements are identical to something “out there” that is akin to a language, as if the 
relation of correspondence can only be conceived of as a relation of resemblance.  
Rorty plays on the absurdity of the idea that reality might be identical to language in 
order to discredit realism and representationalism.  This, however, is an effect that is 
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 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 
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only achieved by assuming that reality would need to be “sentence-shaped” in order to 
be accurately represented by sentences.  In this case Rorty employs a particularly 
narrow understanding of what is required for a representation to correspond to its 
object.  He seeks to persuade us that the notion of representation is exhausted by the 
mirror metaphor. A mirror offers the model of a very particular type of representation 
that is useful in circumstances in which an identical copy of the object is required.  
Very often, however, the purpose of a representation is not to “mirror” its object.  
Language, for example, need not be thought of as an attempt to provide an identical 
copy of reality.  It can rather, for example, be conceived of as a medium that is meant 
to allow us to reason and communicate about reality.  The fact that we reason in 
“sentence-shaped chunks” that bear no “mirror-like” resemblance to reality does not 
mean that our reasoning necessarily fails to correspond to reality.  As we shall see, a 
representation need not be identical to its object in order to “correspond” to it.  Our 
linguistic system can successfully represent reality without satisfying the purported 
need for “mirroring” it.  
 Rorty, it is well-known, conceives of himself as a follower of William James.  
James’ suspicion towards metaphors of “mirroring” also provides the starting point for 
much of his discussion of the nature of truth in his contribution to pragmatism: 
 
The popular notion is that a true idea must copy its reality.  Like other 
popular views, this one follows the analogy of the most usual experience.  
Our true ideas of sensible things do indeed copy them.  Shut your eyes 
and think of yonder clock on the wall, and you get just such a true picture 
or copy of its dial.  But your idea of its “works” (unless you are a clock-
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maker) is much less of a copy, yet it passes muster, for it in no way 
clashes with the reality.  Even though it should shrink to the mere word 
“works,” that word still serves you truly […]13  
 
In this passage, James prefigures Rorty’s questioning of the “mirror” or “copy” 
conception of representation.  They both use this argument as a way of justifying a 
more instrumentalist interpretation of the purpose of language.  James emphasizes the 
lack of resemblance between our words and their objects in order to erode the 
requirement of correspondence and emphasize the importance of practical and 
intellectual utility.  James prefers to use concepts to do with “dealing” or “coping” 
with reality as opposed to “representing” or “corresponding” to it.  Both James and 
Rorty take the idea that our representations of reality are not a “copy” of their object 
as providing a justification for undermining the standards of representation and 
correspondence.  They thereby deny those standards any significant role in their 
respective conceptions of truth.  Because of this, however, their arguments often 
employ a particularly narrow definition of what a representation is.  There are many 
examples of the practice of representation that do not rely on the representation in 
question being identical to its object.  In “On a New List of Categories”, for example, 
C. S. Peirce identifies a number of different types of representation.  The type of 
representation that is captured by Rorty’s metaphor of “mirroring” is defined by what 
Peirce calls a “likeness”.  Peirce describes likenesses as representations “whose 
relation to their objects is a mere community in some quality”.  This relation would 
include the supposed likeness between our language and reality that Rorty claims 
would need to exist in order for our language to correspond to reality.  In addition, 
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however, Pierce describes a type of representation “whose relation to their objects is 
an imputed character”.  These are representations that have been ascribed to objects as 
a matter of convention in the way that symbols are ascribed to things (the nature of 
those semiotic signs is “arbitrary” to use Saussure’s term).  This additional type of 
representation allows for a form of “correspondence” between representations and 
their objects that does not imply any likeness between them.  Words and symbols (and 
the systems in which they feature) can correspond to objects, properties and their 
relations without being identical copies of them.   
 Rorty is obviously aware of the semantic notion of reference and that realist 
theories of reference rely on a correspondence between words and the reality they are 
thought to represent.  The problem, he argues, with suggesting that this relation of 
correspondence need not presuppose a relation of likeness is that it would require - in 
Rorty’s words - an “independent test for the accuracy of representation – of reference 
or correspondence to an ‘antecedently determinate reality’.”14  As far as Rorty is 
concerned, this is something that the model of representation rules out because that 
model necessarily separates us from that “antecedently determinate reality”.  The 
model of representation sets reality apart and makes it mysterious.  There is no 
independent standard of correspondence because we have to rely on the terms set by 
the representation.  It does no good to talk of our words corresponding to real objects 
and properties because without those words to define them we have no conception of 
what those words correspond to.  This seems to be why Rorty assumes that 
representationalist realist accounts of language have to conceive of reality as being 
“sentence-shaped”.  If they did not, the argument appears to run, then such accounts 
would have to invoke a conception of reality’s intrinsic nature that they cannot lay 
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claim to.
15
  Reality can only “appear” to us.  We cannot know reality as it “really is” 
unless it is identical to our representations (which seems unlikely).  For this reason 
Rorty believes that realism is not a serious proposition.  At the same time, as far as he 
is concerned, his rejection of realism and representationalism is not an unnecessary 
concession to the threat of scepticism because scepticism is really a serious problem 
only for representationalists.  According to the terms that Rorty sets out, realism 
requires us to know reality’s intrinsic nature in a way that we cannot if we have to use 
representations to do it.  
 So is the fact that we have to use representations intrinsically a problem?  If 
we are not able to transcend the practice of representation in order to compare our 
representations to reality “as it is in-itself” must we abandon the concepts of realism 
and representation?  The fact that it is possible for a representation to correspond to its 
object without being identical to it suggests that this lack of identity (call it the 
appearance-reality distinction) is not intrinsically a problem.  We can accept that our 
representations do not provide an identical “mirror-like” reflection of reality and still 
suppose that they can correspond to reality.  It is true that appearances can deceive but 
they do not necessarily deceive by virtue of being appearances.  We may not be able 
to identify our representations with reality but they are none the worse for that.  We 
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benefit from recognising them as representations because this encourages us to test 
their accuracy.  Rorty would ask how we are supposed to tell when this standard of 
accuracy has been met.  According to him, all we have is “the success which is 
supposedly explained by this accuracy”: 
 
Representationalists offer us no way of deciding whether a certain 
linguistic item is usefully deployed because it stands in these relations [of 
reference or correspondence to an antecedently determinate reality], or 
whether its utility is due to some factors which have nothing to do with 
them – as the utility of a fulcrum or a thumb has nothing to do with its 
“representing” or “corresponding” to the weights lifted, or the objects 
manipulated, with its aid.  So antirepresentationalists think “we use ‘atom’ 
as we do, and atomic physics works, because atoms are as they are” is no 
more enlightening than “opium puts people to sleep because of its 
dormative power.”16 
 
Rorty argues that the claim of representational accuracy adds nothing to an 
explanation of the success of a description.  It is an “empty compliment” that 
representationalists try to apply once a description has shown itself to be practically 
useful.
17
  Where scientific theories are concerned, Rorty argues, it is their predictive 
power that determines their success not whether they represent what is “really” there.  
The question of whether atoms are as we say they are is beside the point compared to 
whether atomic theory gives us the power of prediction and control.  We can drop the 
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question of whether our descriptions “correspond to reality” because we cannot assess 
this independently and so it is not relevant to us (at least it should not be according to 
Rorty).  
A representationalist might ask if we can really be satisfied by the 
instrumentalist explanation of success that Rorty offers.  Is utility all we really need in 
order to intelligibly explain the success of a description?  In the case of science one 
might argue that a theory’s predictive power is often most intelligibly explained and 
improved by its relative representational accuracy.  In that case, the question of 
whether atoms are as we say they are is not immaterial.  Accuracy (in this sense) may 
not be necessary in order to make successful predictions but it makes successful 
predictions more likely.
18
  We may not be able to transcend our theories in order to 
judge whether they correspond to reality absolutely but does that require us to 
abandon the standard of representational accuracy?  The claim that Newtonian 
astronomy is a more accurate model of the universe compared to Hellenistic astrology 
is not “an empty compliment” even though Newtonian astronomy is not absolutely 
accurate.  The concept of relative accuracy (as a means of explaining relative success) 
is crucial in this context because Rorty tends to define realism in a way that does not 
accommodate it.  As far as he is concerned the purpose of realism (and of theories of 
representation in general) is to provide absolutes.  This assumption lies at the heart of 
Rorty’s polemic against epistemology in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature: 
 
The very idea of “philosophy” as something distinct from “science” would 
make little sense without the Cartesian claim that by turning inward we 
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could find ineluctable truth, and the Kantian claim that this truth imposes 
limits on the possible results of empirical inquiry.  The notion that there 
could be such a thing as “foundations of knowledge” (all knowledge – in 
every field, past, present, and future) or a “theory of representation” (all 
representation, in familiar vocabularies and those not yet dreamed of) 
depends on the assumption that there is some such a priori constraint.
19
  
 
The whole purpose of epistemology, according to Rorty, is to find some form of 
representation that exemplifies the truth and sets the foundation for further inquiry.  In 
so doing, philosophy attempts to provide absolutes that are immune from the 
contingencies of further inquiry.  Epistemology seeks a foundation for inquiry that 
assures us that our minds correspond to reality in an absolute way.  Rorty’s rejection 
of epistemology is motivated by a conviction that there are no such absolutes or 
foundations.  Rorty believes that it is a mistake to assume that there are certain 
representations (or forms of representation) that exemplify what it is like to 
correspond to reality.  Figures like Thomas Kuhn have taught us that we have no idea 
in advance of an innovation where inquiry will take us and that many ideas that have 
formerly been regarded as fundamental to our understanding of reality have been 
changed or abandoned in the course of scientific inquiry.
20
  In the face of ongoing 
intellectual revolution philosophy is not in a position to offer absolutes and the 
growing acceptance of this amongst certain figures working within the tradition of 
analytic philosophy (such as Quine and Putnam) forms the backdrop of Rorty’s 
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reconsideration of the value of epistemology in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.  
 So is the fact that we might not be able to transcend our ongoing inquiries and 
appeal to anything more than the “success which is supposedly explained by [our] 
accuracy” intrinsically a problem?  If we are not able to judge whether our 
representations correspond to reality absolutely must we abandon the standard of 
accuracy?  The fact that we can use relative accuracy as an explanation of success 
suggests that an inability to provide absolutes need not intrinsically be a problem.  We 
could accept that our representations may not correspond to reality absolutely and still 
suppose that they are likely to correspond relatively accurately the more successful 
they are.  It seems difficult to imagine a better way of explaining our relative success 
at negotiating reality.
21
  If reality was a complete mystery to us it seems unlikely that 
we would have much success at all.  Even Rorty’s instrumentalist metaphors of tool-
use are not exempt from implying a standard of adequacy or “fit”.  The usefulness of 
some tools would be particularly hard to explain without the concept of 
representational accuracy.  How else would we explain the success of a map for 
example?  The important question is: why does Rorty believe that philosophy is so 
unsuited to the task of comprehending “the relation between representation and 
represented” in a way that accommodates change and contingency?  What is it that 
commits philosophical realism and representationalism to the kind of absolutism that 
makes contingency and change such serious problems?  It is ironic that Rorty defines 
realism and representationalism in such a rigid way given his belief in our ability to 
re-invent our concepts when they no longer prove useful.  Ultimately we will see that 
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Rorty’s dogmatism on this matter has its roots in his career long adherence to A. N. 
Whitehead’s teaching that all philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato.  I will argue 
this in more detail in the last part of this chapter in which I will begin to show that it is 
not just the notion of relative accuracy that can help us avoid the absolutism that 
Rorty associates with realism.  I would like to show how the notion of “conceptual 
relativity” (or what I like to call “representational relativity”) can be integrated into 
realism.  Before I get to that I would like to consider the extent to which Rorty’s anti-
representationalist pragmatism can be accused of repeating and reinforcing the terms 
that it seeks to dissolve.  I will do this by considering the extent to which Rorty’s 
argument travels a similar path to Kant’s idealism in its handling of our inability to 
judge whether our representations correspond to reality absolutely.  
 
The Epistemic Fallacy 
 
An important claim that can be gleaned from my initial statement of Rorty’s position 
is that the approach that he advocates as an alternative to traditional epistemology 
provides a radical departure from “the notion of knowledge as accuracy of 
representation”.  In order to capture the alternative relationship that he favours Rorty 
often refers to language as a tool rather than a representation.  An incidental way of 
conceiving of this relationship is suggested by a passage in Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations:  
 
How was it possible for thought to deal with the very object itself?  We 
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feel as if by means of it we had caught reality in our net?
 22
 
 
Wittgenstein’s metaphor of the net is an intriguing alternative to Rorty’s mirror or to 
Wittgenstein’s own early treatment of language as a way of picturing the world 
presented in the Tractatus.  Wittgenstein’s metaphor suggests a relationship between 
language and reality that does not depend on a likeness between the two as if language 
is cast over the world in order to “manage” it rather than “reflect” it.  Having made 
this imaginative leap away from what he calls “representationalism” many critics have 
accused Rorty of advocating a kind of idealism.
23
  The philosopher of science Roy 
Bhaskar, for example, has accused Rorty of committing an “epistemic fallacy” in 
which he reduces the real (the subject-independent) to the epistemological (the 
subject-dependent).
24
  Bhaskar argues that even though our current scientific 
understanding and the ontology that it commits us to are historical and social 
products, nevertheless, the intelligibility of the theoretic, experimental and applied 
scientific enterprise commits us to realism.  This is because that enterprise 
presupposes the subject-independent existence of the tendencies and mechanisms that 
it attempts to describe.  Bhaskar argues that Rorty commits a fallacy akin to Hume’s 
reduction of causal laws to constant conjunctions within experience by mistakenly 
reducing the object of scientific inquiry to the subject-dependent dimension.  I would 
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like to explore this criticism while showing that Rorty’s argument has a number of 
things in common with Kant’s idealism (rather than Berkeleyan or post-Kantian 
German idealism).
25
  Doing so will show the extent to which Rorty repeats and 
reinforces the problems that he seeks to dissolve.  
Rorty does not ontologically reduce the real to the epistemological.
26
  Rorty’s 
position is designed to caution us against assuring ourselves that we can represent 
reality within the epistemological sphere.  In a paper of 1980 entitled “Nineteenth-
Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism” Rorty openly describes 
similarities between his view and those of idealists.  Rorty uses the rhetoric of 
idealism in the course of denying that language corresponds to an independent reality: 
 
“Thus one is really comparing two descriptions of a thing rather than a 
description with the thing-in-itself”.27 
 
Rorty rhetorically deploys the appearance-reality distinction despite the fact that it 
comes from the very representationalist tradition that his anti-representationalist 
approach is intended to subvert.  Rorty’s purpose in treating language as a tool rather 
than as a representation is precisely to rid us of this kind of rhetoric and to discourage 
us from taking the question of our representational capability seriously.  Nevertheless, 
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as the above quote shows, Rorty often uses the rhetoric of representation. Rorty’s use 
of the concept of description raises the question of how indispensable the notion of 
representation is to his (and our) understanding of the various purposes of linguistic 
communication.  In the course of this chapter we will see how Rorty continues to rely 
on the concept of representation in the course of articulating his anti-
representationalist position.  The reason why a comparison between Rorty’s view and 
those of idealists is useful is because it emphasises how his anti-representationalism 
actually draws on the representationalist scepticism that it is intended to dissolve. 
To begin my comparison between Rorty’s and Kant’s approaches I will begin 
by considering the reasoning behind Kant’s appeal to the a priori as a corrective to the 
model of intuition based empirical knowledge.  This will allow us to appreciate Kant’s 
influence on those – like Rorty – who criticize the naivety of attempts to reduce the 
subject’s knowledge to a body of mimetic “mirror-like” empirical representations. 
Kant’s insistence on the importance of a priori rules that cannot be established by 
empirical intuition is echoed by Rorty’s appeal to language as the organizing principle 
of human thought.  As indicated in the above quote, Rorty’s rejection of our claims to 
“mirror-like” representational objectivity can also be shown to bear strong similarities 
to Kant’s Copernican Revolution in epistemology because it is motivated by the 
problem that we cannot compare our concepts to reality “as it is in-itself”.  
Understanding Rorty’s association of the doctrine of realism with the need for such a 
neutral “God’s-Eye” view of reality (to use Hilary Putnam’s phrase) is crucial to 
understanding his rejection of realism.  According to Rorty, without such a God’s-Eye 
view of reality realism is not a viable option.  If we are not able to claim that our 
representations correspond to reality absolutely then we must abandon realism.  
  37  
Understanding this dogmatic aspect of Rorty’s rejection of realism is also crucial 
because it is a major weakness of his argument.  After all, a representation need not 
correspond to reality in this absolute sense in order to be realistic.  Having established 
a picture of the similarities between Kant’s and Rorty’s responses to our lack of a 
God’s-Eye view of reality I will then look more closely at the philosophical 
presuppositions that lead Rorty to believe that his rejection of realism is necessary.  As 
we shall see, they arise from his identification of realism and representationalism with 
terms that Plato set out.  
Roy Bhaskar writes that the tendency to commit the epistemic fallacy springs 
from a perceived need for what he calls a “justificationist epistemology”.  
Epistemologies of this kind are characterized by the tendency to appeal to the subject-
dependent “epistemological” dimension as a source of justification for our 
knowledge.
28
  Such a move effaces the nature of reality as a source of justification and 
substitutes a more readily available source.  In Rorty’s case, justification is defined as 
an agreement between people rather than an agreement between our beliefs and 
reality.  He argues that knowledge should be treated as a collection of propositions 
related through rational argument rather than a collection of representations related to 
reality through a mechanism of correspondence: 
 
A claim to knowledge is a claim to have justified belief, and it is rarely the 
case that we appeal to the proper functioning of our organism as a 
justification.  Granted that we sometimes justify a belief by saying, for 
example, “I have good eyes,” why should we think that [such appeals] 
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could tell us about the logical relations between propositions?
29
  
 
Rorty insists that we commit an error when we try to identify justification with a 
mechanism of correspondence.  For him, justification is a matter of citing propositions 
in support of other propositions.  It is a mistake to imagine that those propositions can 
be justified by their supposed correspondence to reality.  As we have seen, Rorty 
doubts that the notion of correspondence makes sense given that our linguistic system 
does not “mirror” reality.   
 For realists like Roy Bhaskar, the restriction of justification to the subject-
dependent sphere is a mistake.  Such epistemological sources as reason and 
experience cannot replace the nature of reality as the justification for our beliefs.  
From a realist perspective it is possible to see the debate between rationalists and 
empiricists as a spurious dispute over what should replace reality as the justification 
for our beliefs.  Broadly put, the rationalists of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries held that the uncertainty involved in seeking empirical confirmation for our 
knowledge claims could be circumvented by justifying claims according to rational 
principles and that the intuitive, analytic and deductive powers of reason were 
sufficient to establish knowledge.  According to empiricists like Locke and Hume, 
however, the rationalist method is inadequate.  Rationality may allow us to reason 
according to principles that exist separately from experience but, according to the 
empiricists, only experience can provide justification for our beliefs.  From the 
perspective of realists like Roy Bhaskar it is from out of this misguided dispute over 
whether reason or experience can provide sufficient justification for our knowledge 
claims that Immanuel Kant’s equally misguided synthesis of the two emerged.  
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In the introduction to his Critique of Pure Reason Kant states - in the manner 
of an empiricist - that all knowledge claims must refer to experience.  He also makes 
it plain that he shares the rationalist aim of establishing strict necessity and 
universality for those claims.
30
  Kant states that we must look to a source other than 
our immediate experience for appropriate grounds for certainty because any attempt to 
derive universal and necessary principles from contingent empirical experiences is 
insufficient to establish the strictness of those principles.  From our experience we can 
only say that “as far as we have observed until now, no exception is to be found to this 
or that rule” (CPR B 3).  Our contingent experience can never confirm the necessity 
and universality of any knowledge claim and so in order to maintain the pursuit of an 
appropriate source of empirical justification for those claims Kant is faced with the 
challenge of positing necessary and universal principles that are not derived from 
sensory intuitions but which still refer to the empirical world.  To satisfy this 
requirement Kant enlarges his concept of experience beyond a manifold of contingent 
empirical intuitions to include actively constituting and necessary sense-making 
principles that are supplied a priori.  Kant claims that there are certain necessary a 
priori principles that our experience cannot do without because they make experience 
possible in the first place.  For example, in ‘The Transcendental Aesthetic’ Kant 
argues that the apprehension of time requires the atomisation and synthesis of a 
temporally undetermined sensory manifold into a chain of successive appearances 
(CPR A 20/B 34). 
 
Given that the matter of sensation provides no determinate 
temporal order for appearances there must be an a priori rule that orders them.  Kant 
claims that the principle of cause and effect provides such a rule.  The order of 
                                                          
30
 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Hackett: 1996), A 1/ B1. All 
further references are given in the text at CPR with marginal A and B numbers. 
  40  
appearances is determined so that what occurs happens as an effect of a preceding 
occurrence (CPR 198-199/B 243-244).  Kant's solution to the problem of appealing to 
the empirical as a basis for certainty is to install the a priori in experience.  The a 
priori actively constitutes experience so that it contains a necessary order.  The 
subject-dependent dimension can then play its role as a substitute for the real subject-
independent object of our knowledge claims.   
Locke’s and Hume’s empiricist epistemologies comprise explanations that 
begin with the subject’s sensory input.  Reality impresses itself on the subject and the 
way that those impressions represent reality to the subject sets the conditions for the 
subject’s knowledge.  Kant's brand of empiricism, on the other hand, introduces 
standards of a priori conceptual determination that are supplied by the subject.  
Contrary to Locke’s account, our subjectivity is not a tabula rasa upon which reality 
imprints itself; nor is the empirical realm merely a Humean succession of atomistic 
and contingently related sense-impressions.  The inadequacy of Hume’s account of 
the empirical as a source of certainty leads Kant to infer that the subject’s 
understanding is not given to it solely by its intuited sensory input.  Kant’s idealism is 
predicated on the assumption that sensory intuition is not enough and that we must 
employ necessary and universal rules that are supplied a priori.  From Richard 
Rorty’s perspective, the idea that a transcendental deduction is capable of setting out 
necessary and universal conditions of possible knowledge is an example of that wider 
picture which “holds traditional philosophy captive” because it models the 
understanding on an innate and unchanging psychological mechanism.  It supposes 
that there is a realm of fixed “concepts” that constitute the mind and form necessary 
truths that can be studied as the foundations of knowledge.  Rorty regards Quine’s 
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attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction as fatal to this attempt to regard knowledge 
as having any such conceptual foundations.  Nevertheless, a precursor of Rorty’s 
rejection of our claims to representational objectivity can be seen in Kant’s idealism 
because Kant’s appeal to a priori rules involves a challenge to the assumption that the 
content of our minds corresponds to reality “as it is in itself”.  
Kant's challenge to the identification of the source of our knowledge with an 
impression or intuition based empiricism is upheld by Rorty in his own criticism of 
Locke.  The same concept of representation that Rorty’s metaphor of the mirror 
captures is applied in Locke’s metaphor of the mind as a blank canvas upon which the 
world makes impressions of itself.  These metaphors associate the notion of sensory 
experience with a mimetic kind of intuition and so make the domain of our sensory 
experience an apt candidate for a source of “mirror-like” representation.  On this view 
the senses are thought to convey knowledge of reality to the extent that they produce 
representations that are accurate likenesses of reality.  Locke states that the mind is 
partly made up of a set of “ideas” that objectively represent reality by virtue of its 
ability to intuit a number of qualities that are identical to the way that world really is.  
Some features of our empirical intuitions mirror the world: 
 
Qualities thus considered in bodies are: 
First, such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in what state soever it 
be; […]  These I call original or primary qualities of body; which I think 
we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, 
figure, motion or rest, and number.  […] the ideas of primary qualities of 
bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the 
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bodies themselves; […] they may be called real qualities, because they 
really exist in those bodies.
31
  
 
Kant’s response to such intuition based empirical explanations of cognition is put 
succinctly in the first Critique: “The understanding cannot intuit anything, and the 
senses cannot think anything.  Only from their union can cognition arise” (CPR A51-
52/B 75-76).  According to Kant’s description the “merely empirical” is inadequate as 
a source of cognition because it lacks the organising structure that the a priori 
provides.  The subject’s understanding cannot be adequately explained with reference 
to the kind of intuited mimetic mirror-like representations that Locke describes.   
 Rorty’s own argument against Locke in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 
takes its lead from Wilfred Sellars’ approach to the philosophy of language.32  In his 
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind Sellars attacks the kind of foundational 
empiricism that Locke proposes in the Essay for effacing the linguistic context that 
gives our words sense.  Locke attempted to do this by reducing the import of such 
words to empirical intuitions (“ideas” in Lockean terms).  Sellars argues that thinkers 
such as Locke overlook the role that our linguistic rules play when it comes to 
determining our thought and that our experience would mean little to us without the 
context that our language provides.  According to Rorty this insight should encourage 
us to entirely dissociate our language from any realist representational meaning.  
Rorty argues that Locke’s theory of ideas effaces the linguistic rules that shape our 
thought and mistakenly models cognition on a mirror.  Just as Kant argues that the 
subject’s bare sensory input is inchoate and undetermined until an intellectual 
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operation orders it in time and space so Rorty argues that we should regard the 
subject’s experience as similarly inchoate without the rules that our language 
provides.  For Rorty, the subject’s sensory interaction with the world is no more than a 
“blind impress” much like a pre-conceptual intuition from Kant’s “Transcendental 
Aesthetic”.33  It is merely a brute and inchoate interface with an ineffable reality.  
Rorty’s use of Sellars’ psychological nominalism as a replacement for realism makes 
his position seem like an analogue of Kant’s idealism.  Language takes on the role of 
the a priori as the organising force in our cognition and the question of whether our 
thought corresponds to the intrinsic nature of reality is put aside. 
We have seen how, from Rorty’s perspective, Kant’s epistemology is part of 
that wider picture that “holds traditional philosophy captive” because it attempts to 
model the subject’s understanding on an innate and unchanging conceptual 
mechanism (rather than on language).
34
  However, the nature of Kant’s account of 
cognition makes it difficult to apply the mirror metaphor to his epistemology.  
Crucially, Kant draws a distinction between the way the world appears to the subject 
and the way things are in-themselves and he eschews the need to assure the subject 
that the a priori rules that structure its cognition correspond to such an independent 
reality.  For Kant, the mind should not be modelled on a mirror because the 
transcendental subject’s a priori norms do not possess the kind of mirror-like 
objectivity that Locke’s notion of ideas is deemed to possess.  They replace such 
mimetic objectivity with an objectivity that is determined by a rule-like a priori 
necessity and universality.  Kant’s insists that it is enough for our a priori epistemic 
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norms to be inescapable rules.  They do not have to be regarded as an accurate 
representation of a mind-independent reality.  Having rejected rationalist metaphysics 
Kant eschews the question of whether our thought corresponds to reality “as it is in 
itself”.  Such a reality remains a metaphysical notion that is beyond our epistemic 
remit.  On Kant's account, the world as it is independently of us is a closed book.  Our 
understanding is determined separately from any ability of the mind to accurately 
reflect reality’s intrinsic nature.  
Realist empiricisms uphold the authority of an independent reality and give 
the subject’s cognitions their justification by allocating them a source in experience.  
For Locke, the mind/mirror is held up to reality in order to generate accurate empirical 
intuitions and the capacity of the real qualities or properties of the world to be intuited 
in our empirical “ideas” provides us with accurate knowledge of reality.  Locke argues 
that rationalists pay too high a price for the strategy that they employ in their appeal to 
innate ideas because they grant those ideas an authority that should be granted alone 
to empirical intuition.  He insists that the subject has knowledge that can be explained 
and justified by describing its source in experience.  Rorty’s response to such 
representationalism is to follow Kant by denying its explanatory force: 
 
The anti-representationalist is quite willing to grant that our language, like 
our bodies, has been shaped by the environment we live in.  Indeed, he or 
she insists on this point – the point that our minds or our language could 
not (as the representationalist skeptic fears) be “out of touch with reality” 
any more than our bodies could.  What he or she denies is that it is 
explanatorily useful to pick and choose among the contents of our minds 
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or our language and say that this or that item “corresponds to” or 
“represents” the environment in a way that some other item does not.35 
 
Rorty repeats Kant’s denial that the practice of explaining “the contents of our minds 
or our language” can be carried out by describing its correspondence to an 
independent reality.  Rorty does not reduce reality to the contents of our minds or our 
language.  He merely positions himself against those who presume that a 
correspondence between our language and an independent reality exists and against 
epistemologists whose explanations try to provide such assurance.  
Kant and Rorty make a similar epistemological demarcation between “our 
minds or our language” and a reality that is independent of them.  We commit an error 
when we try to assure ourselves of our ability to accurately represent such a reality.  
Rorty’s motivation for offering a pragmatist “justificationist epistemology” is not to 
ontologically reduce the real to the epistemological.  Rorty’s metaphorical description 
of language as a tool depends on the real existence of whatever the tool is used on.  
Rorty simply refuses to entertain the possibility that any representational dimension 
pertains to those tools. Rorty is deaf to the epistemic fallacy that Roy Bhaskar accuses 
him of because his anti-representationalism holds that our language is not a means of 
representing reality and so the way reality is need have no bearing on our linguistic 
behaviour.  Rorty’s argument is designed to challenge what he sees as the kind of 
justificationist explanations that realists propose.  According to Rorty, realists commit 
a fallacy by trying to identify some part of our linguistic practice with an absolutely 
accurate representation of reality.  It is as part of a struggle against such absolutism 
that Rorty takes an anti-representationalist stance by denying that any of our linguistic 
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practices represent reality. 
Bhaskar puts Rorty’s refusal to entertain realism down to his lack of a 
“philosophical ontology” and defines such ontology as necessary to the scientific 
enterprise.  Such ontology does no more than describe reality as consisting of real 
subject-independent tendencies and mechanisms that are distinct from our current 
conception of those tendencies and mechanisms.
36
  According to Bhaskar, the 
intelligibility of the scientific enterprise would be lost if it was not understood as an 
attempt to accurately represent such a subject-independent reality.  For Rorty there is 
no possibility of our representing a subject-independent reality.  As we saw above, his 
paper of 1980 entitled “Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century 
Textualism” draws explicit parallels between his position and those of idealists.  In 
that paper Rorty describes similarities between Idealism and Textualism while 
distancing himself from any literal interpretation of the claim that “there is nothing 
outside the text”: 
 
The only force of saying that texts do not refer to nontexts is just the old 
pragmatist chestnut that any specification of a referent is going to be in 
some vocabulary.  Thus one is really comparing two descriptions of a 
thing rather than a description with the thing-in-itself. This chestnut, in 
turn, is just an expanded form of Kant’s slogan that “Intuitions without 
concepts are blind,” which, in turn, was just a sophisticated restatement of 
Berkeley’s ingenuous remark that “nothing can be like an idea except an 
idea.” […] Textualism has nothing to add to this claim except a new 
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misleading image – the image of the world as consisting of everything 
written in all the vocabularies used so far.
37
 
 
Rorty does not deny the existence of a subject-independent reality but he does claim 
that our inability to transcend our representations and judge whether they correspond 
to reality “as it is in itself” should lead us to avoid using the model of representation 
when it comes to describing the relationship that our language has to reality.  Rather 
than dissolve the problem of scepticism Rorty repeats and reinforces it as a reason to 
reject realism and representationalism.
38
  
Rorty’s wholesale rejection of the model of representation is certainly an 
extraordinary response to the idea that we cannot assure ourselves that our 
representations mirror reality “as it is in-itself”.  As I have stated, this inability is not 
intrinsically a problem because we can accept that a representation need not be 
absolutely identical to reality in order correspond to reality.  With this in mind I would 
like to further explore the reasons why Rorty believes that the lack of an absolute 
God’s-Eye view of reality is a problem and that his anti-representationalist response is 
necessary.  As we shall see, those reasons are based on a very narrow philosophical 
understanding of what realism requires.  
 
Footnotes to Plato 
 
Consistently throughout his writing Rorty adheres to A. N. Whitehead’s famous claim 
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that we cannot properly call a form of inquiry “philosophical” that fails to draw on 
some of the terms and oppositions that Plato made canonical.
39
  All philosophy is, 
according to Whitehead’s well known dictum, a series of footnotes to Plato. 
Accordingly, Rorty often states that philosophy has its own specific set of terms 
which it inherited from the ancient Greeks (most notably Plato) and which commits it 
to a set of dogmatic and interrelated binary oppositions.
40
  They include the 
oppositions between the real and the apparent, the absolute and the relative, the 
essential and the contingent, the found and the made and the object and the subject.  
According to Rorty, these oppositions maintain the set of special and supposedly 
perennial metaphysical and epistemological problems that form the philosopher’s area 
of concern and expertise.  Crucially, they define realism as the demand for an absolute 
conception of reality that makes appearances subject to scepticism.  It is precisely this 
problem that Rorty attempts to overcome by developing his form of pragmatism.  His 
anti-representationalism is crucial to that project because treating language as a tool 
rather than as a representation is meant to rid us of the need to compare our contingent 
language to a something more absolute.  Rorty’s attitude to philosophy and his anti-
representationalist stance can thus be traced back to this rigidly dogmatic and 
unfavourable account of what realism demands.  
Rorty’s presuppositions about what realism and representationalism demand are 
in evidence in his “Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism”.  
Opposing the supposed objectivity of scientific methodology Rorty writes: 
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[…] the idea of method presupposes that of a privileged vocabulary, the 
vocabulary which gets to the essence of the object, the one which 
expresses the properties which it has in itself as opposed to those which 
we read into it.
41
 
 
Rorty contrasts the different vocabularies that are used by different fields of inquiry 
and asserts that in order to be realist about any particular one it is necessary to deny 
the realism of the others.  The preferred vocabulary must be considered to represent 
the properties that things have essentially, intrinsically and in themselves as opposed 
to the properties that are assigned by other vocabularies (those that we merely “read 
into” things).  This is not a contrast between essential and non-essential properties 
where non-essential properties may exist alongside essential properties.  Rorty 
correlates the contrast between essential and non-essential properties with an 
opposition between reality and appearances.  According to him, the representationalist 
realist is committed to such a correlation by their need to privilege their particular 
vocabulary.  They must regard their vocabulary as the one that captures the way things 
are at the expense of the realism of other vocabularies.  Rorty identifies what he 
considers to be a Platonic yearning for a metaphysical absolute in attempts to assert 
the representational truth of any of our linguistic practices, and he associates 
representational realism with a kind of essentialist metaphysical reductionism.  
 Rorty regards his philosophical outlook as the culmination of a holist and 
pragmatist trend in contemporary analytic philosophy that has come to undermine the 
kind of “metaphysical, reductionist needs” that he believes realists and 
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representationalists cleave to:
 42
 
 
The usual conception, since Plato, has been that at most one among the 
various vocabularies we use mirrors reality, and that the others are at best 
“heuristic” or “suggestive”.43 
 
Just as Plato considered the object of knowledge to be a realm of essential 
metaphysical truth that stands apart from the vagaries of appearance so Rorty 
construes the intended object of realist representation to be an essential reality that 
stands apart from the vagaries of representation.  This goal is unfeasible given the 
diverse nature of our forms of description and so Rorty concludes that the only viable 
solution is to deny the representational nature of those forms of description.  In his 
paper “Non-Reductive Physicalism”, for example, Rorty claims that his anti-
representationalist pragmatism is the best way to approach the apparent ontological 
inconsistency involved in using both physical and folk-psychological language 
because by treating the two forms of description as tools (rather than as 
representations) we can avoid the realist need to assert the exclusive truth of only one 
of them.
44
  By denying the representational nature of these forms of description we 
can avoid the need for reduction.  We can eschew what Rorty regards as the 
representational realist’s “attempt to find a single language sufficient to state all the 
truths there are to state”.45  Rorty believes that his anti-representationalist pragmatism 
is the only way to avoid having to gratify what he perceives to be the realist’s need for 
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reduction.  
 Rorty never considers the possibility that the need for a “single language to 
state all the truths there are to state” could be denied by realists.  He seems to assume 
that any deviation from that requirement would lead to an ontology that would be 
intolerable to the realist.  Rorty thereby assumes that in order to be considered a 
realistic representation of its referent a form of description must maintain that its 
referent is nothing but whatever that form of description says that it is.  The realist 
must identify reality with a particular representation of it to the exclusion of other 
possible representations.  On this view, having different ways to describe the same 
referent would entail an inconsistent ontology because it would represent that referent 
as being nothing but one thing at the same time as being nothing but another.
46
  
However, it is not necessary for a realist to hold such a reductionist view.  It is 
possible to maintain that we can realistically represent the same referent in different 
ways depending on the form of representation that we use.  According to this 
“representational relativism” it is unnecessary to read a problematic ontology into our 
use of different forms of representation.  To use Rorty’s metaphor against him, realists 
could conceive of reality as having numerous sets of apparent “joints” for our 
language to “cut at” and could deny that our inability to reduce them to a single set is 
any reason to deny the realism of those representations.  Unfortunately, Rorty assumes 
that the realist must believe that we can only have one exclusive form of realist 
representation and that the rest of our representations must be treated as false or “mere 
appearance”.  
 In a number of places Rorty states that the appropriateness of different forms 
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of description depends on the context in which an object is described.  For example, 
in the introduction to his Essays on Heidegger and Others he asserts “the 
irreducibility of house descriptions to timber descriptions, or of animal descriptions to 
cell descriptions” and in his “Non-Reductive Physicalism” he deploys a distinction 
between micro-structural and macro-structural descriptions of the brain.
47
  Yet, he also 
holds philosophical presuppositions that rule out the possibility that this thesis of 
representational relativity could be held by realists.  This approach is spelled out, for 
example, in his paper “A World Without Substances or Essences”.  In it he continues 
to sanction the concept of description and argues that language describes the world in 
a number of contingent ways.  But he also presents a stark choice between the 
“Platonic quest” to “get behind appearances to the intrinsic nature of things” and his 
own quest to persuade us that “language is not a medium of representation”.48  He 
seems to want to articulate a non-reductive form of representationalism but is 
constrained by a wish not to be led by the different ways that language is capable of 
describing things into the Platonic assertion that they are artificial and fail to represent 
the world as it really is.  Rorty’s unpreparedness to contemplate a form of 
representationalism due to this reductionist dogma leads him into the contradictory 
position of simultaneously asserting the descriptive nature of language while denying 
its representational nature.  
 In “A World Without Substances or Essences” Plato’s frustration at the 
supposed impossibility of attaining knowledge of the essential or intrinsic nature of 
things by means of their appearance is only matched by Rorty’s enthusiasm for an 
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equivalent impossibility that he believes applies to our forms of description.  
According to Rorty, our ability to describe things in different ways means that those 
things cannot be thought to have any essential or intrinsic properties and provides 
sufficient reason to believe that language is not a means of representation in any case 
but merely a collection of behavioural rules that serve as useful tools for various 
purposes.  Rorty’s anti-representationalist pragmatism has the effect of flattening the 
world out into a single plane of optional descriptions (or “tools”) by failing to 
acknowledge that in many cases our descriptions vary because the world can be 
realistically represented along different planes.  The stark choice that Rorty offers 
between his anti-representationalism and the “Platonic quest” to pare our descriptions 
of things down to single, essential ones is a spurious choice.  On the contrary, we can 
represent things in numerous ways and still hold those representations to be realistic.  
For example, we can represent a body of mercury as a collection of atoms from a 
microscopic perspective or as a single liquid from a macroscopic perspective.  
Representing mercury in one way does not make the other representation of it false or 
a “mere appearance”.  The microscopic perspective may be more accurate in the sense 
of being more finely grained but that does not make the macroscopic perspective 
false.  They are both realistic but simply represent their object(s) in different ways.  
They can both be thought to represent the same reality but from different perspectives.  
They may not be realistic in Rorty’s absolute sense but it is precisely that definition of 
realism that Rorty agrees that we need to overcome.  The fact that we describe the 
world in different ways “for different human purposes” does not oblige us to deny the 
realism of those descriptions.  It is also not a reason to deny that things have 
properties that are essential or intrinsic to them.  We can hold that things (like 
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mercury) have properties without which they would not be what they are and still 
maintain that we need a number of different ways to describe what they are.
49
  
 The idea that a description of reality is defined by a set of contingent 
anatomical rules is of course familiar from W.V.O. Quine’s “Ontological Relativity”.  
To a large extent Quine represents the holist and pragmatist trend in twentieth-century 
analytic philosophy that Rorty believes his own anti-representationalist pragmatism 
perfects.  The distinctive feature of Rorty’s reading of that trend is his insistence that 
the relativistic and holist thesis that Quine describes prevents us from making any 
assertion of the realism of our descriptions.  This is evident from Rorty’s criticism of 
Quine.  Thus, in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature Rorty castigates the later Quine 
for falling prey to the kind of metaphysical, reductionist needs that we have seen 
Rorty associate with realism.  For example, in the course of dismissing the language 
of intentional psychology Quine writes: 
 
If we are limning the true and ultimate structure of reality, the canonical 
scheme for us is the austere scheme that knows no quotation but direct 
quotation and no propositional attitudes but only the physical constitutions 
and behavior of organisms.
50
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Quine privileges the language of physics and contradicts his own claim from “Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism” that we cannot attach such special status to any of the 
“posits” that we use to describe the world.  Rorty responds as follows: 
 
Why do the Naturwissenschaften limn reality while the 
Geisteswissenschaften merely enable us to cope with it?  What is it that 
sets them apart, given that we no longer think of any sort of statement 
having a privileged epistemological status, but of all statements as 
working together for the good of the race in that process of gradual 
holistic adjustment made famous by “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”?51 
 
Rorty is offended by Quine’s attempt to privilege the language of physics as if there 
was something “ontologically disreputable” about beliefs and intentions and insists 
that if Quine held consistently to the holist and pragmatist stance advocated in “Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism” there would be no way that he could claim that physics is 
uniquely realistic.
52
  The justification for our use of physics would be held to be on a 
par with the justification for our use of any other language.  Rorty insists that being a 
consistent Quinean holist and pragmatist means that we have no way of knowing 
which of our vocabularies are especially realistic and so we must be prepared to “take 
irreducibility in our stride” and “judge each vocabulary on pragmatic or aesthetic 
grounds” rather than on the grounds that they are realistic.53  Rather than take the 
irreducibility of our language to mean that reality is not exhaustively represented by 
any one description, Rorty argues that the irreducibility of our language means that 
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we should entirely give up on the idea that we can realistically represent reality at all.   
 Rorty’s criticism of realism and representationalism is based on a combination 
of his “metaphysical, reductionist” conception of their approach and an aversion 
towards attempts to pare our language down to fit such reduction.  Rorty argues that 
his anti-realist pragmatism or “anti-representationalism” is the only viable stance to 
take because we have no idea which of our terms cut at the intrinsic and essential 
joints in reality and which do not.  The fact that Rorty is unprepared to acknowledge 
that it is unnecessary to take such a reductionist and absolutist approach to realism 
and representationalism means that his own philosophical stance is itself decisively 
defined by that reductionism and absolutism.  His anti-representationalism, in other 
words, actually mirrors the representationalist scepticism that he wishes to dissolve 
and he ends up claiming that our language has no representational relationship to 
reality at all.  There are moments in his writing, and particularly in Philosophy and the 
Mirror and Nature, when he does acknowledge that it is unnecessary to take such a 
reductionist view of representation.  For example, discussing Quine’s ontological 
relativism Rorty writes:  
 
“[...] talk about rabbit-stages and talk about rabbits are talk about the same 
things (in different ways)”.54 
 
But Rorty, at the same time dismisses this kind of acknowledgment as merely 
“common-sensical and philosophically uninteresting” because it goes against the grain 
of philosophy’s self-image as an arbiter of the absolute realism of our 
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representations.
55
  The whole thrust of Rorty’s argument in Philosophy and the Mirror 
and Nature is aimed at demonstrating that as soon as we start to therapeutically 
relieve our metaphysical, reductionist needs we begin to rid ourselves of the need for 
a separate discourse that stands over all other discourses and passes judgment on their 
absolute realism.  Rather than give up the ghost after writing Philosophy and the 
Mirror and Nature, however, Rorty uses that reductionist concept of realism as an 
object of satire and as a justification that allows him to propose an alternative form of 
philosophy that positively denies the realist and representational nature of our 
relationship to the world. 
 Rorty’s anti-realist and anti-representationalist stance arises from a misguided 
belief that realists are compelled to argue that we need a single and exclusive form of 
representation to capture reality.  According to Rorty, realists are compelled to argue 
that one exclusive form of representation must capture the way reality is “in-itself” at 
the expense of the realism of all other forms of representation.  He fails to appreciate 
that realists do not have to absolutely identify reality with a particular representation 
of it and nor do they have to fall prey to an invidious distinction between reality and 
the various ways that it “appears”.  In other words, the problems posed by the binary 
oppositions of Western metaphysics are reason to abandon those oppositions but are 
not reason to abandon the model of representation itself.  The virtue of Roy Bhaskar’s 
realism, for example, is its acknowledgement that the intelligibility of the scientific 
enterprise rests on a distinction between the subject-independent reality that science 
seeks to represent and the various ways that science represents that reality.  We need 
not associate realism with the kind of absolutism and reductionism that Rorty 
associates it with and the distinction between reality and our representations need not 
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involve the veil-of-appearances scepticism that he insists that it must.  Rorty takes our 
inability to assure ourselves that any of our descriptions of the world capture reality 
“absolutely” as a reason to abandon realism and representationalism.   
 In the next chapter I would like to introduce an example of a less absolutist 
form of realism.  I will do this by giving an account of the developments that took 
place in Nietzsche’s thought regarding the appearance-reality distinction.  This will 
allow us to further expand our notion of what realism and representationalism entail 
beyond the narrow terms that Rorty offers.  Nietzsche came to conceive of a form of 
realism that rejects the same Platonic absolutism that Rorty rejects.  This is a form of 
realism that starkly contrasts the earlier scepticism of the easy “On Truth and Lies in a 
Non-Moral Sense” that Rorty takes inspiration from.  I will also draw parallels 
between this early essay and the position that Quine puts forward in “Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism”.  This will allow us to show that Rorty’s restriction of realism to a form 
of reductionism and absolutism places strain on his attempt to align Donald 
Davidson’s position with his own.  
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Chapter 2 - More Eyes, Different Eyes. 
 
From Nietzsche’s Early Non-Correspondence Theory of Truth to the Realism of 
Twilight of the Idols 
 
According to Richard Rorty, the representational truth of our linguistic practices is not 
something that should concern us because when we use language our purpose is not to 
represent anything.  This is why he denies that an objective subject-independent 
reality has any relevance when it comes to justifying our linguistic behaviour.  
Returning to Wittgenstein’s suggestive metaphor, the relationship between language 
and the world that Rorty conceives of is one in which the world is caught in a net 
rather than represented.  Rorty argues that our linguistic conventions are justified by 
their usefulness alone and that the concept of representation is of little use when it 
comes to appreciating the relationship that our behavioural rules have to the world 
that they are employed to cope with.  In the last chapter my exploration of the 
similarities between Kant and Rorty’s arguments revealed similarities between their 
challenges to our “mirror-like” representational objectivity.  In this chapter I would 
like to explore other historical precedents for Rorty’s thought by proposing that 
another way of appreciating his position is to consider the similarities and differences 
between his and Nietzsche’s arguments.  With this in mind I would like to challenge 
Rorty’s frequent attempts to claim Nietzsche as an ally by describing how Nietzsche 
rejected the kind of anti-realist stance that Rorty takes and how he overcame an early 
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“representationalist scepticism” through the development of a form of empirical 
realism that is reminiscent of W.V.O. Quine’s position in “Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism”.  In this way we will see how Rorty’s reading of Nietzsche’s position 
draws on some early idealist-influenced rhetoric that Nietzsche actually tried to leave 
behind.    
As Maudemaire Clark has pointed out, in his early essay “On Truth and Lies in 
a Nonmoral Sense” Nietzsche uses one conception of true representation that 
conforms to the kind of absolute “mirror-like” objectivity that Rorty identifies with 
realism.
56
  Nietzsche calls such truth “pure knowledge” or “the correct perception” in 
order to capture a sense of its imagined perfection.
57
  The problem, for Nietzsche, is 
that we are not capable of such objectivity and the identification of our understanding 
with this conception of true representation involves a serious misunderstanding:  
 
[...] how miserable, how shadowy and transient, how aimless and arbitrary 
the human intellect looks within nature.  […] it is human, and only its 
possessor and begetter takes it so solemnly – as though the world’s axis 
turned within it.
58
 
 
Nietzsche subjects the human intellect to a naturalist treatment that questions its 
ability to “mirror” reality.  He thereby, Rorty notes, offers a misanthropic description 
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of us as wretched creatures that are “content to receive stimuli and, as it were, to 
engage in a groping game on the backs of things”. 59  It is a description that could 
uncharitably be thought to epitomize Rorty’s own unedifying portrait of us as 
organisms that merely emit “marks and noises”.  Rorty would no doubt defend 
himself by reminding us that we should not take his portrayal of us too seriously as if 
it captured the real, intrinsic and essential truth about us.  The problem is that such a 
defence only underscores an irony in his disapproval of reductionist philosophy 
because his own stark physicalist and anti-representationalist description of us 
involves a similar act of reduction.
60
   
 In “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”, Nietzsche satirizes our 
pretention to objectivity by describing a disjunction in the relationship between the 
human subject and reality that undermines the kind of mimetic conveyance of likeness 
that realist empiricists attribute to our experience.  He denies that the subject’s 
experience resembles reality and describes the perceptual mechanism as a chain of 
non-identical types of representation that leaves the nature of reality mysterious.  The 
term “metaphor” is used by Nietzsche in an unusual psycho-physiological sense to 
mean perceptual representations as well as figurative linguistic phrases: 
 
To begin with, a nerve stimulus is transferred into an image: first 
metaphor.  The image, in turn, is imitated in a sound: second metaphor.  
And each time there is a complete overleaping of one sphere, right into the 
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middle of an entirely new and different one.  […] the mysterious X of the 
thing in itself first appears as a nerve stimulus, then as an image, and 
finally as a sound.
61
 
  
Nietzsche argues that if our empirical reports require the transmission of a chain of 
unmirror-like representations (or “metaphors”) then those reports do not accurately 
reflect the reality that forms the first link in the chain.  It is on the basis of this early 
“artist metaphysic” (to coin a phrase) that Nietzsche makes the definitively sceptical 
claim that “we possess nothing but metaphors for things – metaphors which 
correspond in no way to the original entities.”62  This scepticism allows Nietzsche to 
formulate his famous phrase: “Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are 
illusions.”63  If “the correct perception” is impossible then we cannot avoid falsifying 
reality and what we take to be a representation of reality is a misrepresentation of it.  
In Rorty’s terms, the Nietzsche of “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” is a 
representationalist sceptic rather than an anti-representationalist.  
It was from Schopenhauer that Nietzsche inherited his early idealist 
epistemological leanings rather than from a direct encounter with Kant’s first 
Critique.
64
   Nevertheless, Nietzsche agrees with Kant that our understanding does not 
originate in unmediated mimetic empirical experiences because our sensory input 
does not provide us with the necessary rules for our understanding.  In “On Truth and 
Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” Nietzsche declares his Kantian heritage clearly by offering 
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a naturalised version of Kant’s “Transcendental Aesthetic” in which he states that the 
form of our empirical experience is not given by a bare empirical input by an a priori 
cognitive structure:  
  
[…] everything marvellous about the laws of nature, everything that quite 
astonishes us therein and seems to demand our explanation, everything 
that might lead us to distrust idealism: all this is completely and solely 
contained within the mathematical strictness and inviolability of our 
representations of time and space. But we produce these representations in 
and from ourselves with the same necessity with which the spider spins 
[...] the artistic process of metaphor formation with which every sensation 
begins in us already presupposes these forms and thus occurs within 
them.
65
 
 
For the Nietzsche of “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”, the empirical is 
imbued with a naturalised and merely subjectively human form of the a priori.  The 
early Nietzsche is an empiricist in a “representationalist sceptic” sense.  He is 
certainly not a Lockean or Aristotelian realist empiricist.  Aside from his naturalised 
“Transcendental Aesthetic” our conceptual norms are described by Nietzsche to be 
abstractions that overlook the “unique and entirely original” character of our 
experiences.
66
  These linguistic conceptual generalities (what Nietzsche calls ““truth” 
within the realm of reason”) are justified by their “venerability, reliability and utility” 
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and
 
not by their representational accuracy.
67
  
 In this early unpublished work Nietzsche’s own challenge to realist empiricism 
draws on a naturalised form of idealism.  Using a naturalist idiom (rather than Kant’s 
transcendental deductive method) the representations or “metaphors” that we possess 
are explained by Nietzsche to be specifically human and subjective forms of 
representation that fail to correspond to a “mysterious X” that is “inaccessible and 
indefinable for us” and is the true “essence of things” standing behind appearances.68 
Nietzsche insists that we have no way of representing that essence objectively and that 
our representations of the world are artificial and illusory. “Metaphors” (in his 
widened sense of the term) account for both the drive to accumulate conceptual 
“truths” and our creative drive so that artistic recreations of the world characterise our 
attempts to represent the world:  
 
The drive toward the formulation of metaphors is the fundamental human 
drive, which one cannot for a single instant dispense with in thought, for 
one would thereby dispense with man himself.  This drive is not truly 
vanquished and scarcely subdued by the fact that a regular and rigid new 
world is constructed as its prison from its own ephemeral products, the 
concepts.  It seeks a new realm and another channel for its activity, and it 
finds this in myth and in art generally.  This drive continually confuses the 
conceptual categories and cells by bringing forward new transferences, 
metaphors, and metonymies.  It continually manifests an ardent desire to 
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refashion the world which presents itself to a waking man, so that it will 
be as colourful, irregular, lacking in results and coherence, charming, and 
eternally new as the world of dreams.
69
 
 
This early tendency to assert the primacy of artistry in our cognitive activity is 
characteristic of Rorty’s interpretation of Nietzsche.  Rorty quotes with approval 
Nietzsche’s early account of our concepts as “a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, 
and anthropomorphisms… which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished 
poetically and rhetorically”.70  Yet, it has to be acknowledged that Nietzsche was not 
content with his early idealist aestheticism for very long.  The development of 
Nietzsche’s thought is notable for the contrasting way that he later came to deal with 
the epistemological problem that is posed by the existence of a subject-independent 
reality.  It is clear from Nietzsche’s description of reality as “the essence of things” 
that, at this early stage, he shares the metaphysical and reductionist concept of realism 
that Rorty opposes in his own arguments against our representational objectivity.  
That conception takes reality to comprise an essential nature that appearances fail to 
represent and so perpetuates a form of scepticism regarding our representations.  In 
Rorty’s case, of course, the appearance-reality distinction is only maintained in his 
writing as part of his portrayal of the undesirable philosophical baggage that comes 
with being a representationalist.  One of the reasons that Rorty advocates Nietzsche’s 
philosophy is that Nietzsche also came to see such baggage as similarly undesirable.  
Yet, Nietzsche’s own strategy for discarding that baggage marks a significant 
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difference between his later philosophy and the early work that Rorty draws on and 
develops in formulating his anti-representationalist approach.  Exploring these 
differences will prove relevant as a way of appreciating the idiosyncrasies of Rorty’s 
interpretation of Nietzsche’s work, not to mention the idiosyncrasies of Rorty’s own 
position.  With this in mind I would like to describe how Nietzsche overcame his early 
idealist influences and developed a form of empirical realism.  We shall see how 
Nietzsche’s mature realist account of the subject’s experience renders that experience 
unsuitable as a bearer of the kind of necessary rules that characterise the Kantian 
conception of experience. In this way we will be able to appreciate how Nietzsche’s 
Humean (or in his own terms “Heraclitean”) conception of the empirical echoes the 
internal critique of the analytic movement that W.V.O. Quine developed and which 
Rorty departs from in his advocacy of a return to Nietzsche’s earlier idealist-
influenced aestheticism.  As a first step to appreciating the development of 
Nietzsche’s thought I will start with that “monument of a crisis” which marks 
Nietzsche’s reaction against his early “artist metaphysic”.  
In contrast to his early aestheticism, Nietzsche opens Human, All Too Human 
with the declaration that he is not interested in the justification of artistic mythological 
ideas but only in naturalist explanation.  He states that we have too easily appealed to 
a “miraculous origin” for much of what we take to be the case and that this is a failure 
of explanation and the worst of methods for inquiry.
71
  By seeming to justify or 
explain an idea or phenomenon by appealing to an inscrutable metaphysical reality we 
actually circumvent the demand for explanation.  Metaphysical philosophy is an 
apology for ignorance and its consequence is the justification of a set of dualisms (for 
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example, freedom versus determinism or the mind versus the body) that fail to 
provide the kind of integrated account of the world that naturalists strive for.  
Nietzsche’s proposed “chemistry of concepts and feelings” is a naturalist 
philosophical manifesto that eschews the appeal to a miraculous realm as a means of 
justifying the use of incompatible ideas.  Nietzsche calls for an attempt to reduce the 
human - by which he means “all those impulses that we ourselves experience in the 
great and small interactions of cultures and society, indeed even in solitude” (Human 
All Too Human §1) - to a set of known natural elements.
72
  The complete table of 
chemical elements and their properties is Nietzsche’s model for the end of inquiry in 
psychology and moral science.  
 This is not to suggest that reality is portrayed as an entirely open book in 
Human, All Too Human.  Crucially, Nietzsche warns that the true and ultimate nature 
of reality may always be too obscure for us to know.  The main argument that 
Nietzsche employs in order to convey the world’s ultimate obscurity is that it 
represents many thousands of years of evolution.  The most radical effect that 
Nietzsche’s conception of evolution has on his thought is that it not only endows the 
object of our understanding with a degree of historical relativity, it endows the faculty 
of understanding itself with a similar relativity: 
 
A lack of historical sense is the congenital defect of all philosophers. 
Some unwittingly even take the most recent form of man, as it developed 
under the imprint of certain religious or even political events, as the fixed 
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form from which one must proceed.  They will not understand that man 
has evolved, that the faculty of knowledge has evolved, while some of 
them even permit themselves to spin the whole world from out of this 
faculty of knowledge.  (Human All Too Human §2). 
 
Nietzsche’s approach in this passage is similar to the one employed in “On Truth and 
Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”.73  The “faculty of knowledge” is given a naturalist 
treatment that questions its ability to know reality.  Nietzsche’s rejection of 
metaphysical philosophy does not come hand in hand with a belief that we represent 
reality objectively.  According to Nietzsche, our intellect has evolved a specific form 
that represents the world to us in a particular way.  Nietzsche is against metaphysical 
philosophy because it makes a virtue of the limits of our understanding.  It does so by 
sanctioning an appeal to the miraculous as a justification for the use of unscientific 
ideas.  Through metaphysical philosophy the limits of our understanding become a 
crutch for groundless metaphysical and religious claims.  Against such speculative 
inquiry, however, the Nietzsche of Human, All Too Human does not abandon those 
limits but draws humility from them. 
 Nietzsche still uses his early representationalist sceptic notion of 
“appearances” as a model for the subject’s understanding in Human All, Too Human. 
This is typified by his continued and repeated warnings about the specialised and 
erroneous nature of appearances.  In Human, All Too Human Nietzsche describes “all 
characteristic traits of our world of appearances” as “our inherited idea of the world, 
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spun out of intellectual errors” (Human All Too Human §16).  “Nature” as an idea is a 
misrepresentation of reality: “this is perfectly true in respect to the concept of nature 
which we are obliged to apply to her (Nature = world as idea, that is as error), but 
which is the summation of a number of errors of reason” (Human All Too Human 
§19).  Nietzsche declares faith in the ability of science to provide an “ontogeny of 
thought” that will reveal that the world as we know it “is the result of a number of 
errors and fantasies which came about gradually in the overall development of organic 
beings” (Human All Too Human §16).  But he also recognises that it is hard to see 
how this ontogeny could be developed from our error-strewn perspective.  According 
to Nietzsche we are “unable to break significantly the power of ancient habits” 
(Human All Too Human §16) and it is only by abandoning our intellectual norms that 
we could approach the genuinely real: 
 
Only very late does the intellect stop to think: and now the world of 
experience and the thing-in-itself seem so extraordinarily different and 
separate that it rejects any conclusion about the latter from the former, or 
else, in an awful, mysterious way, it demands the abandonment of our 
intellect, of our personal will in order to come to the essential by 
becoming essential [...] (Human All Too Human §16) 
 
In order to reach behind appearances we would have to abandon our intellect which 
has made a more essential and objective reality obscure to us.  Yet Nietzsche seems to 
doubt the possibility that such abandonment could provide knowledge.  He states that 
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it could only lift us “for moments” above the process of representation as it could only 
falsify our intellectual errors without positively correcting them.  A form of 
knowledge that corresponds to a more essential and objective reality is still out of 
reach in Human, All Too Human.  The “essence of the world” (Human All Too Human 
§10) still remains beyond our epistemological frontier.  
 Rather than remain at this impasse, however, Nietzsche’s writings after 
Human, All Too Human start to employ a conception of reality that is less essentialist.  
In The Gay Science Nietzsche continues to question our ability to really comprehend 
reality.
74
  For example, he questions his tentative hope that natural science may 
overcome the failure of explanation perpetrated by metaphysical inquiry:  
 
Cause and effect.  – “Explanation” is what we call it, but it is 
“description” that distinguishes us from older stages of knowledge and 
science.  Our descriptions are better – we do not explain any more than 
our predecessors.  […] In every case the series of “causes” confronts us 
much more completely, and we infer: first, this and that has to precede in 
order that this or that may then follow – but this does not involve any 
comprehension.  In every chemical process, for example, quality appears 
as a “miracle,” as ever; also, every locomotion; nobody has “explained” a 
push.  But how could we explain anything?  We operate only with things 
that do not exist: lines, planes, bodies, atoms, divisible time spans, 
divisible spaces.  How should explanations be at all possible when we first 
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turn everything into an image, our image! (The Gay Science §112) 
 
Here in The Gay Science the “miraculous origin” which Nietzsche earlier accuses 
metaphysics of relying on as an explanatory principle now appears as the questionable 
origin of the very chemical phenomena that he uses as the paradigm for scientific 
enquiry in Human All Too Human.  Nietzsche’s slender hope that we may penetrate 
deeper than our image-strewn understanding has receded since the writing of Human, 
All Too Human.  Nevertheless, despite this continued insistence on the superficial 
nature of our understanding, Nietzsche shows evidence in The Gay Science that he 
doubts the expedience of the essentialist metaphysics that lay behind the scepticism of 
his earlier thought.  In section fifty four he denies that there is a more essential reality 
behind appearances: 
 
What is “appearance” for me now? Certainly not the opposite of some 
essence: what could I say about any essence except to name the attributes 
of its appearance!  Certainly not a dead mask that one could place on an 
unknown x or remove from it!  (The Gay Science §54) 
  
Nietzsche argues that the opposition between appearance and “some essence” is a 
nonsensical one because we could only conceive of such an essence via its 
appearance.  The notion of an essential and remote reality that appearances fail to 
capture has evidently lost its force for Nietzsche.  He asks “whether existence without 
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interpretation, without “sense,” does not become “nonsense,” whether, on the other 
hand, all existence is not essentially actively engaged in interpretation” (The Gay 
Science §374).  Earlier in his thought Nietzsche rejects the possibility of a view from 
nowhere or perspective-less representation - what he calls “pure knowledge” or “the 
correct perception” in “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”.  The Gay Science 
now denies that there ever was an essential reality for such view to represent. 
Excising the notion of an essential nature from the metaphysical world does not 
rid the metaphysical truth of its meaning altogether for Nietzsche.  Despite the fact 
that he rejects the idea of there being a more essential reality behind our particular 
perspective he argues that this anti-essentialist truth is truer than the way the world 
appears to us.  Returning in The Gay Science to his treatment of the concept of cause, 
Nietzsche states that “[an] intellect that could see cause and effect as a continuum and 
a flux and not, as we do, in terms of an arbitrary division and dismemberment, would 
repudiate the concept of cause and effect and deny all conditionality” (The Gay 
Science §112).  In Beyond Good and Evil such metaphysical truth is posited more 
emphatically:  
 
In the “in-itself” there is nothing of “causal connections,” of “necessity,” 
or of “psychological non-freedom”; there the effect does not follow the 
cause, there is no rule of “law.”  It is we alone who have devised cause, 
sequence, for-each-other, relativity, constraint, number, law, freedom, 
motive, and purpose; and when we project and mix this symbol into things 
as if it existed “in itself”, we act once more as we have always acted – 
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mythologically.
75
  
 
Nietzsche here insists that our conceptual norms are a misrepresentation of a 
fundamental truth.  The real metaphysical truth, for Nietzsche, is the world’s 
indeterminacy or its lack of any essential nature.   
One may wonder how Nietzsche could presume to know such truth given that 
he is one of us and must see as we do.  The answer is that by the time Nietzsche came 
to write Beyond Good and Evil his conception of the way the world appears to us had 
gone through a change.  The conception of appearances that he favours in The Gay 
Science but which is different to ours (that is, the one which repudiates the concept of 
cause and effect and denies all conditionality) comes to be ours in Beyond Good and 
Evil.  His conception of appearances in Beyond Good and Evil marks an increasing 
departure from the early idealist influence that Schopenhauer exerted on his work in 
favour of a realist version of the conception of appearances that he associates with 
Heraclitus.  The “faith of the metaphysicians” that Nietzsche attacks in Part One of 
Beyond Good and Evil is the faith in “opposite values” (Beyond Good and Evil §2) 
that Plato articulates in The Republic and which seems to have been an idealist 
reaction by Plato against his own early Heraclitianism.
76
  Seen through the prism of 
Plato’s idealism Nietzsche questions his own idealist influences: 
 
[Kant] was proud of having discovered a new faculty in man, the faculty 
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for synthetic judgments, a priori. Suppose he deceived himself in this 
matter; […] synthetic judgments a priori should not be possible at all; we 
have no right to them; in our mouths they are nothing but false judgments 
(Beyond Good and Evil §11). 
 
Nietzsche still describes the synthetic a priori as “necessary for the sake of the 
preservation of creatures like ourselves” (Beyond Good and Evil §11) but his 
conception of the empirical is one from which the a priori can be removed.  It is a 
“transitory, seductive, deceptive, paltry world” (Beyond Good and Evil §2) or, as 
Aristotle puts it, a world in which “all sensible things are in a state of flux and […] 
there is no such thing as knowledge of them.”77  The waning of any idealist influence 
on Nietzsche is obvious in Beyond Good and Evil.  More than ever before in his work 
he has pried the idealist a priori framework of his earlier thought away from his 
conception of the empirical to reveal a realist version of the kind of Humean or 
Heraclitean realm of contingency that Kant’s transcendental deduction and Plato’s 
theory of Forms were designed to circumvent. 
 In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche reiterates his belief in the impossibility of 
genuine explanation by science, although he now clearly values such inquiry for its 
empirical honesty: 
 
[…] physics, too, is only an interpretation and exegesis of the world (to 
suit us, if I may say so!) and not a world-explanation; but insofar as it is 
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based on belief in the senses, it is regarded as more, and for a long time to 
come must be regarded as more – namely, as an explanation (Beyond 
Good and Evil §14). 
 
This guarded respect for empirical science is repeated in Twilight of the Idols.
78
  By 
the time that Nietzsche wrote Twilight he had fully realised the implications of his 
denunciation of idealism and representationalist scepticism.  Reality is not 
distinguished from “mere” appearances in Twilight.  Reality is the mutable, transitory 
and contingent nature of the world that experience reveals.  Rather than misrepresent 
a real metaphysical world Nietzsche declares that “so far as the senses show 
becoming, passing away, change, they do not lie” (Twilight of the Idols, “’Reason’ in 
Philosophy” §3).  To the extent that science captures the contingent, transitory and 
mutable aspect of the sensible world Nietzsche values it: 
 
We posses scientific knowledge today to precisely the extent that we have 
decided to accept the evidence of the senses […] Change, mutation, 
becoming in general were formerly taken as proof of appearance, as a sign 
of the presence of something which led us astray.  Today, on the contrary, 
we see ourselves as it were entangled in error, necessitated to error, to 
precisely the extent that our prejudice in favour of reason compels us to 
posit unity, identity, duration, substance, cause, materiality, being; […] 
(Twilight of the Idols, “’Reason’ in Philosophy” §3+5).  
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Empirical experience does not misrepresent an obscured real world and neither does it 
comply with our conceptual norms.  Nietzsche no longer uses the idealist notion of an 
inescapable a priori framework that renders reality obscure.  The mature Nietzsche’s 
description of cognition comprises a realist and thoroughly mutable, transitory and 
contingent empirical element that is distinct from the imposed strictures of “reason”.  
 Calling Nietzsche’s view of the empirical in Twilight “realist” is misleading if 
this is meant to suggest that he believes that experience makes available the kind of 
truth that he put out of the subject’s reach in his early thought.  His mature rejection of 
the notion of a remote metaphysical reality is also a rejection of the existence of the 
kind of essential truth that such a notion embodied in his earlier thought.  Even 
though Nietzsche came to believe that we have empirical access to the real world he 
also came to deny that there is any essential way that that world is.  We are not 
capable of “pure knowledge” of the “essence of things” because, it turns out, there is 
no such essence.  Although the young Nietzsche was initially misled into taking the 
essentialist metaphysician’s problem seriously, for the mature Nietzsche the 
contingency of our experience reflects the true nature of the world.  The sense in 
which Nietzsche’s mature empiricism is realist is the sense in which his conception of 
the empirical shows it to reveal how everything is really in a state of mutation or 
“flux”.  It is as a consequence of his realist anti-essentialism that Nietzsche believes 
that the principles that govern our reason bear little likeness to the world and our 
experience of it.  Nietzsche’s treatment of reason in Twilight renders it a fairly blunt 
instrument.  According to him, it “belongs in origin to the age of the most rudimentary 
form of psychology” (Twilight of the Idols, “’Reason’ in Philosophy” §5).  Reason is a 
  77  
crude instrument compared to the “delicate tool” (Twilight of the Idols, “’Reason’ in 
Philosophy” §3) of the senses.  As an attempt to render experience comprehensible 
reason models the world on a number of abstract grammatical principles and 
anthropomorphic metaphors.  For example, it posits unity and thing-hood and “sees 
everywhere deed and doer” (Twilight of the Idols, “’Reason’ in Philosophy” §5).  
Nietzsche states that the lack of a representational correspondence between our 
experience and the scheme that our reason provides is what prompts Platonic 
metaphysicians to believe that reason can refer to a more fundamental reality.
79
  
Against such Platonism, Nietzsche argues (specifically referring to logic and 
mathematics) that reason is a “system of conventional signs” in which “reality does 
not appear at all, not even as a problem” (Twilight of the Idols, “’Reason’ in 
Philosophy” §3).  Reason is a means that we developed in order to circumvent our 
experience of the world’s transitory, mutable and contingent nature.  Belief in an 
alternative “real world” that is represented by reason is unfounded and the problem of 
whether reason objectively represents such a reality is a pseudo-problem.  
 Nietzsche overcame the problem of representational scepticism not by taking 
an anti-realist stance but by adopting a realist and anti-essentialist empiricism that 
regards reason as a man-made sanctuary from the world’s thoroughgoing contingency.  
With this in mind I would now like to go on to consider how Nietzsche’s treatment of 
language and experience echoes the internal critique of the analytic movement that 
W.V.O. Quine developed and to consider how Rorty’s “anti-representationalist” 
criticism of Quine’s position results in Rorty’s dismissal of realism in favour of 
Nietzsche’s earlier idealist-influenced rhetoric.  
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Nietzsche, Quine, Davidson and Rorty 
 
The last few paragraphs of Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”80 read as if they 
could have been written by Nietzsche:   
 
Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient 
intermediaries – not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as 
irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer.  
[…] The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in 
that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for 
working a manageable structure into the flux of experience.  […] The 
edge of the system must be kept squared with experience; the rest, with all 
its elaborate myths and fictions, has as its objective the simplicity of 
laws.
81
 
 
These words read like work that Nietzsche might have produced if he had ultimately 
elaborated on the need to “sharpen and arm” (Twilight of the Idols, “’Reason’ in 
Philosophy” §3) the senses along the lines of the account of physics that he gives in 
Beyond Good and Evil.  In this case, language could be seen to be capable of more 
“delicacy” in its accommodation of the Heraclitean “flux” of experience than 
Nietzsche suggests in Twilight; perhaps by its accommodation of plasticity in posits 
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like energy and matter.
82
  Nevertheless, the hypothetical posits and laws of physics are 
not a representation of an objective truth for Nietzsche or for the Quine of ‘Two 
Dogmas’.  They are “myths and fictions”.  The language of physics is a means of 
marshalling our ideas in a way that merely limits the threat to them that is posed by 
the contingency of our experience.   
 The express purpose of Quine’s insistence that our hypothetical posits are not 
reducible to experience is to criticise the dogma he calls “reductionism”.  By 
“reductionism” Quine means the belief that every meaningful statement is “equivalent 
to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience.”83  It is an 
assumption that formed the central thesis of Ayer and Carnap’s logical positivism and 
which in turn formed a central tenet of much of the analytic movement of the 
twentieth century.  Against this movement, Quine denies that our linguistic 
propositions and terms have empirical content that fixes their truth-value. He believes 
that the value of our statements and posits is largely determined at a remove from our 
immediate experience: “The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs […] is a 
man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges.”84  Quine 
points out that the attempt to translate all meaningful statements into ones about 
immediate experience has precedents in the British empiricism of the Enlightenment.  
Rather than explain the acquisition of concepts by their genesis in experience Ayer 
and Carnap were more concerned with fixing the truth-value of linguistic statements 
by mapping them onto experience.  Nevertheless, Quine denies that it is right to speak 
of the empirical content of statements as if it was experience alone that determines 
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whether we hold a statement (or posit) to be justified.  Quine regards the justification 
for our linguistic statements to be more insulated from “the flux of experience” than is 
suggested by the belief that they are (or should be) a straightforward attempt to 
represent experience.   
By describing the relationship between experience and our “posits” in this way 
Quine echoes the account of that relationship that Nietzsche offers.  Our conceptual 
apparatus is a means of circumventing “the flux of experience” and is justified by its 
own legislative authority rather than by its representational objectivity.  The 
justification of any particular statement is contingent on the status and maintenance of 
the conceptual apparatus that it employs rather than the nature of reality.  Quine’s 
description of “the man-made fabric of language” calls to mind a passage from “On 
Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”: 
 
[…] one may certainly admire man as a mighty genius of construction, 
who succeeds in piling up an infinitely complicated dome of concepts 
upon an unstable foundation, and, as it were, on running water.  Of course, 
in order to be supported by such foundations, his construction must be like 
one constructed of spiders’ webs: delicate enough to be carried along by 
the waves, strong enough not to be blown apart by every wind.
85
 
 
Nietzsche anticipates Quine’s description of our concepts as a human construction that 
is continually adjusted, maintained and added to in an ongoing attempt to maintain its 
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integrity in spite of our experience.  In the same passage, Nietzsche also goes on to 
illustrate how this post-empiricist position might lead one to claim that we inhabit an 
intellectual landscape out of touch with reality:  
 
When someone hides something behind a bush and looks for it again in 
the same place and finds it there as well, there is not much to praise in 
such seeking and finding.  Yet this is how matters stand regarding seeking 
and finding “truth” within the realm of reason.  If I make up the definition 
of a mammal, and then after inspecting a camel, declare “look, a 
mammal” I have indeed brought a truth to light in this way, but it is a truth 
of limited value.  That is to say, it is a thoroughly anthropomorphic truth 
which contains not a single point which would be “true in itself” or really 
and universally valid apart from man.
86
 
 
Nietzsche claims that by crafting our concepts and definitions ourselves we create a 
set of self-validating rules that do not hold independently of us. Nietzsche uses the 
rhetoric of myth-making which Quine echoes in his description of the “myth of 
physical objects”.  Both suggest that in our attempts to represent reality reality 
becomes obscured behind a “man-made” fabrication.  
 The difference between Nietzsche’s early description of our cognitive 
apparatus and his later description is that his early description renders reality entirely 
mysterious.  For the early Nietzsche even “the flux of experience” is a “metaphor” 
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that is no less mysterious than any mind-independent world of entities.  The objects of 
our theories have nothing real about them at all in “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral 
Sense”.  In that essay, our experience is taken to be mere appearance whereas for 
Quine and the Nietzsche of Twilight alike the senses do not lead us astray in that way.  
Even so, it is clear from Quine’s and Nietzsche’s descriptions of experience that 
neither man believes that the senses help us very much.  The premise that our 
experience is an indeterminate “flux” is intended to persuade us that the concepts that 
we apply to the world are an attempt to impose structure and stability where we find 
none.  Both argue that our experience is so indeterminate that we are forced to inhabit 
our own “more manageable” scheme.87  They both advocate a realist conception of 
experience and so they both stop short of arguing that our means of representation 
completely obscures the reality that it is intended to represent.  Yet, they both give the 
impression that reality must remain elusive because our attempts to conceptualise it 
insulate us from its indeterminacy.  Quine’s thesis of “ontological relativity” 
illustrates this very clearly.  According to it, the full extent of our conceptual 
apparatus (including the means by which we individuate objects) is in principle 
revisable due to the lack of any independent standard for its justification.  
Consequently, the way that we “slice” the world up (to use Quine’s own metaphor 
from “Ontological Relativity”) cannot be considered a matter of representing 
structural features of reality that exist independently of the act of slicing.
88
  Even 
macroscopic physical objects are “cultural posits” for Quine.89  
Looking at Quine’s account of our conceptual apparatus in this way brings out 
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those aspects of his position that are well known from Donald Davidson’s criticism of 
the idea of a “conceptual scheme”.  In his paper “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual 
Scheme” Davidson questions whether our inability to say what the objects of our 
theories are in an “uninterpreted” or “absolute” sense must lead us to regard the act of 
description as an act of fabrication that insulates us from reality.  According to what 
Davidson calls the “third dogma of empiricism” our conceptual scheme is thought to 
impose a legislative influence on our thought that mediates our relationship to reality.  
In this way our means of representation comes to be regarded as eclipsing the reality 
that it is intended to represent and we are lead into a sceptical form of relativism 
according to which there is a potential for radically different conceptions of the same 
ultimately inscrutable reality.  The idea of a “conceptual scheme” creates an 
opposition between reality and our representations and invokes the traditional binary 
opposition between reality and appearances that has permeated the philosophical 
tradition and driven it to ponder a wedge between us and reality.  Davidson urges us to 
overcome the tendency to conceive of the act of conceptualisation as an act of 
obscuration and to remove philosophical obstacles to our “unmediated touch with the 
familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false”.  By 
relinquishing the notion of an “uninterpreted reality [...] outside all schemes and 
science” we embrace the reality that is represented by our schemes and science.90  We 
save the notion of objective truth by denying that it stands for an inscrutable 
metaphysical absolute. 
The belief in our need to break down the kinds of intermediaries between our 
beliefs and reality that create the problem of scepticism gives Davidson a pre-eminent 
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position in the pantheon of philosophical figures that Rorty advocates.  Rorty 
associates “representationalism” with the kind of philosophy that posits such 
intermediaries.  Rorty’s rejection of the notion of representation is motivated by that 
association.  Yet, as we have seen, Rorty is dogmatic in is his association of the notion 
of objective truth with the same notion of a remote metaphysical absolute that 
Davidson describes as being correlative with scepticism.  According to Rorty, the 
notion of objectivity stands for a conception of true representation that has it capture 
such an absolute (as if in a mirror) and the fact that such an absolute is not available 
means that we must abandon any pretense to realism and objectivity.  In his early 
discussion of Davidson in “The World Well Lost” Rorty describes the “realistic true 
believer’s notion of the world” as merely a philosophical “obsession”.91  Rorty claims 
that by giving up the notion of an “uninterpreted reality outside all schemes and 
science” we are left with a notion of “the world” as merely “a vast body of platitudes” 
or “the objects that inquiry at the moment is leaving alone: those planks in the boat 
which are at the moment not being moved about.”92  Despite using Davidson’s 
arguments against scepticism and conceptual relativism, and despite accepting 
Davidson’s claim that the vast majority of our beliefs must be true, Rorty defines his 
own position in a way that rids us of the capacity for objective truth.  Rorty’s 
association of the notion of objectivity with the kind of “mirror-like” representations 
that supposedly capture the way reality is leads him to reject the notion of objectivity 
altogether.  Rather than save the notion of objective truth by denying that it represents 
a remote metaphysical absolute Rorty advocates Davidson’s linguistic holism as a 
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way of completely abandoning the notion.
93
 
Rorty urges us to accept an anti-representationalist account of our relationship 
to reality despite the fact that it rules out any sense that we are acquainted with an “an 
objective public world that is not of our making”.94  According to Rorty, such 
“representationalism” is not worth the trouble because it ends up inserting “imaginary 
barriers” between the subject’s beliefs and reality.95  Rorty’s argument assumes that 
representationalism necessarily brings with it a distinction between reality and 
appearances that encourages scepticism and so rather than encourage the sceptic’s 
doubts (as he assumes representationalism must) Rorty urges us to render those 
doubts redundant by describing the subject’s relationship to its environment in baldly 
physicalist and pragmatist terms.  The linguistic “marks and noises” that we emit 
should be regarded as part of the repertoire of tools that our species has developed in 
practical interaction with its environment rather than as attempts to represent that 
environment.
96
  Rorty drains language of any representational function and portrays it 
as merely an observed natural behavior akin to flint knapping.  For Rorty, language is 
simply a phonic and graphic product that is no more “representational” for us than 
birdsong or a spider’s web.97  Paradoxically (or “ironically” as Rorty might say) this 
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naturalist and pragmatist stance is not even offered as a representation of reality.  It is 
proposed as simply our most expedient way of speaking because it enables us to avoid 
positing a metaphysical idol of the tribe like Kant’s noumenal world or the 
“mysterious X” of “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”.  It is still merely one 
conventional set of “marks and noises” among many possible ones.  It is just “a 
disposition to respond in various ways to various stimuli.”98 
 Rorty offers an account of the subject’s  relationship to reality that is strikingly 
similar to the one that Nietzsche proposes in “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral 
Sense”, except that it is stripped of the “representationalism” that Rorty would insist 
is responsible for the variety of scepticism that Nietzsche expresses in that early work.  
Rorty echoes Nietzsche’s description of our interaction with the world as a chain of 
natural causes that do not “mirror” reality.  As Nietzsche describes it, it is a chain of 
nerve stimuli, images and sounds.
99
  For Rorty, it is a network of electrical charges, 
brain-states, nerve-muscle interfaces and utterances.
100
  Both accounts are designed to 
puncture the “pride connected with knowing and sensing” that both philosophers 
believe captivates and entraps the realist.  In Nietzsche’s words the “senses nowhere 
lead to truth” for “on the contrary [human beings] are content to receive stimuli and, 
as it were, to engage in a groping game on the backs of things.”101  For Rorty, of 
course, once we have discarded the Mirror of Nature the sceptical overtones of 
Nietzsche’s description of our relationship to our environment ought to be avoided.  
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According to Rorty, Nietzsche’s combination of a physicalist perspective with a form 
of representationalist scepticism is misguided.  Nietzsche’s early pragmatism lacks the 
“anti-representationalism” that Rorty believes should replace the representationalist 
cultural idiom dominant in the philosophical tradition.  Rorty urges us to embrace a 
view of our linguistic practices that regards those practices as tools rather than 
representations so that the kind of philosophy that gives rise to the positing of 
representations and the question of their “mirror-like” objectivity is eradicated from 
our culture.  
In the introduction to his Essays on Heidegger and Others Rorty describes his 
philosophy (and pragmatism in general) as post-Nietzschean because it takes as read 
Nietzsche’s claim that “‘knowledge in itself’ is as impermissible a concept as ‘thing-
in-itself’” and that “[the categories of reason] represent nothing more than the 
expediency of a certain race and species – their utility alone is their ‘truth’.”102  But 
Rorty fails to convey that the terms on which he argues for his pragmatist anti-
reprsentationalism are closer to the terms that Nietzsche sets out in “On Truth and 
Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” than to the terms that Nietzsche sets out in Twilight.  By 
the time Nietzsche wrote Twilight he had abandoned the essentialist conception of 
reality that we find in “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”.  The Quinean 
pragmatism of Twilight is based on Nietzsche’s conviction that the nature of reality (as 
revealed by the flux of experience) is indeterminate.  For Rorty, by contrast, the 
concept of reality is bound up with the kind of metaphysical essentialism that 
Nietzsche expresses in “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”.  Rorty’s position is 
motivated by his belief that such metaphysical essentialism is merely a philosophical 
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obsession that can be bracketed out to preserve something like Nietzsche’s anti-realist 
position in “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”.  According to Rorty, once we 
rid ourselves of “representationalism” and the scepticism that attends it we can rest 
content with the “conceptual crap game” that Nietzsche describes in “On Truth and 
Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”.103  We can accept that our descriptions are justified purely 
on pragmatic or aesthetic grounds rather than on the grounds that they convey 
objective truth.  
One way of capturing the difference between Rorty’s position and Nietzsche’s 
later one is to see Rorty as advocating an anti-realist form of anti-essentialism and the 
later Nietzsche as advocating a realist form of anti-essentialism.  This difference can 
be illustrated by considering Nietzsche’s polemic against “the ascetic ideal” in On the 
Genealogy of Morality.  Here the refusal to believe in the reality of what we hold to 
be true is identified with the degenerate ressentiment of the ascetic priest: 
 
Supposing that such an incarnate will to contradiction and anti-nature is 
prevailed upon to philosophize: on what will he vent his innermost 
capricious will?  On what is most certainly felt to be true, real: he will 
seek error precisely where the true life instinct most unconditionally 
posits truth.
104
 
 
Nietzsche describes universal scepticism as a corrosive consequence of hankering for 
an absolute truth.  Nietzsche goes on to use a concept of “objectivity” in a manner that 
suggests an alternative to the “metaphysical, reductionist” one that motivates Rorty’s 
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(and the early Nietzsche’s) anti-realism: 
 
For let us guard ourselves better from now on, gentlemen philosophers, 
against the dangerous old conceptual fabrication that posited a “pure, will-
less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge” […] here it is always 
demanded that we think an eye that cannot possibly be thought, an eye 
that must not have any direction, in which the active and interpretive 
forces through which seeing first becomes seeing-something are to be shut 
off, are to be absent […] There is only a perspectival seeing, only a 
perspectival “knowing”; and the more affects we allow to speak about a 
matter, the more eyes, different eyes, we know how to bring to bear on 
one and the same matter, that much more complete will our “concept” of 
this matter, our “objectivity” be. (On The Genealogy of Morality, “Third 
Treatise: What Do Ascetic Ideals Mean?” §12) 
 
Here Nietzsche advocates an alternative concept of objectivity to the reductionist, 
essentialist and “non-perspectival” one that he satirizes and that Rorty identifies with 
representational realism.  This alternative concept of objectivity denies that there is 
only one way of truthfully representing reality and holds that the more representations 
we have of reality the more we get to know it as a whole.  It accepts the partial or 
“perspectival” nature of representation without assuming that this must rule out our 
objectivity.  Nietzsche argues that the ideal of a pure, non-perspectival or single 
“mirror-like” form of representation that captures the way reality is has always been a 
myth and that despite this realization we should not abandon the belief in realism or 
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objectivity.  In contrast, Rorty never entertains such a non-reductive form of realism.  
Rorty embraces Nietzsche’s perspectivism while assuming that it is incompatible with 
realism.  Where Nietzsche urges us to train more eyes, different eyes, on reality, Rorty 
closes us off from reality:  
 
You can dissolve macrostructure into microstructure – stars and tables into 
atoms […] The antiessentialist specializes in creating this hall-of-mirrors 
effect – in getting us to stop asking which is the real thing and which the 
image, and to settle for an ever-expanding choice of images.
105
 
 
When Rorty uses the rhetoric of representation he invokes the kind of veil-of-
appearances scepticism that is familiar from “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoeal 
Sense” – the very kind that Nietzsche came to find unsatisfactory and reject.  
According to Rorty, once we have accepted the truth of perspectivism then reality 
must drop out if the picture and the Mirror of Nature must become an endless “hall-
of-mirrors”.  For the Nietzsche of The Genealogy of Morality, by contrast, the 
contingent nature of particular representations does not rule out their realism.  Rorty’s 
dogmatism regarding the oppositional traditions of “representationalism” makes his 
anti-reductionism anti-realist whereas Nietzsche’s lack of such dogmatism allows him 
to conceive of a realist form of anti-reductionism. 
  In the next chapter I will continue my comparison between Rorty and 
Nietzsche by exploring Rorty’s theory of metaphor.  Rorty regards metaphor as the 
driving force behind our intellectual advances.  He uses the concept of metaphor in 
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order to provide an anti-realist explanation of intellectual change.  We have seen that 
Rorty’s interpretation of Nietzsche relies on his reading of “On Truth and Lies in a 
Non-Moral Sense” and his theory of metaphor borrows from it directly.  He argues 
that the creation of a metaphor always involves an act of contrivance that 
compromises its realism.  Rorty’s notion of the unrealistic nature of metaphor is 
further evidence of his narrow Platonic conception of what realism entails and I will 
consider Aristotle’s theory of metaphor as an alternative.  I will also discuss some of 
the advantages of entertaining a less absolutist conception of realism and 
representationalism as an alternative to Rorty’s anti-representationalism. 
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Chapter 3 - Metaphor as the Vanguard of the Species 
 
Philosophy and the Kaleidoscope of Nature 
 
I have been arguing that Richard Rorty’s rejection of the model of representation is 
motivated by too narrow a conception of what it means for a representation to be 
realistic.  Rorty associates the doctrine of realism with a belief in a privileged form of 
representation that captures the way that reality is as if there could be a single and 
exclusive form of representation that captured all there is to reality.  I have also tried 
to show that one of the remarkable features of Nietzsche’s intellectual career is that he 
broke away from this philosophical dogma and began, with the notion of 
perspectivism, to use the term “objectivity” in a new way.  Nietzsche conceives of a 
form of objectivity that acknowledges the partiality of our representations but does 
not regard that partiality as a bar to objectivity.  Rather than contrast our 
representations with something more absolute it overcomes their partiality by having 
them participate in a more complete whole.  This view stands in stark contrast to the 
one Nietzsche expresses in his early unpublished essay “On Truth and Lies in a Non-
Moral Sense”.  The early Nietzsche is totally in thrall to the idea of objectivity that 
demands transcendence.  It demands a pure, perfect and “mirror-like” form of 
representation that captures “the essence of things” and he denigrates the human 
subject for the inadequacy of its representations.  Often when Rorty refers to 
Nietzsche’s influence on his own thought he cites “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral 
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Sense”.  Rorty gives full support to the anti-realist account of metaphor that Nietzsche 
puts forward in “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense” and claims that it lends 
credence to his own belief in our lack of “objectivity”. Rorty is convinced that the 
sceptical outlook of “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense” can be spun into a 
positive affirmation of our creativity once we abandon our illusory hope of obtaining 
objectivity.  
 Having touched on Rorty’s advocacy of Nietzsche’s early aestheticism in the 
last chapter I would now like to examine it more closely in this chapter.  To do so I 
will continue my comparison between Rorty and the early Nietzsche by focusing on 
their accounts of the role of metaphor in our thought.  This will involve an exploration 
of their aestheticism in the wider context of their naturalism and physicalism because 
their accounts of metaphor draw on their wider conception of the human subject’s 
relationship to the natural world.  Nietzsche’s “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral 
Sense” gives the human subject a naturalist treatment that rules out the possibility of 
realist representation and describes the subject’s cognitive apparatus as a body of 
“metaphors” that misrepresent reality.  Similarly, Rorty argues for a physicalist and 
pragmatist account of the subject’s relationship to reality that denies that the subject’s 
linguistic utterances “mirror” reality.  There is no sense for either of them in which 
the subject is able to “speak of things as they are”106, to use John Locke’s literal-
minded phrase, and as an anti-realist alternative they both turn what they perceive to 
be the traditional authority of the literal over the metaphorical (and the scientific over 
the aesthetic) on its head.  According to both Rorty and Nietzsche alike, it is inventive 
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metaphorical conceits that form the vanguard of the subject’s cultural and intellectual 
life rather than attempts to represent the world as it “really” is.107  
Rorty denies that there are any sceptical implications to his anti-realism by 
claiming that the problem of scepticism is caused specifically by the realist standards 
of representation that thinkers like Locke advocate.  Rorty argues that realism has the 
effect of undermining itself by introducing a standard of objectivity that is 
unattainable.  It forces us to make a distinction between our representations and a 
more objective reality that inevitably places a veil-of-appearances between us and that 
reality.  Rorty’s anti-representationalism is simply intended to change our conception 
of language from one that ties it to the sort of representationalist model that puts 
reality at a remove from us to one that treats it as a practical tool in direct causal 
contact with reality.  Yet, in the course of rejecting representationalism Rorty strips 
language of its ability to refer to the world beyond our linguistic behaviour.  Any 
notion of our language having a representational function that keeps us in touch with 
“an objective public world that is not of our making” is lost.  Rorty erases any 
meaningful relationship that our language may have to an objective world and 
confines us within what he calls a transient and culturally contingent “metaphoric”.108  
Rather than conceive of the aim of inquiry as a matter of representing reality Rorty 
advocates a belief in the importance to our intellectual advances of novel and unusual 
combinations of linguistic terms that have no realism.  
The purpose of Rorty’s insistence on the ubiquity of metaphor is to challenge 
the presumption that we are able to deal in a kind of plain literal language that avoids 
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metaphor.  This insistence is part of his attempt to persuade us to abandon the belief in 
our objectivity and so it implicitly assumes that metaphors lack objectivity in their 
very nature.  Throughout my criticism of Rorty I have argued that his attempt to reject 
traditional philosophical dogma suffers from the respect that he pays that dogma.  In 
the case of the literal-metaphorical contrast the situation is no different.  The idea that 
metaphors lack realism and objectivity comes from the same philosophical opposition 
that he wishes to set aside and thereby overcome.  Rorty’s anti-realist radicalism 
actually depends on that opposition, as we can see towards the end of his paper “Non-
Reductive Physicalism” in which he claims that his insistence on the unavoidability of 
metaphor puts him at odds with the Western realist tradition.  He states that Western 
philosophy has tended to treat metaphor as a “dangerous enemy”:  
 
It has made much of the contrast between “literal truth” conceived of as 
“correspondence to reality” and “mere metaphor”, where the latter is 
thought of as an alluring, seductive, dangerous temptation – a temptation 
to “escape from reality”.  This literal-metaphorical contrast lies in the 
background of the opposition, characteristic of the post-Kantian period in 
philosophy between science and art.
109
 
 
Rorty wishes to advocate the kind of revaluation of metaphor that Nietzsche attempts 
in TL by showing that it is not a “dangerous temptation” at all but a necessary part of 
our cognitive toolkit.  He wants to insist that the methods of science and art are not as 
distinct as some would like to believe.  Yet, in the course of arguing that science deals 
in metaphor as much as art Rorty leaves in place the belief that metaphors do not 
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represent reality.  He tries to change the way that he believes tradition values 
metaphor without changing what he perceives to be its second-rate cognitive status 
and so he perpetuates the opposition as much as he tries to challenge it.   
 Attempts to invest our linguistic practices with a fixed, plain literal meaning 
are rejected by Rorty as abortive foundational philosophical attempts to provide an 
“Archimedean point” for our historically and culturally contingent linguistic practices.  
In response to such foundationalism Rorty insists that our terms have a long and 
polysemous past and that their meanings are the result of a number of contingent 
metaphorical transfers.  Rorty quotes with approval, in this context, Nietzsche’s early 
account of our terms as “a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and 
anthropomorphisms… which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished 
poetically and rhetorically”.110  In contrast to the literal-minded model of inquiry that 
Locke proposes, this insistence on the importance of metaphor is intended to persuade 
us of the inventive and “unrealistic” character of our combinations of terms.  Locke’s 
attitude to figurative modes of expression is notoriously disparaging because of this 
contrast: 
 
[…] if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art 
of rhetoric, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative 
application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to 
insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the 
judgment, and so indeed are perfect cheats…  [and] they are certainly, in 
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all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided.
111
 
 
Locke states that in order to convey knowledge we must adhere to a tight 
correspondence between what we say and the literal truth.  By using rhetorical devices 
like metaphor we disregard such truth and “insinuate wrong ideas”.  Rorty’s position, 
however, rules out the possibility of attaching the kind of objective literal meaning to 
our linguistic practices that Locke proposes.  According to Rorty, as far as 
representationalist realists are concerned we cannot avoid misleading our powers of 
judgment.  Similarly to the Nietzsche of “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”, 
Rorty makes a claim for the ubiquity of metaphor in order to eradicate any realist 
meaning from our utterances.  According to Rorty, all expressions were once 
metaphorical and the ones that we regard as literal have simply lost the novelty and 
the unreality (or meaninglessness) that they once had.   
 Locke would seem to put an unreasonable restriction on us given the 
pervasiveness of metaphorical expressions in our language and Rorty draws on these 
incessant transpositions within our discourse in order to deny that we can speak 
plainly and objectively in the way that Locke implies.  Rorty’s definition of metaphor 
goes so far as to evoke Nietzsche’s early and unusual physiological use of the term to 
refer to the human subject’s cognitive apparatus in general.112  In “On Truth and Lies 
in a Nonmoral Sense” Nietzsche defines metaphors as acts of misrepresentation and 
argues that all of our forms of representation arise from acts of distortion that make 
them metaphors.  The term “metaphor” stands for any such act in “On Truth and Lies 
in a Nonmoral Sense”.  It stands not just for our acts of figurative linguistic phrasing 
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but for the whole physiological operation that goes into cognition.  The thesis of “On 
Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” is that we distort reality at such a root sensory 
level that cognition is always a product of misrepresentation that can never correctly 
represent reality (the “mysterious X”).  Rorty’s own anti-realism evokes this 
wholesale approach of Nietzsche’s.  In his paper “A World Without Substances or 
Essences”, for example, Rorty denies that our concept of “an object” has any real 
meaning.  He states that it is just a hypostatization of the linguistic subject (just as 
Nietzsche calls it a “basic presupposition of the metaphysics of language”).113  Rather 
than represent the world “objectively” we obscure the world and transform it into 
something of our own creation.   
Rorty would remind us that any talk of distortion or misrepresentation should 
not be taken seriously as if describing the world involved representing it.  Rorty’s 
presumably ironic forays into conventional sounding discussions of metaphor should 
always be understood against the background of his anti-representationalism.  For 
Rorty, the fact that it is not possible to isolate a form of representation that captures 
the way things are “essentially, intrinsically and in-themselves” means that we ought 
to do away with the model of representation entirely.  Rorty eliminates any 
mechanism of representation from his conception of the human intellect and reduces 
language to a collection of “marks and noises” in order to discourage our tendency to 
treat our sentences as representations.  In turn, Rorty abandons representationalist 
theories of meaning and adopts an anti-representationalist version of Wittgenstein’s 
concept (or metaphor) of the “language-game”114.  In Rorty’s view, using language is 
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like participating in any kind of rule governed behavior and has no special 
representational function.  An utterance’s place in such a pattern of behaviour 
constitutes its meaning and any deviation from that pattern is nonsense. In order to 
make sense we must confine ourselves to “the quite narrow (though stifling) limits of 
regular, predictable, linguistic behavior”.115  As far as metaphors are concerned, 
according to Rorty, they are simply unfamiliar marks or noises that disturb the usual 
pattern of our utterances.  Novel metaphorical sentences “make no sense” because 
they combine linguistic terms in ways that diverge from the current conventions of 
use.
116
  
Expanding on his anti-representationalist account of language Rorty explains 
the role of metaphor by using what he regards as a Davidsonian account of the 
difference between the literal and the metaphorical.  According to Davidson, 
metaphorical sentences have no meaning besides the literal meaning that we impute to 
them and it is for this reason that a metaphor cannot be paraphrased.  Davidson says 
that metaphors “intimate much that goes beyond the literal meaning of the words. But 
intimation is not meaning.”117  For meaning to be found in a metaphor it has to be 
translated into something that makes literal sense whereas, on the face of it, metaphors 
do not make such sense.
118
  Rorty interprets this view as follows: 
 
by putting metaphor outside of the pale of semantics, insisting that a 
metaphorical sentence has no meaning other than its literal one, Davidson 
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lets us see metaphors on the model of unfamiliar events in the natural 
world – causes of changing beliefs and desires – rather than on the model 
of representations.
119
 
 
Rorty interprets Davidson as having argued that metaphors do not initially have literal 
meaning but gain it by asserting a causal pressure to change what we take to be 
literally meaningful.  Metaphors fall outside of the “narrow limits” of regular, 
predictable, linguistic behavior and cause shifts in this narrow antecedent scheme.  
They are unfamiliar and meaningless utterances that do not convey truths within the 
antecedent limits of literal meaning but come to alter what we take to be literally 
meaningful.
120
  
Rorty argues that Davidson enables us to think of intellectual history as a form 
of blind natural selection in which novel and nonsensical ways of using language 
come into existence by chance and kill off old ones only to be replaced by further new 
generations that, rather than converge on the real truth, create ever more varied forms 
of life: “as much a result of thousands of small mutations finding niches (and millions 
of others finding no niche), as are the orchids and the anthropoids.”121  Rorty’s 
Darwinian view of intellectual history actually owes more to his reading of Thomas 
Kuhn than Donald Davidson: 
 
[…] the resolution of [scientific] revolutions is the selection by conflict 
within the scientific community of the fittest way to practice future 
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science.  […] And the entire process may have occurred, as we now 
suppose biological evolution did, without the benefit of a set goal, a 
permanent fixed scientific truth, of which each stage in the development 
of scientific knowledge is a better exemplar.
122
 
 
Rorty sees in Davidson’s account of metaphor a metaphor for the kind of accidental 
and contingent variation that fuels biological evolution and he co-opts that account 
into the service of a starkly mechanistic version of Kuhn’s non-teleological reading of 
scientific history in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
123
  For Rorty, intellectual 
revolutions involve “metaphoric re-descriptions” that are mutations in the genetic 
code of language caused by the same sorts of “blind, contingent, mechanical forces” 
that shape other natural phenomena.
124
  Some catch on and define a generation and 
others do not but there is no Mirror of Nature that guides the process.  
 As with all of Rorty’s re-descriptions of his philosophical influences, his 
interpretations of Davidson and Kuhn are much like metaphorical conceits 
themselves.  Rorty presents the arguments of both men through the filter of his own 
particular philosophical commitments and in doing so he alters the way we see their 
arguments.  The unique slant that Rorty puts on his interpretations of these two 
thinkers is encapsulated by his suggestion that novel metaphors and new descriptions 
of the world are meaningless in the strongest sense.  That is, that they do not just say 
things that are unusual but do not say anything meaningful at all.  Rorty seems to be 
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aware of the strain that this interpretation puts on Davidson’s original thesis:  
  
Davidson does, occasionally, say things which seem to support the view 
that metaphors have “cognitive content”.  For example: “Metaphors often 
make us notice aspects of things we did not notice before; no doubt they 
bring surprising analogies and similarities to our attention.”125 
 
Davidson’s original argument was designed to show only that metaphors do not have 
a special kind of meaning that is irreducible to literal interpretation.  Rorty, however, 
associates such acts of literal interpretation with a conventionalism that fails to do 
justice to the novel character of metaphorical expressions.  Even though Rorty agrees 
with the positivist principle that the meaning of an expression is exhausted by its 
literal interpretation he has preconceptions about the conventional nature of literal 
meaning that lead him to claim that in order to convey the role of metaphorical 
expressions it is necessary to give them potential significance beyond any literal 
interpretation.
126
  In the course of appropriating Davidson’s argument Rorty interprets 
Davidson himself as having also given them such significance.  In actual fact, 
Davidson’s argument is designed specifically to deny metaphors such significance.  
To put it bluntly, Davidson does not share Rorty’s belief that in order to say something 
new it is necessary to talk nonsense. 
 Rorty’s account of the non-cognitive nature intellectual creativity also colours 
his interpretation of Kuhn’s work.  Rorty sees support for his account of intellectual 
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innovation in Kuhn’s observation that very often a change in our scientific outlook 
comes about when a description of the world that originally seems absurd gains 
influence and becomes the norm:  
 
Kuhn’s examples of “revolutionary” change in science were, as he himself 
remarked… cases in which a scientist has said something which sounds so 
silly that it is hard to believe that we have understood him properly.
127
 
 
Kuhn observes that the history of scientific advancement does not simply involve the 
accumulation of scientific facts but involves periodic transformations in theory that 
confound previous notions of what is fact.  These “revolutions” are marked by 
moments in history when scientists propose things that seem absurd in the context of 
current theory and Rorty claims that this confirms his belief that the novel 
propositions that cause changes in our intellectual outlook are originally meaningless.  
As with Davidson’s theory of metaphor, however, Rorty’s reading of Kuhn skews his 
original argument.  Kuhn never denies that history’s revolutionary propositions were 
meaningful in the minimal sense of being comprehensible.  For example, even though 
Kuhn observes that the proposition that the Earth moves around the sun seemed 
absurd in the context of sixteenth century belief he does not deny that it was a 
comprehensible proposition.  Rorty, by contrast, does make such assertions when he 
combines his stark Darwinian account of intellectual history with his understanding of 
the non-cognitive nature of intellectual innovation: 
 
To have a meaning is to have a place in a language game. Metaphors, by 
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definition, do not.  […] Uttering a sentence without a fixed place in a 
language-game is, as the positivists rightly have said, to utter something 
which is neither true nor false.  […] But this is not to say that it may not, 
in time, become a truth-value candidate.
128
 
 
According to Rorty, intellectual revolutions occur when eccentric geniuses utter 
sentences that do not initially mean anything but cause alterations in our linguistic 
conventions so that they come to be regarded as literally meaningful.  New 
“metaphoric re-descriptions” become understood not as a result of being given a 
literal interpretation but by changing what we take to be literally meaningful in the 
first place.   
 Ironically, given Rorty’s professed support for Davidson’s rejection of the idea 
of a conceptual scheme, Rorty’s interpretation of Kuhn’s argument emulates the 
unsympathetic interpretation that Davidson gives in “On the Very the Idea of a 
Conceptual Scheme”.129  The idea that in the course of an intellectual revolution our 
understanding can alter so radically that what was once meaningless becomes 
meaningful evokes the idea of radical conceptual variance that Davidson finds 
untenable.  Such revolutions are not just a case of taking something to be true that was 
not previously thought to be so.  They are cases in which our understanding alters to 
the extent that what was completely meaningless for us becomes meaningful to us.  
According to Davidson, when Kuhn talks of scientists “working in different worlds” 
before and after a scientific revolution and of them having “incommensurable” 
conceptual paradigms he is positing this kind of fundamental conceptual difference:  
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Kuhn […] wants us to think of different observers of the same world who 
come to it with incommensurable systems of concepts. […] 
“Incommensurable” is, of course [Kuhn’s] word for “not 
intertranslatable”.130 
 
In fact, it is not at all certain that Kuhn meant what Davidson takes him to mean by 
the term “incommensurable”.  In the postscript of the third edition of The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, for example, Kuhn acknowledges that communication 
problems between people who hold incommensurable beliefs can be resolved through 
translation.
131
  Both parties can understand each other’s positions even though they 
disagree over which to believe.  Nevertheless, Rorty is led by the logic of his 
understanding of the non-cognitive nature of intellectual innovation into making the 
same conflation that Davidson accuses Kuhn of making.  For Rorty, 
“incommensurable” does mean “not intertranslatable”.  Although Rorty tries to defend 
Kuhn in the face of Davidson’s criticism Rorty reads Kuhn in the same way that lead 
to that criticism in the first place because he adopts a theory of intellectual innovation 
that is un-Davidsonian.  
 As far as Davidson is concerned, the role that metaphors play in our culture 
can be captured without supposing that they have significance besides the literal 
translation that we give to them.  The role of metaphors (besides startling us) is to 
suggest analogies and similarities that do make literal sense and so it is wrong to deny 
them such translatability and sense.  As I have already intimated, part of the reason 
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why Rorty does deny them such translatability and sense is that he wants to preserve 
the idea of varying “conceptual schemes”.  In order to define the character of a 
metaphoric re-description Rorty believes that it is necessary to deny them the meaning 
that the property of translatability confers.  To posit such translatability would be to 
posit the existence of an antecedent understanding for them to conform to and would 
suggest that our concepts are not as mobile an army as Rorty is inclined to believe 
they are.  Even though Rorty often endorses Davidson’s claim that our “conceptual 
scheme” is largely stable, Rorty’s theory of metaphor leaves that endorsement 
sounding vacuous.  As I stated in the last chapter, as far as Rorty is concerned all of 
our concepts are “planks in the boat” that can be moved about.  What we take to be 
meaningful is freely open to change through the acceptance of any new combination 
of terms.  If our language is just a disposition to respond in various ways to various 
stimuli then there is no telling what that response could be.   
 Rorty encourages us to believe that nothing constrains us from accepting any 
new metaphor.  Such constraint would suggest that we are qualified to decide what is 
literally true and what is not in advance of an innovation.  Rorty associates the belief 
in such a qualification with a form of realism that aims to constrain our use of 
metaphor and he sees no way to appreciate our use of metaphor without abandoning 
realism.  According to Rorty, metaphor delivers what might be termed a kaleidoscope 
of different descriptions that confounds our attempt to conceive of a single and 
essential form of literal description.  What we take to be literally meaningful is 
continually changing because, to quote Nietzsche, our use of metaphor “continually 
confuses the conceptual categories and cells by bringing forward new transferences, 
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metaphors and metonymies.”132  Davidson, on the other hand, suggests that this 
perceived confusion is an illusion.  Rather than take metaphors at face value and be so 
confused Davidson proposes that we understand metaphors by translating them into 
our underlying grasp of what makes literal sense.  Davidson suggests that the use of 
metaphor is compatible with realism because rather than confuse our sense of what is 
literal and meaningful it actually relies on it by representing reality in an unusual but 
still meaningful way.  Even though Davidson denies that metaphors have a special 
kind of meaning that is irreducible to literal interpretation he suggests that we can 
entertain an alternative to Rorty’s Platonic conception of the non-cognitive nature of 
metaphor.  In fact, by considering one particular contemporary rival to Plato’s position 
on the cognitive status of metaphor we can challenge Rorty’s insistence that a belief in 
the significance of metaphor must put us at odds with realism. 
 
Footnotes to Aristotle 
 
Often, Rorty cites Jacques Derrida as a key figure in the fight for freedom from the 
Platonism that he believes holds the realist captive.133  Rorty appropriates the 
argument of Derrida’s “White Mythology” in order to challenge the presumption that 
we are able to deal in a kind of literal language that avoids metaphor.  In attacking that 
presumption Rorty assumes that Derrida intends to extinguish our pretension to 
realism.  Yet, it would be wrong to think that Derrida’s treatment of metaphor 
complements Rorty’s.  It can be argued that Derrida actually offers an alternative for 
realists.  This is illustrated by the fact that the accounts of the anti-realist character of 
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metaphor that Rorty and the early Nietzsche both give make them resolutely un-
Aristotelian.  The representationalist concept of truth is central to Aristotle’s account 
of what makes a good metaphor in the Poetics. Derrida sums up Aristotle’s position in 
“White Mythology”: 
 
The definition of metaphor is in its place in the Poetics, which opens as a 
treatise on mimēsis.  Mimēsis is never without the theoretical perception 
of resemblance or similarity, that is, of that which will always be posited 
as the condition for metaphor.  Homoiōsis is not only constitutive of the 
value of truth (alētheia) which governs the entire chain; it is that without 
which the metaphorical operation is impossible.  “To produce a good 
metaphor is to see a likeness.”  The condition for metaphor (for good and 
true metaphor) is the condition for truth […] Metaphor, thus, as an effect 
of mimēsis and homoiōsis, the manifestation of analogy, will be a means 
of knowledge.
134
  
 
Derrida’s point here is that, for Aristotle, a good metaphor is a kind of representation 
that conveys real truth because it relies for its success on a likeness to whatever it 
represents.  Aristotle argues that although by using metaphors we may combine ideas 
in ways that seem to confound literal sense we do not necessarily “insinuate wrong 
ideas” by means of them.  On this view “speaking of things as they are” in Locke’s 
restrictive literal-minded sense is not the only way to inform or instruct.  By bringing 
ideas together against the grain of Locke’s approach metaphors can be found to shed a 
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revealing light on reality.  
Christopher Norris has elaborated on Derrida’s discussion of Aristotle in the 
following way:  
 
[…] it is precisely the virtue of ‘good’ metaphors to provide a basis for 
analogical reasoning from things already known to things whose 
properties can best be inferred through the perception of resemblance or 
natural-kind affinity.  In other words, there is always a mimetic 
component in the process of knowledge-acquisition, whatever those 
subsequent stages of advance that enable thinking to reduce its 
dependence on “naive” or “unrectified” images, metaphors, and modes of 
perceptual-intuitive grasp.
135
 
 
Norris argues that the practices of mimetic representation, comparison and 
metaphorical transference are fundamental to our cognitive achievements.  The 
metaphorical application of familiar ideas allows us to grasp unfamiliar things in our 
efforts to understand them.  The notion of “rectification” that Norris employs here 
comes from the work of the French philosopher of science Georges Canguilhem who 
has made a study of the way that figurative expressions (for example “tissue” or 
“cell”) are applied within the scientific field before extended and closer study of the 
relevant objects produces more particular concepts.
136
  On this view, metaphors can be 
an aid to realist scientific inquiry rather than a hindrance to it.  They can aid the 
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“extended process of conceptual assimilation” that Kuhn describes as facilitating 
scientific discovery.
137
 
Aristotle’s realist challenge to Plato’s position on the cognitive status of 
metaphor is especially pertinent when considering Nietzsche’s account of the 
formation of concepts in “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” (that most eclectic 
of philosophical treatises) because Nietzsche draws on a parody of Plato’s idealism in 
his derisive portrayal of the knowledge that supposedly arises from our attempt to 
perceive kinds.  According to the early Nietzsche, our concepts of kinds are 
combinations of empirical ideas that have been forced together. They are “coins that 
have lost their embossing”.138  By forming concepts we express “one-sided 
preferences, first for this, then for that property of a thing” and hypostatize those 
choices as if they expressed “the essence of things”.139  For example the formation of 
our concept of leaves “awakens the idea that, in addition to the leaves, there exists in 
nature the “leaf”: the original model according to which all leaves were perhaps 
woven, sketched, measured, coloured, curled, and painted – but by incompetent 
hands, so that no specimen has turned out to be a correct, trustworthy, and faithful 
likeness of the original model.”140  In this way we are removed from the “unique and 
entirely individual” nature of things.  In “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”, 
Nietzsche employs a parody of Plato’s idealism in order to satirize our attempts at 
conceptualizing the sensible world and insists that our concepts can only dislodge us 
from the world and confine us in a realm of illusion.
141
  Nietzsche shows no sign of 
Aristotle’s belief that our effort to understand the world through our perception of 
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kinds may provide knowledge.  Nietzsche shares Plato’s “Heraclitean” conception of 
the irredeemably contingent, transitory and mutable nature of the sensible world.  Any 
attempt to posit such kinds contradicts the “flux of experience”. All that we can do is 
contrive to create some order out of the chaos by supposing that some of our 
metaphors form more stable “concepts”. 
In “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” Nietzsche associates realism with 
belief in a pure and correct form of representation that captures “the essence” of 
reality and in the absence of such a form of representation he states that “we possess 
nothing but metaphors for things – metaphors which correspond in no way to the 
original entities.” 142  Nietzsche insists that realism requires a purer and more correct 
form of representation than mere metaphors provide.  Metaphors draw analogies 
between diverse things and in doing so they confound our attempts to define the 
essence of those things.  They present a plethora of diverse analogies that “continually 
confuses the conceptual categories.”143  When it comes to representing reality the fact 
that we employ different forms of representation means that the “correct” or “pure” 
form that (he assumes) realism demands eludes us. In order to represent reality we 
have to employ some kind of “metaphor”.  The problem for the early Nietzsche and 
for Rorty is that neither can conceive of a form of realism that accommodates this 
kind of contingency.  Such an impure form of realism is contrary to philosophical 
doctrine as they see it.  Plato’s cave allegory is canonical for both men and while we 
remain in the cave amongst shadows scepticism is the only option.  This is why Rorty 
prefers to deny the representational nature of language altogether.  If transcendence or 
scepticism is all that representationalist realism allows then it is better to change our 
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story and deny that our language is meant to represent anything in the first place. 
What Aristotle’s philosophy offers, on the other hand, is a line that is not so 
divided.  Holding the standard of homoiōsis to be constitutive of the value of truth 
creates a kind of realism that is less of an all or nothing affair.  It enables us to 
conceive of a form of representation that has truth and realism without being “mirror-
like” in an absolute sense.  Metaphors, for example, may analogize things that are not 
identical but can still possess truth and meaning by virtue of a likeness between those 
things.  The standard of realism then becomes more a matter of likeness than of 
perfect “mirroring”.  This is true not only of metaphors in our conventional sense of 
the term but also in Nietzsche’s wider sense.  Whatever form of representation we 
consider we can regard it as capable of being realistic and challenge Nietzsche’s 
assumption in “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” that scepticism is inevitable 
in the absence of a pure form of representation.  We can deny Nietzsche’s assumption 
in “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” that the “metaphorical” nature of our 
representations must render reality mysterious and suppose that we can represent 
reality using different representations while still remaining realistic.  Reality then 
becomes not so remote as to be completely mysterious but not so inconsistent as to be 
identified with its various representations.  In this way we can maintain a distinction 
between the subject-independent reality that we represent and the various ways that 
we represent that reality without succumbing to scepticism. 
Plato described the cave of his famous allegory as a theatrical space that is cut 
off from reality.  The prisoners inside the cave observe shadows on the wall that are 
cast by artificial objects.  In order to know reality it is necessary for the prisoners to 
escape the cave and confront reality directly.  A less absolutist realism, on the other 
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hand, might imagine people observing likenesses of real objects.  Those likenesses 
could be thought to inform us about the nature of reality.  With this less absolutist 
approach we could retain realism as a standard against which we judge competing 
representations.  Real objects could be thought to have an intrinsic nature that we can 
be right or wrong about without requiring a single absolute representation of that 
nature.  This preserves the kind of kaleidoscope of meaning that makes metaphor such 
a rich descriptive form while restricting the “anything goes” aestheticism that Rorty 
and the early Nietzsche seem to advocate.  In this way we could achieve Rorty’s 
stated aim of laying Plato’s allegory to rest without abandoning the notion of 
representation and of a reality to be successfully or unsuccessfully represented.  We 
would no longer be able to imagine ourselves judging our representations from an 
absolute standpoint but that would not invalidate the standard of realism tout court. 
 In his paper “Inquiry as Recontextualisation: An Anti-Dualist Account of 
Interpretation” Rorty sums up an opposing argument to his position in the following 
way:  
 
The essentialist rejoins by saying that although the descriptions may vary 
depending on the describer, the thing described does not.  He accuses the 
antiessentialist of having confused the order of being with the order of 
knowing […]144 
 
Accusing the anti-essentialist of committing the epistemic fallacy, the “essentialist” (a 
term that Rorty regards as being synonomous with “realist”) opposes the attempt to do 
                                                          
144
 Rorty, “Inquiry as Recontextualisation: An Anti-Dualist Account of Interpretation” in Objectivity, 
Relativism and Truth, 93-110, p. 100. 
  114  
away with the notion of an independent objective reality.  Rorty responds by stating 
that his anti-representationalism does not deny the existence of a reality that is 
independent of our descriptions.  It simply denies that our descriptions are meant to 
represent that reality.  Rorty’s and the early Nietzche’s anti-realisms are united by a 
refusal to believe that we can know a self-consistent independent reality while it is 
being, as Rorty says, “reflected in all those mirrors”.145  What I have been arguing, on 
the contrary, is that belief in our ability to represent a reality that has an intrinsic 
nature does not entail the need for a single or essential form of representation to 
capture its nature.  In the first chapter I argued that we can represent the same 
objective reality using different anatomical principles - a fact that is exemplified by 
science’s stratification of reality into objects that range from the sub-atomic to the 
astronomic.  In this chapter I have argued that the use of metaphors gives further 
scope for representing the same reality in different ways.  Metaphors may, on the face 
of it, “insinuate wrong ideas” and “confuse the conceptual categories” by analogizing 
things that are not identical but this does not mean that they are unrealistic.  It is by 
virtue of whatever degree of likeness a good metaphor has that it provides a truthful 
representation of its subject, often encouraging us to see that subject in new and 
enlightening ways.  
 By adopting this kind of non-reductive realism we can agree with Rorty that 
the Mirror of Nature (in his absolutist and reductionist sense) is a myth whilst 
avoiding the less plausible aspects of his anti-realist alternative.  Instead of denying 
that our language represents reality altogether we can accept the contingency that 
Rorty insists goes into forming our descriptions and maintain that this does not rule 
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out our realism.  For example, we can take his metaphor of “the tool” to be a useful 
one (among others) when thinking of language and accept that our descriptions cut the 
world up in lots of useful ways while also denying that this rules out our realism. 
Instead of rejecting the notion that “truth is correspondence to reality” because we 
have given up on the idea that “some one among the languages mankind has used to 
deal with the universe is the one the universe prefers – the one which cuts things at the 
joints” we can save the notion by denying that realism demands only one “essential” 
conception.
146
  We can accept that our linguistic descriptions are able to represent the 
world in various ways while still maintaining that those ways are realistic.  By 
relinquishing the idea that there must be a single privileged way of representing 
reality we can embrace the realism of the ways that we do represent reality.  With 
Donald Davidson we can save the notion of objective truth by denying that it stands 
for an inscrutable absolute outside of our “schemes and science”.  
 Returning to Kuhn’s non-teleological reading of intellectual history, this kind 
of realism can also help us to make sense of the notion of scientific progress albeit as 
an imperfect and inefficient kind of progress.  We can accept that science advances by 
improving the accuracy with which our words “attach to nature” (to use a phrase of 
Kuhn’s) without supposing that we are guided in advance by a perfect “paradigm” that 
does not need periodic revision.  This is what I take to be the moral of Kuhn’s 
argument in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  In discussing how it is that 
science can be thought to progress through paradigm shifts Kuhn describes science as 
“a process whose successive stages are characterised by an increasingly detailed and 
refined understanding of nature” but also as one in which “even the most striking past 
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success provides no guarantee that crisis can be indefinitely postponed.”147  Kuhn 
presents the history of science as a succession of imperfect representations of nature 
that have each provided us with an improved understanding despite their subsequent 
crises and revisions.  He describes scientific inquiry as an inefficient exploratory 
practice that lacks a “plan that had been present at the start” but nevertheless makes 
progress as new paradigms “usually preserve a great deal of the most concrete parts of 
past achievement.”148  It is a practice in which our understanding can be so imperfect 
and can change so much that “though the world does not change with a change of 
paradigm, the scientist afterward works in a different world.”149  This is not the kind 
of radical change in “conceptual scheme” that Davidson and Rorty interpret Kuhn as 
describing but it is change that sometimes radically alters our conception of reality.  
Science is a practice in which our dependence on representations can result in this 
kind of fallibility and change while it nevertheless continues to improve our grasp on 
reality.  
 When Rorty discusses science he often applies his analogy of “the tool” in 
order to encourage us not to think of it as a representation.  He urges us to value 
science for its practical usefulness rather than any “mirror-like” representational 
properties.  The virtue of using the analogy of “the tool” when thinking about science 
and language is that it moves us away from the kind of “metaphysical, reductionist” 
conception of description that Rorty does so much to discredit.  It allows us to 
distance ourselves from the need to find that one perfect and metaphysically essential 
way of describing reality that Rorty believes realists hanker for.  The problem with 
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Rorty’s approach is that he denies that this tool has to accurately “fit” the reality that it 
is designed to work on.  This denial is not necessary so long as we avoid becoming 
fixated by “metaphysical, reductionist needs” as if we are bound to exclusively 
identify reality with the particular description that we apply to it at any one time. 
Often the task at hand determines the instrument used.  As Rorty says: 
 
The line between a giraffe and the surrounding air is clear enough if you 
are a human being interested in hunting for meat.  If you are a language-
using ant or amoeba, or a space voyager observing us from far above, that 
line is not so clear, and it is not clear that you would need or have a word 
for “giraffe” in your language.  More generally, it is not clear that any of 
the millions of ways of describing the piece of space-time occupied by 
what we call a giraffe is any closer to the way things are in themselves 
than any of the others. 
 
Rorty here rightly insists that we describe things as we do because of our needs and 
interests.  Where he is wrong is in supposing that because no single description is 
“closer to the way things are in themselves than any of the others” we must deny the 
realism of those descriptions.  Once you give up on the idea that there must be one 
single and exclusive form of description that captures the way things are the relativity 
of descriptions to purposes or perspectives no longer rules out their realism.  Even 
apparently unrealistic representations – like metaphors - can have a degree of realism. 
 Having explored Rorty’s theory of metaphor I would now like to turn to 
Rorty’s account of personal identity in order to show how his anti-realist theory of 
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metaphor is employed in his political philosophy.  Rorty describes a practice of “self-
creation” in which individuals achieve autonomy through the creation of new 
metaphors for their identity.  In order to explore the plausibility of this account of 
personhood I will offer an interpretation of the poetry of Sylvia Plath as an example of 
self-creation.  I will also look at the implications of Rorty’s claim that the idea of a 
common human nature must be abandoned.  Rorty places great emphasis on the role 
of the poet when it comes to generating our sense of solidarity.  To examine this 
approach I will look at the work of Tony Harrison.  
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Chapter 4 - The Poeticised Republic 
 
Strong Poets 
 
So far I have been primarily concerned with Rorty’s views on the nature of knowledge 
and his attempt to make a radical departure from “the notion of knowledge as 
accuracy of representation”.  We have seen that Rorty’s desire for such a departure 
springs from his limited reading of the possibilities within realism.  I have argued 
against Rorty’s characterisation of realism and in favour of an approach that admits 
the contingencies that accompany the practice of representation.  I agree with Rorty 
that we must abandon the Platonism that demands a single, perfect and exclusive view 
of reality and I agree that we must resist scepticism towards forms of description that 
do not meet that imagined ideal.  Neither requirement however imposes upon us the 
need to abandon representationalism and realism.  A less metaphysical, less 
reductionist realism provides an accurate account of the way that we (including 
scientists) successfully represent reality albeit in contingent, various and imperfect 
ways.  Rorty’s anti-realist stance is to a large extent motivated by a laudable wish to 
disabuse philosophers of the belief that they are able to see further out of the cave 
than everyone else.  However, he is wrong to insist that this requires us to abandon 
realism.  According to the set of Platonic oppositions that inform Rorty’s thought a 
representation that is contingent cannot be realistic and so the idea of representing an 
objective reality that has an intrinsic nature is ruled out so long as we do it in 
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contingent ways.  I have argued, on the contrary, that the contingency of a 
representation need not rule out its realism once we fulfil Rorty’s stated intention once 
and for all and discard the philosophical dogmas that create such oppositions.  
 Having got to this point I would like to change focus slightly. Rorty is as much 
a political philosopher as he is an (anti)epistemologist and he places great faith in the 
utopian potential of his anti-realist approach.  In this chapter I would like to continue 
my assessment of Rorty’s anti-realism while examining its influence on his political 
philosophy.  As we have seen, Rorty’s utopia would be a “poeticised culture”.150  It 
would be a culture that has realised that “metaphoric redescriptions are the mark of 
genius and revolutionary leaps forward.”151  This culture would have abandoned the 
need to find one privileged, literal way of describing the world and thereby have 
embraced the role that metaphors play in our language.  It would have woken up to 
the impossibility of reducing our language so that it corresponds to the way the world 
is and recognized our potential for describing the world in endlessly new and creative 
ways.  Rorty places great emphasis on that potential to the extent that he regards the 
truth to be extremely “mobile”.  For him, our inability to isolate a description that 
exclusively captures the way things are makes truth merely “the fossilized product of 
some past act of imagination.”152  For Rorty, metaphors are not insightful ways of 
representing reality that rely for their success on a correspondence to reality.  They are 
inventive uses of language that have no realist truth content.  There is no truth in this 
sense as far as Rorty is concerned.  The ways in which we describe the world are 
entirely contingent on the acts of imagination of the poets who first produced them. 
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Rorty envisages a utopia in which the hierarchy of Plato’s Republic is turned on its 
head and the creative artist takes the place of the philosopher as the most important 
cultural figure.  
Rorty states that a poet is best able to appreciate our potential for re-describing 
the world because they are “the person who uses words as they have never been 
used”.153  By this strength they can break out of “one perspective, into another”.154  
They accept the contingency of our descriptions and are open to new and surprising 
metaphors whereas the philosopher misguidedly tries to entrench one particular 
description as if it captured the reality of things.  In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 
Rorty states that the Romantic poets serve as the best historical example of the kind of 
figure that he has in mind because they regarded creative art as the primary tool of 
moral and intellectual reform.  For example, by setting out to describe the lives of 
uneducated country folk in their poetry Wordsworth and Coleridge sought to elevate 
them in the minds of the reading public.
155
  The Romantics believed that our social 
and intellectual attitudes could be changed through the creative re-description of the 
world.  They confirm for Rorty that the truth is made rather than found and show that 
language is a tool for “grabbing hold of causal forces and making them do what we 
want, altering ourselves and our environment to suit our aspirations.”156  Rorty 
emphasises the way that our descriptions of the world are coloured by our values and 
claims that this gives us the power to transform the world.  The imposition of our 
values makes the un-mirror-like nature of our descriptions most obvious.  So long as 
our relationship to reality is mediated in this way we cannot attain that perfectly 
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“objective” representation that Rorty regards as being the object of realism and so it is 
better to deny the representational nature of language and treat it simply as a tool for 
getting the world that we want.  
Rorty argues that our realism is ruled out by our tendency to describe things in 
ways that are contingent on our interests.  Our inability to attain an absolute 
conception of reality prevents us from corresponding to reality.  As a consequence, we 
must accept that our particular beliefs do not correspond to reality.  What we take to 
be true about ourselves is a reflection of the way that we have come to describe 
ourselves rather than a representation of reality.  The social changes that have 
occurred over the centuries have occurred because we have periodically re-created 
ourselves in line with our historically contingent values and not because we have 
increased our objectivity.  When Wordsworth and Coleridge set out to re-describe the 
lives of poor rural people they were performing such a re-creation.  They were not 
describing reality but using their imaginative creativity to change what those people 
“are”.  Rorty claims that it is this potential to re-describe ourselves that fuels social 
change rather than any increase in our objectivity.  This gives the poet a leading 
cultural significance in Rorty’s political philosophy and prompts him to claim that his 
anti-realist philosophy is most suited to a hopeful utopian liberal politics. 
There are no objective grounds on which to base our self-descriptions in 
Rorty’s poeticised culture.  Our “nature” changes as our beliefs change and our self-
descriptions reflect that contingency.  For example, our liberal values do not reflect 
the fact that we really each have an intrinsic equality or autonomy.  Rorty denies that 
autonomy is “something which all human beings have within them and which society 
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can release by ceasing to repress them.”157  He is suspicious of any attempt to justify a 
set of beliefs by appealing to an intrinsic reality.  The fact that throughout the 
centuries we have described ourselves in ways that have suited different beliefs and 
values is an indication that we cannot isolate an essential (and therefore on his terms a 
“real”) nature for ourselves.  Rorty urges us to approach our self-descriptions with the 
same sense of irony that he urges us to adopt in our dealings with the non-human and 
so he denies that his own commitment to liberal democracy is founded on a 
conception of human nature that is objective.  It merely signifies his membership of a 
culture that has come to describe people as equal and autonomous.  In fact, Rorty’s 
ironic attitude leads him to challenge that description as when he states that autonomy 
is only “something which certain particular human beings hope to attain by self-
creation, and which few actually do.”  Rorty cannot seek to justify his own politics by 
appealing to an intrinsic reality.  As far as he is concerned, it is up to the poet to 
transform the world into something that matches a particular set of values while 
ironist philosophers remind us of their lack of objectivity.  
In Rorty’s culture only intellectuals would worry about the contingency of our 
beliefs. Non-intellectuals would not worry.  Rorty’s culture would not be one that 
“socialized its youth in such a way as to make them continually dubious about their 
own process of socialization”.158  Doing so would risk engendering resentment 
towards the status quo.  Instead, it is up to poets to question those contingencies in the 
privacy of their own idiom.
 159
  They are the ones who challenge convention by using 
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words as they have never been used.  This is how Rorty defines autonomy in his 
liberal culture.  It is a state that is reached by certain individuals who privately react 
against convention.  In this regard, the non-conformism that characterizes Rorty’s 
account of intellectual innovation also characterises his account of the poet’s life so 
that the use of a “literal description of one’s individuality, which is to say any use of 
an inherited language-game for that purpose, will necessarily fail.”160  There is also no 
“real self” for the poet to discover.  On Rorty’s terms, the belief in a real self is a sign 
of bad faith.  It expresses a desire for a human “essence” that transcends our necessary 
contingency.  Rorty insists that the project of gaining autonomy requires the formation 
of novel descriptions or “metaphors” that create new people for us to be.  
 Rorty accepts our physical existence and its “brute, inhuman, causal 
stubbornness” but he insists that “this should not be confused with… an intentional 
stubbornness, an insistence on being described in a certain way, its own way.”161  As 
far as individual people are concerned, Rorty denies that there is a “right” way to 
describe someone and he claims that each person’s identity is effectively produced in 
the act of description.  The fact that those descriptions do not represent reality gives 
us free rein to be creative: 
 
This is the difference between the will to truth and the will to self-
overcoming.  It is the difference between thinking of redemption as 
making contact with something larger and more enduring than oneself and 
redemption as Nietzsche describes it: “recreating all ‘it was’ into a ‘thus I 
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willed it.’”162 
 
Rorty takes inspiration from Alexander Nehmas’s aestheticist reading of Nietzsche in 
Nietzsche: Life as Literature in order to challenge the notion that we have a pre-given 
identity that we are beholden to.
163
  Nehamas emphasises Nietzsche’s denial of the 
existence of a reality that underlies appearances in order to present the self as 
something akin to a fictional story that we create as we live.  According to this 
interpretation, Nietzsche’s philosophy of becoming undermines the idea that knowing 
oneself is a matter of discovery.  The self is not already formed for us to discover but 
is created by us.  Similarly, self-creation, for Rorty, is not a process of “coming to 
know a truth which was out there (or in here) all the time”.164  Some may use a script 
and a language that their culture has prepared in advance but for the poet it is an act of 
originality and creativity for which they use “words never used before”.165  
Since, according to Rorty, a literal description of a person’s individuality will 
fail to capture the novel character of the contingencies that shape them, the self-
creating poet must create new forms of language that challenge what we take to be 
meaningful.  In his paper “Feminism and Pragmatism” Rorty states that a kind of 
separatism is required to prevent the dissolution of such a project so that “a language 
[can be] gradually put together… in the course of a long series of flirtations with 
meaninglessness”: 
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“For meaninglessness is exactly what you have to flirt with when you are 
in between social, and in particular linguistic, practices – unwilling to take 
part in an old one but not yet having succeeded in creating a new one”.166 
 
In the same way that intellectual revolutions occur when eccentric geniuses utter 
words that do not mean anything so, according to Rorty, social changes occur when 
particular people start to be described in novel and incomprehensible ways.  As we 
saw in regard to his theory of intellectual innovation Rorty defines “meaningfulness” 
along narrow lines.  In order to respond to contingency, or to be original, Rorty claims 
that it is necessary to defy the conventional conditions of meaningfulness.  We are not 
in a position to capture new contingencies with our existing cognitive scheme.  In the 
case of the ironist poet, being novel requires the individual to defy what is considered 
meaningful when describing him- or herself: 
 
The process of coming to know oneself, confronting one’s contingency 
[…] is identical with the process of inventing a new language – that is, of 
thinking up some new metaphors.
167
 
 
Rorty appeals to his theory of metaphor in order to describe the practice of gaining 
autonomy as a creative practice that demands separatism and radical alterity.  Novel 
poets are so different from other people that they fail to make sense to them.  In the 
absence of a common cognitive scheme each autonomous individual is identified by 
their own idiosyncratic and untranslatable metaphors.  
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 Rorty believes that his philosophy is suited to a pluralistic liberal politics 
because it avoids the suggestion that one of our self-descriptions has the privilege of 
representing the essential truth about us.  It encourages freedom and tolerance by 
denying that any particular description of us is the right one.  Yet, Rorty claims that in 
order to achieve this freedom and tolerance we must do away with the idea that we 
share a common conceptual landscape.  On his terms, having common concepts 
would commit their possessors to confinement within a set of conventionalist and 
essentialist limits that dictate what it is possible for them to say.  Rorty defines these 
limits by suggesting that they rule out novelty and contingency.  He claims that our 
“metaphoric redescriptions” are too confusing to our existing notions of what makes 
sense.  Although Rorty pays lip service to Davidson claim that there are no such 
things as “conceptual schemes” Rorty’s conception of the non-cognitive nature of 
intellectual innovation belies that service.  He argues that new “metaphors” cannot be 
understood using our existing conceptual scheme and so we lack the commonality to 
our cognition that could afford common understanding.  For Rorty, such commonality 
would require an essential, privileged and exclusive metaphysical standpoint that 
transcends the diversity, novelty and contingency of our lives.  In the absence of such 
a standpoint we lack the kind of common concepts that would allow us to comprehend 
each other.  Rorty posits precisely the kind of conceptual relativism that Davidson 
rejects and presents a picture in which different people and cultures inhabit different 
“conceptual schemes”.  
 Rorty envisages a form of liberalism that Jean-François Lyotard has 
questioned because it imagines each person or culture operating a kind of authority 
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“whose rationale is not in principle accessible to everybody”.168  By giving up on the 
possibility of understanding each other we create a kind of terror.  Rorty states that 
people can only rationally accept or understand new ideas by holding most of their 
old ideas constant.  They have to be able to invoke some of their old ideas in the 
course of understanding the new ones.  If they have to make a more radical break in 
the continuity of their cognition they cannot do so “rationally”.  They have to say, 
helplessly “it just happened; somehow I got converted.”169  In the absence of 
continuity between the ideas of different people and cultures they can only seem like 
alien forces to each other.  In response to this problem Rorty falls back on Davidson.  
He argues that Lyotard would be justified in his claims if it were true that we 
encounter other people and cultures “without pretending to establish any continuity 
between [our modes] of discourse”. 
 
“If they did not, as Donald Davidson has remarked, it is hard to see how 
the two would ever have been able to learn enough of each other’s 
languages to recognize the other as a language user”. 170 
 
Despite offering an un-Davidsonian account of language in order to reject the idea 
that we have the kind of commonality to our cognition that can afford common 
understanding Rorty invokes such commonality in order to play down the 
consequences of the former claim.  Although Rorty offers an account of conceptual 
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and cultural relativism that posits precisely the kind of barriers to comprehension that 
Davidson refuses to entertain – by suggesting, for example, that women are forced to 
“flirt with meaninglessness” when challenging sexism – he nevertheless shrugs off 
concerns by stating that differences between cultures, beliefs and discourses are not 
differences in “conceptual scheme” but merely “differences of opinion”.171  
 Rorty’s support for Davidson’s rejection of the idea of a “conceptual scheme” 
is equivocal. Rorty admires Davidson’s lack of interest in the notion of a true 
metaphysical reality beyond our cognition yet he is reluctant to accept the idea that we 
share a common cognitive landscape.  He supports Davidson’s attempt to relieve us of 
the need to distinguish our man-made language from the reality that it is thought to 
represent but he does not take this as licence to accept that our language describes a 
common, objective world.  Such commonality does not capture the sense of historical 
and cultural contingency that Rorty takes from Kuhn.  The idea that we have a 
common cognitive scheme does not seem to capture the kind of change and 
discontinuity that Kuhn describes taking place during intellectual revolutions: 
 
[…] though the world does not change with a change of paradigm, the 
scientist afterward works in a different world.
172
 
 
Some form of conceptual relativism seems necessary in order to capture the cognitive 
gestalt switch that is necessary to move from one world to the other.  The 
incommensurable nature of the two worlds seems to require incommensurable 
“conceptual schemes”.  This is why Rorty claims that sentences describing a new 
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world are meaningless to someone working in the old world.  The difference between 
the old and the new worlds that the revolutionary thinker switches between is so 
momentous that there seems to be nothing to stop our concepts from changing beyond 
recognition.  
 As far as Rorty is concerned, positing a degree of commonality to our 
cognition gives the realist philosopher something to get their teeth into.  It suggests 
that there is a common objective reality informing our linguistic practices that belies 
historical and cultural change and not a “mobile army of metaphors” that transform 
appearances like a kaleidoscope.  It seems to give encouragement to the “Platonic 
quest” to find some essential meaning to our concepts that stands apart from the 
vagaries of their use.  Rorty is resistant to the idea because that quest has traditionally 
aimed at transcending contingency.  It has aimed at penetrating behind our 
representations to what “we are really talking about”.  In challenging our 
“metaphysical” urge Rorty argues that the mechanism of metaphor makes it hard to 
maintain a sense of what we are really talking about.  He claims that when people say 
unusual things they confuse our concepts so much that it becomes hard to know what 
they are talking about.  We continually alter our conception of the world to the point 
that we fail to understand each other.  In the last chapter I tried to offer reasons to 
doubt this.  I argued that metaphors change and supplement our concepts in 
comprehensible ways based on the sense that we can make of them.  They do not alter 
our concepts beyond recognition but allow us to appreciate new conceptions of the 
world by means of such recognition.  That is not to say that our notions of what is to 
be believed do not change.  The question of whether something is to be believed is 
different from the question of whether it can be understood.  Rorty often seems to 
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confuse the two as if what we currently believe is all that we can understand.  This 
seems to be down to his insistence that all a thinker has to work with is an “inherited 
language-game” so that a sentence that diverges from conventional wisdom is by 
nature inherently meaningless.  He fails to credit us with the ability to entertain new 
and diverse descriptions of the world using a common language. 
The idea that our language provides a basis for common understanding among 
people with diverse lives implies that it does not limit us in the way that Rorty 
supposes.  It implies that our notion of what can count as meaningful extends beyond 
conventional wisdom.  For Rorty, as we have seen, our language is restricted in 
precisely this way.  He argues we are only able to understand controversial or unusual 
ideas by changing our notions of what counts as meaningful.  Rather than propose 
alternative descriptions of the world using common concepts Rorty claims that it is 
necessary to invent new and untranslatable ones for the purpose.  As a result, people 
who hold different beliefs and who employ different descriptions of the world have no 
common means of communicating those beliefs and descriptions.  On Rorty’s terms, 
people who hold particular beliefs do not just disagree with other claims but are 
unable to understand them.  He concedes that it is possible to learn these new 
languages so that they become part of a more inclusive culture but he maintains that 
they cannot be reconciled in a way that allows us to treat them as descriptions of the 
same reality.  Instead we must posit a plurality of separate and irreconcilable worlds 
and cultures that have no need or ability to enter into “rational” communication with 
one another.  In the absence of a common scheme for conceptualising the world we 
are unable to establish the terms on which such communication could take place. 
One might wonder where this leaves Rorty’s own liberal worldview.  We tend 
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to think of liberalism as an attempt to promote a conception of justice that is based on 
the idea that we share a common humanity.  This must become difficult once you have 
abandoned the kind of common scheme for conceptualizing the world that such an 
idea would require.  Rorty argues that, in order to solve this problem within his liberal 
utopia, it is necessary to separate the private realm of self-creation from the public 
realm of moral obligation.  In the next part of this chapter I would like to explore the 
plausibility of this separation.  I will do this by interpreting the work of Sylvia Plath 
as an example of the kind of creative process that Rorty has in mind when he 
describes the act of self-creation. 
 
Sylvia Path 
 
Sylvia Plath‘s poetic persona is renowned for expressing dissatisfaction with her 
contingencies.  Her suicide has often promoted critics to interpret her poetry as 
expressing, to use David Holbrook’s words “a dangerous rejection of life moving 
towards nihilism and an abandonment to hate.”173  Rorty himself diagnoses nihilism 
and hate – on the level of the private project of gaining autonomy – as expressions of 
a loss of aspiration due to our inability to emancipate a pure form of the self from 
“messy” contingency.174  For Rorty, this is a hangover from our tradition’s attempts to 
distil the self down until it corresponds to an independently autonomous centre, free 
from the marks of our particular place in the world.  For Holbrook, Plath’s poetry was 
an expression of her lack of satisfaction with the obligations of her inherited 
femininity.  According to him, this manifested itself in her impulse towards gaining 
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purity and towards destroying her contingencies.  It might seem unfair to align Rorty’s 
attack on philosophical nihilism with Holbrook’s reactionary attack on Plath’s 
rejection of her inherited femininity.  The difference between them is that whereas 
Holbrook would have preferred it if Plath had not lost faith in her inherited role, Rorty 
would have understood her doubts and would have deterred her from rejecting her 
contingencies by urging her to try and create a self that she did not have doubts about. 
            I want to claim that we can interpret Plath’s poetry not as a nihilistic rejection 
of life.  I want to identify in her poetry an attempt at self-creation.  In describing this 
actual struggle for self-creation I want to assess the viability of Rorty’s account of 
such a process. Doubts about the viability of Rorty’s account crop up in his essay 
“Freud and Moral Reflection”.  In this essay Rorty describes the unconscious as a 
partner in conversation: 
 
“What is novel in Freud’s view of the unconscious is his claim that our 
unconscious selves are not dumb, sullen, lurching brutes, but rather the 
intellectual peers of our conscious selves, possible conversational 
partners for those selves.”175 
 
We have seen how Rorty refuses to give the network of beliefs and desires that 
comprise the self over to a source of intentionality that is outside of those beliefs and 
desires.  Following Donald Davidson’s essay “Paradoxes of Irrationality”176, Rorty 
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says that there is no need to regard the self as anything more than a number of sets of 
beliefs and desires, each one a consistent package (a “quasi-self’’177).  He says that it 
is unnecessary to treat the unconscious as “a seething mass of inarticulate instinctual 
energies, a ‘reservoir of libido’ to which consistency is irrelevant.”178  Rorty seeks to 
show that such descriptions – which create a permanently disruptive gap in the 
coherence of our identity – can be jettisoned.  He says that Freud helped us to see that 
the unconscious “can be viewed as an alternative set [of beliefs and desires] 
inconsistent with the familiar set that we identify with consciousness, yet sufficiently 
coherent internally to count as a person.”179 
              The reason we tend to describe the unconscious as a “mob of ‘irrational’ 
brutes”180 that our intellect has to struggle with – rather than as an alternative intellect 
– is that “one’s unconscious beliefs are not reasons for a change in one’s conscious 
beliefs, but they may cause changes in the latter beliefs, just as may portions of one’s 
body (e.g., the retina, the fingertips, the pituitary gland, the gonads)”181.  On this view, 
the unconscious has a causal stubbornness that is akin to that of metaphors.  Just as 
metaphors become incorporated in our conscious beliefs and desires, our unconscious 
can become incorporated in an enlarged version of our conscious beliefs and desires.  
Trying to conceptualise this model of self-enlargement, Rorty writes: 
 
Once I could not figure out why I was acting so oddly, […] But now I 
shall be able to see my actions as rational, as making sense, though 
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perhaps based on mistaken premises.  I may even discover that those 
premises were not mistaken, that my unconscious knew better than I 
did.182 
 
Trying to explain why the “crazy quasi people” in you hold “the crazy views they 
do”183 makes it possible to re-appropriate your unconscious as a step towards 
becoming a self that you can call your own.  This is not a “true self” but it can be a 
self that has woven itself into a coherent configuration. 
            Doubts about the viability of this model are encapsulated by Rorty himself 
when he says: “this way of stating the aim of psychoanalytic treatment may seem to 
make everything sound too sweetly reasonable.”184  He also acknowledges that “the 
facts of resistance forbid the analyst to think in conversational terms.”185  On Rorty’s 
model, I think that this difficulty must be interpreted as stemming from the possible 
incompatibility of some of the sets of beliefs and desires that might comprise a self.  It 
is understandable that someone might resist and deny a belief or a desire that could 
cause them guilt and humiliation.  In this instance, a hostile relationship between 
selves would seem more likely than a conversational one.  Perhaps it might even 
involve a relationship to the unconscious that kept it unarticulated and more 
manifestly causal, rather than reasonable and conversational.  It is here, I think, that 
we can get a picture of the kind of strength that Rorty’s poet might need in order to 
listen to those selves and re-create them so she can say “thus I willed it”. 
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Sylvia Plath’s own poetry is notable for the explicit way that she lays herself 
bare in it.  Although, having said that, articulating her unconscious is shown by her to 
be very difficult.  Her unconscious usually turns up in less articulated, more causal 
and menacing incarnations.  Consider Plath’s poem “The Disquieting Muses”186 in 
which the sense of alienation that Holbrook identifies is expressed in a split between 
the homely self and a more seductive and also illicit and disquieting self: 
 
Mother, who made to order stories 
Of Mixie Blackshort the heroic bear, 
Mother, whose witches always, always 
Got baked into gingerbread, I wonder 
Whether you saw them, whether you said 
Words to rid me of those three ladies 
Nodding by night around my bed, 
Mouthless, eyeless, with stitched bald head.187  
 
What is most notable here is that these muses are “mouthless, eyeless and bald.”  
They embody the contingencies that make Plath the alienated individual she is but 
they are not in conversation with her.  I do not think that Rorty would subscribe 
wholeheartedly to Freud’s notion of the “return of the repressed” because it 
immediately assumes an antagonistic and estranged relationship between the 
conscious and the unconscious.  But Rorty does concede that unconscious beliefs and 
desires – that can be potentially incorporated in our consciousness beliefs and desires 
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– can have an unarticulated stubbornness as causes of changes in conscious beliefs 
and desires.  Even though, according to Rorty, such causal stubbornness can always 
be re-described it can still throw up beliefs and desires that generate anxiety.  They 
can do so if they contradict and even displace conscious beliefs and desires. 
               Holbrook talks of “ego-weakness” in this way.188  He says that it is a state of 
consciousness in which the stability of the ego is continually threatened by the 
libidinal ego – a collection of unsatisfied desires that are so unsuccessfully repressed 
that the ego cannot ignore them and which are often felt in highly emotional ways - 
for example through frustration and anger.  The ego has to re-assert itself by resisting 
them.  According to Jacqueline Rose, when Holbrook uses this model to criticise Plath 
he projects onto her a “degraded and abused image of femininity”.189  This is an image 
of “a woman who despises herself as a woman”.190  According to Holbrook, Plath’s 
libido opens up a gap in her identity and causes hatred, “extremism, violence, gross 
indecency and moral inversion”.191  To reiterate my departure from Holbrook, I do not 
want to attack Plath.  I want to use Plath’s work as an example of an attempt to self-
create, not as an example of self-defeating hatred.  
 In Rorty’s terms, rather than having a disruptive gap in her identity, Plath’s 
identity comprised two quasi-selves in a stand-off, both trying to assert themselves in 
incompatible ways.  It is the strong poet’s task is to listen to those selves and re-create 
them so she can say “thus I willed it”: 
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“the patient has to think dialectically, to grant that there is much to be said 
on both sides.  To think, as opposed to react to a new stimulus, simply is 
to compare and contrast candidates for admission into one’s set of beliefs 
and desires”.192 
 
According to Rorty, to think about the unconscious is to articulate it.  Once you do, 
you can reconcile yourself to it by describing it in terms that you are comfortable 
with, or you can disconnect its effect on you by describing it as insignificant 
(assuming, of course, that re-description has the power to do so).  This is an example 
of the struggle that we have seen in Rorty’s work to assert the autonomy of our beliefs 
over their pre-determination.  Here, in this struggle for an autonomous self, is an 
example of “grabbing hold of causal forces and making them do what we want, 
altering ourselves and our environment to suit our aspirations”, rather than resisting 
the grip that they have on us. 193  It is an autonomous act in which the agent takes 
responsibility for themselves through creative self-expression and forms a space in 
which they can endorse new modes of being for themselves.  But to do this, such a re-
interpretation will still have to be thought to apply truthfully to the idiosyncratic 
causal forces that you are trying to get hold of.  Otherwise, presumably, those causal 
forces will go on asserting themselves as before.  As we shall see, reconciling her 
various selves proves very difficult for Plath’s poetic persona.      
According to Holbrook, when stuck with the mouthless character of her 
unconscious, Plath expresses “desperation at not knowing what she is, and her 
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uncertainty about taking on any form, finding any direction, or creating anything from 
her body that was substantial and trustworthy.”194  
 
“The inner edifice has to be made out of intellectual effort, by a 
‘thinking’ version of that impingement ‘which is experienced as hate’ – 
which is why it is dark.  It is a shadow self […]”195 
 
However, what Holbrook identifies as a “shadow self” that is experienced as hate, is 
also potentially a space for self-creation.  In “Poem for a Birthday” Plath’s shadow 
self is eerie. But rather than being dark because it is eerie, it is eerie because it is dark. 
It is not necessarily experienced as hate because it is potentially light: 
 
It has so many cellars, 
Such eelish delvings! 
I am round as an owl, 
I see by my own light. 
 […] 
I must make more maps.196  
 
The problem is that Plath cannot create a self that she is reconciled to through her 
inherited femininity.  Plath’s sense of alienation makes her suspicious of that role, as 
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we see in her poem “Mirror”: 
 
[…] A woman bends over me, 
Searching my reaches for what she really is. 
Then she turns to those liars, the candles and the moon.197 
 
Plath is suspicious of this role even though that part of her identity includes things 
that are important to her.  In “Child” for example, she expresses her devotion to her 
baby boy: 
 
Your clear eye is the one absolutely beautiful thing. 
I want to fill it with color and ducks, 
The zoo of the new198 
 
But in being a mother she resists rather than reconciles herself to her need to create a 
self that she can call her own.  In “Mirror” Plath is seen to rely on inherited, lying 
self-images and there is nothing in that image that she can call herself.  In “Morning 
Song” she dissolves completely as she gives herself over to satisfying her child’s 
needs: 
 
[…] New statue. 
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In a drafty museum, your nakedness 
Shadows our safety. We stand round blankly as walls.199     
 
In “Ariel” her alienated self re-asserts itself in competition with her children: 
 
The child’s cry 
 
 Melts in the wall. 
And I 
Am the arrow, 
 
The dew that flies 
Suicidal, at one with the dive 
Into the red200     
 
In these poems we can see the conflict that Rorty identifies between private projects 
of self-creation and the needs of others.  Those who do not feel the need to assert a 
sense of alienation would probably be able to see the insignificance of those feelings 
when compared to their love and affection for their children.  However, in Plath’s 
poetry, that sense of alienation is strong enough to persist.  It is strong enough to 
persist but not strong enough to overcome resistance.  The difficulty in reconciling 
herself to her sense of alienation is expressed in “Stillborn” where she uses the idea of 
stillborn children as a metaphor for her poems.  In this poem, her preoccupation with 
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her alienated self is seen as a guilt ridden fantasy about the possible consequences of 
neglecting her real children: 
 
 […] they are dead, and their mother near dead with distraction, 
And they stupidly stare, and do not speak of her.201  
 
This is not just expressive of a lack of confidence in her poetic project; it is an 
uncanny metaphor for the consequences of this internal conflict between her two 
significant selves.  The role of mother remains unfulfilled, thanks to a clash between 
that role and the project of articulating her alienation from that role.  The project of 
expressing that alienated individuality remains unfulfilled because that project 
neglects those who depend on her.  Not only does she find it difficult to articulate her 
alienated self but the articulation of that self is resisted by her inherited role.  Self-
creation through the resolution of this conflict is not a realisable possibility for Plath.  
The relationship between selves is not one between conversational partners, but rather 
inheres between two struggling selves, each of whom needs to overcome the other.  
Neither of those selves can be described as insignificant enough to justify that 
overcoming.  
Instead of turning to herself and saying “Thus I willed it”, Plath elsewhere 
expresses a need not to re-appropriate her past but to break from it completely.  
However, these forms of self-creation are superficial. In “Face Lift”, the poet 
fantasises about cosmetic self-creation: 
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Skin doesn’t have roots, it peels away easy as paper.202  
 
“In Plaster” shows the superficiality of such change as the former self re-asserts itself: 
 
Living with her was like living with my own coffin: 
   […] 
I’m collecting my strength; one bay I shall manage without her. 
And she’ll perish with emptiness then […]203 
 
Achieving self-creation in this cosmetic way is not possible for Plath. She cannot 
overcome that “messy” side that re-asserts itself and which overcomes the untainted 
self.204  This is mainly because the untainted self is passive – it has a “slave 
mentality.”205  In “Fever 103”, the contrast between “messy” contingency and purity is 
transferred onto a contrast between the sinful and the virginal.  There is a choice 
between going to hell and suffering sin that cannot be purged, or “dissolving …/ To 
Paradise”.206  The virginal state is the purest and it does not give itself over to the 
needs of others but it withdraws from life: 
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I am too pure for you or anyone.207 
 
Purity and self-effacement, in other words, are the same for Plath.  She is aware of the 
ineffectual, dis-empowering nature of the self that tries to deny messy contingency.  
But we have seen that even when Plath tries to tackle her contingent quasi-selves she 
fails to gain the kind of autonomy that Rorty describes; that is, she fails to gain an 
individual self-image that she can call her own and that she can respect and endorse. 
In “Lady Lazarus” Plath expresses a need to overcome the past and overcome 
the resistance of her mother-self and her virgin-self in order to achieve a self that she 
can call her own: 
 
Out of the ash 
I rise with my red hair 
And I eat men like air.208 
 
This is a positive ending - but it is one that is achieved by fantasising about suicide.  
David Holbrook interprets her violent fantasies as a manifestation of failure and hate - 
a consequence of her ego-weakness.209  I noted at the start of my discussion of Plath 
that David Holbrook saw her life as culminating in an abandonment to nihilism and 
hate” – the result of her loss of faith in the value of her femininity.  He claims that her 
repeated attempts at suicide and her fantasies of consuming and destroying others are 
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manifestations of “the animus which becomes malevolent because it cannot find in 
itself the “‘female–element–being’ quality.”210  Jaqueline Rose responds by criticising 
Holbrook for projecting onto Plath “a masculinity untempered by an essentially 
female modification.”211  As a result of this projection Holbrook criticises Plath for 
betraying that part of herself that nurtures and cares rather than destroys.  According 
to Rose, critics like Holbrook are preoccupied with the idea of the source of life 
becoming the destroyer of life.  This idea involves the embodiment of our most 
precious values (like the conviction that cruelty is the worst thing that we do) 
becoming the embodiment of a nihilism that threatens those values.  As I said earlier, 
Holbrook sees this loss of faith as leading to “extremism, violence, gross indecency 
and moral inversion.”  According to Holbrook, even Plath’s celebration of her more 
buoyant, exhilarating and not necessarily hostile fantasises (like “Lady Lazerus”) 
degrade her femininity.  This is because by fantasising about suicide she risked 
harming her children.212  But we have also seen how important Plath’s children were 
to her when she was not fantasising about suicide and when she was trying to 
reconcile her private project of self-creation with her devotion to them.  The problem 
for her was that when her obsession with that project conflicted with her devotion to 
her children she looked (to Holbrook) like the embodiment of the Resenter.  The 
Resenter is one who carries his or her yearning for autonomy – on a private level – 
over onto a need for the embodiment of that autonomy on a public level.  He or she 
dreams of “total revolution” because the values that society is founded on must be 
overthrown for autonomy to be possible.  But the mother does not refuse - she is not 
able to divide the private realm from the public realm.  As a result her fantasies of 
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autonomy are considered selfish and dangerous.  She is forced to take on the role of 
Resenter.  Rorty’s idea that there is a private self that can be defined independently of 
the public or political realm becomes difficult to justify.  I previously said that it 
might seem unfair to align Rorty’s attack on nihilism with Holbrook’s attack on Plath.  
To repeat my distinction: whereas Holbrook would have preferred it if Plath’s ego had 
not been weakened, Rorty would have recognised her doubts as an acknowledgement 
that she needed a new identity.  The problem, for Rorty, is that the creation of this 
autonomy would have required Plath to regard the needs of others as less significant 
than he believes them to be.  Plath’s resentment was not a rejection of those values.  
She was unable to create an autonomous self because of her devotion to those values.  
Plath was not able to separate the public and the private.
213
 
Plath’s fantasies of purity and empowerment may have been fantasies of “total 
revolution”, in which she defied her devotion to others, but they were fantasies after 
all.  When she places her poetic persona in less fantastical situations her resentment is 
more contained.  For an example, consider ‘Lebos’ in which her devotion becomes 
both her identity and the source for her resentment: 
 
Now I am silent, hate 
Up to my neck, 
Thick, thick. 
I am packing the hard potatoes like good clothes, 
I am packing the babies, 
I am packing the sick cats. 
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O vase of acid, 
It is love you are full of. You know who you hate.214 
 
This tension between Plath’s quasi-selves throws up some serious doubts about 
Rorty’s conception of the role of poetry in its harmony with his politics. In 
“Kindness” we see compassion and solidarity, in the mind of Plath, twisting into 
subjugation: 
 
O Kindness, kindness 
Sweetly picking up pieces! 
My Japanese silks, desperate butterflies, 
May be pinned any minute, anesthetized.215      
 
For Plath, kindness is an anaesthetic.  She expresses a resentment that is not dissolved 
by compassion.  This raises a problem with Rorty’s conception of the harmonious 
relationship that is meant to exist between poetry and his politics.  It is this problem of 
resentment and the need to promote solidarity that I would like to turn to next. 
 
Solidarity 
 
As far as Richard Rorty is concerned we have no choice but to accept the provinciality 
of our concepts and our culture.  He insists that the “ritual invocation of the need to 
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avoid relativism” that he encounters amongst his critics is merely a “habit nurtured by 
the Enlightenment, and justified by it in terms of an appeal to Reason, conceived of as 
a transcultural human ability to correspond to reality”.  In the absence of that ability 
Rorty sees no way of arguing for the realism of any belief.  To do so would be to 
pursue that Platonic quest for transcendence that is ruled out by the contingency of 
our descriptions.  Rorty argues that the liberal notion of our common humanity is as 
contingent as any of the various descriptions of the human condition that have arisen 
throughout history.  Rorty denies that his liberal values make him particularly 
“enlightened” and subscribes to what he calls a “postmodernist bourgeois liberalism” 
which he describes in the following way: 
 
[…] it should be seen as an attempt to resolve a small, local, 
psychological problem.  This psychological problem is found only within 
the souls of bourgeois liberals who have not yet gone postmodern, the 
ones who are still using the rationalist rhetoric of the Enlightenment to 
back up their liberal ideas.  These liberals hold on to the Enlightenment 
notion that there is something called a common human nature, a 
metaphysical substrate in which things called “rights” are embedded, and 
that this substrate takes moral precedence over all merely “cultural” 
superstructures.
216
 
 
Rorty pitches his political philosophy in terms of that spurious choice that we have 
seen him offer between anti-realism and the “Platonic quest” to find a single, 
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transcendent and exclusive metaphysical truth.  In the absence of such a transcendent 
metaphysical perspective Rorty claims that we must accept that realism and 
objectivity are impossible.  Consequently, there is no objective truth for the liberal to 
claim knowledge of when criticizing forms of discrimination.  Rorty argues that we 
create our nature through our discourse and so spreading liberal ideas is not a matter 
of enlightening people about a reality that belies their current beliefs.  People are what 
they are described to be and exposing them to liberal ideas does not lift a veil of 
ignorance but simply exposes them to another possible description. Rorty eschews the 
notion of emancipation.
217
  He does not wish to claim that liberals have a unique 
insight into the truth so he prefers to value the institutions of political freedom over 
the “metaphysical” underpinnings that philosophers may posit.  
 Rorty’s politics amounts to the claim that “if we take care of political freedom, 
truth and goodness will take care of themselves.”  Rorty values what he calls “free 
discussion” above any particular notion of the truth or the good.  He claims that we 
can have a culture in which “the press, the judiciary, the elections, and the universities 
are free, social mobility is frequent and rapid, literacy is universal, higher education is 
common, and peace and wealth have made possible the leisure necessary to listen to 
lots of different people and think about what they say”.  This culture can exist without 
us having a view about “universally shared human ends, human rights, the nature of 
rationality, the Good for Man, nor anything else”.218  Rorty advocates for the citizens 
of his utopia a freedom of conscience and thought that encourages the kind of 
plurality of voices and opinions that J. S. Mill advocates in On Liberty.  The 
individual is given the autonomy to develop their own private and contingent beliefs 
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free from any public pressure to conform.  Mill’s intention in promoting individual 
autonomy is to encourage original insights.  Mill values free discussion as a 
mechanism for uncovering new truths and for revising and improving public opinion.  
The difference with Rorty’s vision is that Rorty does not imbue the truth with the 
same objective quality that Mill imbues it with.  In Rorty’s system there is no 
objectivity that sets truth apart from the vagaries of opinion.  In this case the result of 
“free discussion” is not an increase in objectivity.  The truth is whatever consensus 
arises from a choice of metaphoric.  The truth will have to “take care of itself”, not 
because it possesses a unique quality that sets it apart from opinion, but precisely 
because it lacks any such privilege.  Individuals are free to nurture their own private 
and idiosyncratic beliefs and only with luck – “the sort of luck which makes the 
difference between genius and eccentricity” – will those beliefs influence public 
opinion and become accepted.
219
  
Rorty states that the justification for our liberal principles is entirely 
ethnocentric and circular.  It is the contingent result of culture and chance and Rorty is 
explicit about the implications of this: 
 
There is no reason the ironist cannot be a liberal, but she cannot be a 
“progressive” and “dynamic” liberal in the sense in which liberal 
metaphysicians sometimes claim to be.  For she cannot offer the same sort 
of social hope as metaphysicians offer.  She cannot claim that adopting her 
redescription of yourself or your situation makes you better able to 
conquer the forces which are marshaled against you.  On her account, that 
ability is a matter of weapons and luck, not a matter of having truth on 
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your side, or of having detected the “movement of history”.220 
 
Rorty denies that his liberal principles are based on knowledge of reality.  A political 
system that does not share those principles could exist with equal justification.  Such a 
system might oppress women or sanction slavery.  Without any distinction between 
objective truths and falsehoods it is not possible to objectively oppose the beliefs used 
to justify such discrimination.  It is not open to the inheritors of the values of the 
Enlightenment to argue that sexism and racism are based on objective falsehoods.  
Consequently liberals must rely on “weapons and luck” in order to further their cause 
and not a “transcultural human ability to correspond to reality”. 
Rorty agrees that “there is such a thing as moral progress” and that it involves 
the “ability to see more and more traditional differences (of tribe, religion, race, 
customs, and the like) as unimportant when compared with similarities with respect to 
pain and humiliation” but he denies that this progress marks “a gradual diminution of 
the influence of prejudice and superstition.”221  On Rorty’s terms it is not possible to 
contrast prejudice and superstition with a more objective truth.  For him, the fact that 
there is no essential metaphysical truth prevents us from making that distinction.  All 
of our descriptions are contingent, partial and prejudiced. Consequently: 
 
It is neither irrational nor unintelligent to draw the limits of one’s moral 
community at a national, or racial, or gender border.
222
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Being rational and intelligent cannot consist in an attitude of objectivity if such an 
attitude is impossible.  Alarmingly, Rorty goes so far as to insist that “the force of ‘us’ 
is, typically, contrastive in the sense that it contrasts with a ‘they’ which is also made 
up of human beings – the wrong sort of human beings.”223  One of the implications of 
his view is that there are no objective grounds on which to challenge the descriptions 
(and metaphors) that some may use to refer to “the wrong sort of human beings.”  
Being able to contrast prejudice with a more objective truth seems crucial in such 
cases and, as we have seen, Rorty rules out that contrast.  Instead, our conscience is 
tied to some particular cultural contingencies that define our provincial community.  
This is a lesson that Rorty draws from Freud’s moral psychology:    
 
Freud shows us why we deplore cruelty in some cases and relish it in 
others.  He shows us why our ability to love is restricted to some very 
particular shapes and sizes and colours of people, things, or ideas.  He 
shows us why our sense of guilt is aroused by certain very specific, and in 
theory quite minor, events, and not by others which, on any familiar moral 
theory, would loom much larger.
224
  
 
Psychoanalysis challenges the attempt to establish a universal moral order by showing 
that our values are “far more finely textured, far more custom-tailored to our 
individual case, than the moral vocabulary which the philosophical tradition offered 
us.”  Rorty argues that moral philosophers such as Kant mistakenly attempt to 
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obligate us to humanity as a whole by seeking objective and universal grounds on 
which to base our values whereas literature, ethnography and journalism educate us 
more effectively by capturing and re-describing the particular contingencies that 
define us. 
 In his book Solidarity in the Conversation of Humankind Norman Geras tests 
Rorty’s moral particularism by using the example of rescuer testimonies from the 
Holocaust.
225
  Geras challenges Rorty’s claim that the notion of our common 
humanity is a “weak, unconvincing explanation of a generous action.”226  In 
Contingency, Irony and Solidarity Rorty speculates about the motives of rescuers in 
the following way: 
 
[...] surely they would usually, if queried, have used more parochial terms 
to explain why they were taking risks to protect a given Jew – for 
example, that this particular Jew was a fellow Milanese, or a fellow 
Jutlander, or a fellow member of the same union or profession, or a fellow 
bocce player, or a fellow parent of small children [...]
227
 
 
Contrary to Rorty’s speculation, Geras finds that the overwhelming trend amongst 
actual testimonies is a “universalist voice”.  Citing many examples, Geras shows that 
rescuers tend to see Jewish victims as primarily “part of humankind” or “fellow 
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human beings in need”.228  They do not emphasise the sorts of parochial 
considerations that Rorty describes.  As Geras points out, Rorty often makes a lot of 
the fact that human beings share a common susceptibility to pain and humiliation.
229
  
Hoever, Rorty wishes to avoid the suggestion that this common susceptibility 
comprises a metaphysical essence that belies our apparent differences.  His retreat 
from moral universalism is part of that avoidance manoeuvre.  Rorty argues that our 
commonality is not a reality that is intrinsic to us.  It is something that we have to 
create and maintain through our discourse.  Rorty insists that it is not metaphysics that 
fuels moral progress but the wish to gradually enlarge our moral community.  To this 
end liberal writers seek to widen that community by enlarging the quantity of people 
that are allowed to constitute it.  This is not a matter of recognising an objective truth 
but of extending our sympathies.  It is a matter of describing people in ways that 
encourage our imaginative identification with them.  We do this by telling sad and 
sentimental stories rather than reflecting on a common essence.
230
  Our similarities 
with respect to pain and humiliation are as contingent as anything else.  They do not 
point towards a metaphysical essence and so, on Rorty’s terms, their truth is reliant on 
our choice of language.  It is up to the liberal writer to propagate and maintain a 
language that defines cruelty.
231
  Without this language cruelty would not exist.  Rorty 
endorses the principle of human sympathy and solidarity but he states that it can only 
be the result of the accumulated efforts of artists who re-create our world in order to 
gradually increase the number of different people who qualify for that sympathy and 
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solidarity. 
 One of the most disconcerting things about Rorty’s rejection of the principle of 
objectivity is thus his acceptance of moral provincialism.  It leads him to write some 
startling things.  In his “Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality” he discusses 
the persecution of Muslims in Bosnia at the end of the last century in the following 
way: 
 
We here in the safe, rich democracies feel about Serbian torturers and 
rapists as they feel about their Muslim victims: they are more like animals 
than like us.  […] We think of Serbs or Nazis as animals, because 
ravenous beasts of prey are animals.  We think of Muslims or Jews being 
herded into concentration camps as animals, because cattle are animals.  
Neither sort of animal is very much like us, and there seems no point in 
human beings getting involved in quarrels between animals.
232
 
 
This attitude is an expression of Rorty’s ethnocentrism and it seems surprising given 
his assertion that humans share ethically relevant similarities.  Rorty seems to assert 
some conception of our commonality as a corrective to our provincial prejudices 
while at the same time denying the realism or universal truth of that commonality.  
Rorty may be right to claim that we do not need “an essence which is something more 
than our shared ability to suffer humiliation” but his limitation of that shared ability to 
those who fall under the right description adds an uncomfortable provincialism (and 
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proto-colonialism) to his position.  Rorty sees no way of asserting the reality of our 
common humanity without implying that it must point towards a metaphysical 
essence that reveals everything else about us to be “mere appearance”.  Rorty’s 
treatment of realism never escapes this Platonic dogma.  The idea that our 
representations do not capture such an essence leads him to claim that they do not 
represent reality at all.  As a result, according to Rorty, we become trapped in Plato’s 
cave in the midst of ignorance and prejudice as “the work of changing moral 
intuitions is […] done by manipulating our feelings rather than by increasing our 
knowledge”.233 
 The tension between Rorty’s ironism and liberalism is another consequence of 
his narrow conception of what realism entails.  Throughout my criticism of Rorty I 
have tried to show how unnecessary that conception is.  Contrary to Rorty’s argument 
we do not need a transcendent metaphysical viewpoint in order to capture reality.  
With representations that are immanent to our perspective it is possible to capture 
reality and consider whether the descriptions that people use in order to justify 
discrimination are true.  This does not require the observation of a metaphysical 
essence.  It simply involves recognizing whether our current descriptions accurately 
represent reality from the relevant perspective.  We do not need to transcend our 
means of representation in order to have an appreciation of our commonality that can 
educate us out of the kind of invidious characterizations of other people that Rorty 
deploys in his assertion of cultural provincialism.  In fact, we can have a conception 
of our commonality that is as non-Platonic, Darwinian and anti-essentialist as Rorty 
would like.  That conception of our commonality might even extend across species 
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boundaries, as Peter Singer has argued, making Rorty’s use of a moral distinction 
between humans and animals seem quaint.
234
  In this way we can appreciate the 
influence that an increase in knowledge does have on our moral intuitions. 
 Rorty is right when he criticizes human rights foundationalists for treating the 
differences between human beings as “mere appearance” when compared to their 
similarities.  Much of Rorty’s ethical provincialism is designed to emphasise the truth 
of those differences.  The problem is that Rorty’s alternative to such foundationalism 
has the effect of entrenching the prejudice that often accompanies those differences.  
In attempting to honour our differences Rorty leaves us ill-equipped to deal with 
ignorance and falsehood.  Against Rorty, I would argue that it is perfectly possible to 
assert the reality of our common humanity without requiring a reductionist 
metaphysical conception of that commonality.  We can appreciate the contingencies 
that contribute to our identity and consider the extent to which those contingencies 
make us both similar and different without elevating our similarities to another order 
of reality.  By accepting the fact that our practice of representation (despite its 
contingency) is able to successfully capture reality we can challenge prejudice and 
falsehood without insisting that we need a transcendent viewpoint that reveals us all 
to be “essentially” and “in reality” the same.  In short, we can retain the notion that 
there are transcultural universals which unite human beings without requiring a 
Platonic metaphysical conception of those universals.  
 Rorty describes his political philosophy as an attempt to substitute hope for 
knowledge.
235
  He regards the desire for knowledge as anathema because it seeks to 
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deny the creative aspect of language use.  According to Rorty, we ought to 
acknowledge our creativity and embrace our ability to alter our world in line with our 
aspirations.  The problem with this vision is that it would be a world in which the 
nature of things (including people) is determined by a culture’s choice of description 
and the “weapons and luck” that it can muster to support that description.  It would be 
a world in which the truth of our common humanity is contingent on the work of a 
particular culture’s writers who seek to transform the subjects of their stories into “the 
right sort of human beings”.  Hope would not come from spreading knowledge and 
overcoming prejudice but from a kind of cultural imposition in which liberal writers 
bestow a person’s humanity on them.  It seems to me that Rorty’s anti-realist irony 
cannot avoid these unfortunate implications whereas it is entirely possible to 
acknowledge the contingency and relativity of our descriptions without having to 
deny their realism.  It is possible to have a conception of our common humanity that 
acknowledges its contingency without insisting that it thereby fails to represent 
reality.  Admittedly this would rid the liberal’s case of the argumentative weight that 
comes from giving it the status of an exclusive metaphysical truth but I would agree 
with Rorty that it is not entitled to that status in the first place.  The belief that we 
share a common humanity should be considered a factual claim rather than a 
metaphysical one.  The hope of the liberal is not that this belief will supplant or 
transcend appearances but that it will become universally apparent. 
 Rorty‘s notion that our sense of solidarity is dependent on the work of writers 
who seek to transform the subjects of their stories into “the right sorts of human 
beings” is an invitation to consider another example of real poetry.   With this in mind 
I would like to consider the work of Tony Harrison in order to assess the hopes that 
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Rorty places in the power of creative art to generate solidarity. 
 
Tony Harrison 
 
In Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Rorty argues that the projects of self-creation 
and the promotion of solidarity are necessarily supported by bourgeois achievements 
like literacy, higher education, social mobility, leisure and the freedom of the press, 
judiciary, elections and universities.236  In Rorty’s liberal utopia intellectuals would be 
ironists, although non-intellectuals would not: 
 
The latter would, however, be commonsensically nominalist and 
historicist. So they would see themselves as contingent through and 
through, without feeling doubts about the contingencies they happen to 
be.237  
 
Only the intellectual elite would express discontent with the status quo.  As far as 
ironist intellectuals are concerned, Rorty says that in trying to create a new vocabulary 
they are trying to alienate themselves from the conventional vocabulary that other 
people accept.  They must also believe that it is possible to create a new language that 
they can be reconciled to: 
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“Irony is, if not intrinsically resentful, at least reactive.”238 
 
Resentment is avoided by maximising the quality of education, freedom of the press, 
educational opportunities and opportunities to exert political influence.  Those who do 
not have access to these freedoms must be reconciled to the process of socialization 
that they have undergone.  According to the tradition of working class poetry, 
however, this reconciliation is very difficult.  Writing about working class poetry, 
Luke Spencer has said that Douglas Dunn “was able to acknowledge, as Orwell had 
done thirty years before, both the oppositional imperative of working class writing 
and the inescapable dilemma posed for it by bourgeois cultural dominance.”239  
Working class writing highlights an acute problem with the possibility that 
opportunities to experiment with self-creation may not be universal. It exhibits a 
division in our society that makes solidarity difficult. 
           Tony Harrison was born into the working class in Leeds during the forties and 
grew up with first-hand experience of the political and cultural dominance of the 
educated classes.  He also proved to be an academic success, which was how he got to 
articulate that experience.  His collection of sonnets called The School of Eloquence 
registers the implications of his struggle to infiltrate our “glorious heritage.”240  
Harrison traces his awareness of his exclusion from that glory back to the teaching of 
his schoolmaster, as portrayed in “Them and [uz]”: 
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                ‘Poetry’s the speech of Kings. You’re one of those 
                   Shakespeare gives the comic bits to: prose. 
                   All poetry (even Cockney Keats?) you see 
                  ‘s been dubbed by [vs] into RP,  
                   Received Pronunciation please believe [vs] 
                   Your speech is in the hands of the Receivers.241 
 
Our poetic heritage established models for evaluating and creating poetry that require 
refinement and erudition.  Members of the working class are unable to express their 
expectations in a way that is adequate to these standards.  Our heritage is preserved in 
a way that suppresses forms of self-expression that are native to the working class.  
Harrison, however, has a familiarity and sympathy with the working class as well as a 
middle class education.  In “Classics society” Harrison is seen to straddle the 
“dreadful schism in the British nation”242 that Edmund Burke believed would 
precipitate the uprising of the working class against the establishment.  In “Them and 
[uz]’ Harrison claims poetry for himself and for those who are silenced by the 
requirements of the education system. 
 
                      So right, yer buggers, then. We’ll occupy 
                       Your lousy, leasehold poetry.’’243 
 
However there is a problem.  What can you occupy poetry with when, as a class, your 
                                                          
241
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cultural identity has not been expressed.  Once more, one can appropriate Luke 
Spencer’s use of Dunn in considering Harrison’s project: 
 
The best way of negotiating that dilemma, Dunn argued, is 
“commitment … the idea under which a working-class poet can 
organise the sundry circumstances that belong to him and which cohere 
in the form of beliefs about the world”.  This offers genuine hope of 
bringing poetry into a mutually beneficial relationship to politics; of 
enabling the poet to ‘see poetry as the vision of its own classless 
society.244 
 
These words chime with Rorty’s idea that poetry and politics can offer social hope 
through the creation of self-images that people can be reconciled to.  However, 
according to Luke Spencer, Dunn’s vision of working class commitment “fosters 
resentment – a grudge – towards those who have relegated poetry to an instrument of 
their own class ascendancy”245.  This commitment is necessary “to keep that grudge 
intact: its purity will help to prevent the dilution and assimilation of the working-class 
poet’s emancipatory project”246. 
           As I said in my discussion of Plath, Rorty distrusts resentment both on a private 
level and on a public level.  He argues against it on a philosophical level because, as 
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he says: 
 
They tend to accept some version of the story of the West as a long 
slide downhill from better days (the time of ‘organic community’’ or 
‘the polis’ or some such – a time before ‘structures of power’ started 
scrawling all over us).  They see no redeeming features in the present, 
except perhaps for their own helpless rage.247 
 
Accusing Foucault of “anarchistic moments” in which he concludes that “every social 
institution is equally unjustifiable” because all of them exert “normalising power”, 
Rorty says: 
 
Only if one refuses to divide the public from the private realm will one 
dream of a society which has “gone beyond mere social democracy”, 
or dream of “total revolution.’’  Only then will anarchism begin to 
seem attractive.  Only then will one be tempted to use a pejorative term 
like “discourse of power’’ to describe the results of any social 
compromise, any political balancing act.248 
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Resentment is a reluctance to play inherited language-games, or to reconcile yourself 
to any language-game that you can think of.  To think, according to the Resenters, is 
to submit to a power that you cannot call your own.  This brand of hatred is not the 
result of failing to realise your aspirations but a refusal to entertain any kind of 
aspiration in the first place.  As Rorty puts it: 
 
[…] the difference between us and the Resenters is that we regret our 
lack of imagination, whereas they make a virtue of what they think a 
philosophic-historical necessity.249 
 
Mirroring Rorty’s hope that the liberal poet can work within social democracy and 
replace resentment with solidarity Harrison wants to reconcile the need to give the 
working-class a voice with the liberal hope that he can provide them with a self-image 
that they can call their own and can endorse.  However, because the schism that 
Harrison wants to straddle is one between an educated class that prizes articulacy and 
a working class that does not, an extra difficulty is added.  In an analogous situation to 
Plath’s partially articulated quasi-selves, Harrison’s working class voice comprises a 
“mute ingloriousness”250 
          To illustrate the exclusion of his class from the means to articulate their 
expectations, Harrison shows the shadowy presence that labourers have in our history.  
In “The Ballad of Babelabour” all that labourers are seen to leave behind are the 
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buildings that house their master and confine their fellows: 
 
                           They’re their own meat and their own dough 
                           Another block      another 
                           a place for the great Pharaoh 
                           a prison for their brothers251  
 
This particular poem is vitriolic and represents the confrontational vein in Harrison’s 
poetry.  It is fair to assume that any project seeking to articulate the suffering of 
victims, so that such suffering is acknowledged by those who are responsible for it, 
might be hindered if those responsible are offended or humiliated.  Engendering guilt 
and humiliation can be seen to create the kind of obstacles that get in the way of a 
person’s attempts to converse with their unconscious.  To satisfy Rorty’s requirement 
that literature should sensitise people to suffering rather than perpetuate the schism 
that prevents solidarity, it might be that the depth of feeling on both sides has to be 
subdued.  With this in mind, there are less scathing poems in Harrison’s canon, for 
example “The Earthen Lot” and the first poem of “The Rubarbarians”.  In the latter, 
the Yorkshire cropper’s rebellion is only accessible through the testimonies of the 
mill-owners.  The mob is reduced to “shadows in moonlight”252.  They are a sketchy 
presence in history and in, as Harrison puts it in “On Not Being Milton”, “the silence 
round all poetry”253.  We can see here how this project is not just waged on a private 
level.  The standards by which poetry is valued have to be changed to accommodate 
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Harrison’s working class voice.  In “Earthen Lot” the bones of the dead masons who 
constructed “a solid bulwark for their betters”254 jostle as if they cannot rest peacefully 
until they are appeased.  The sentiment in these poems seems to be a mournful 
acknowledgement of what is lost.  But they betray the need to encapsulate working 
class experience and voices in ways that pursue the need for solidarity without 
minimizing the suffering that characterizes that experience. 
“Fire-eater” sees Harrison using metaphors of magic to describe the role he 
has made for himself. He intends to turn the grammatically confused utterances of his 
relatives into a new language: 
 
I’m the clown sent to clear the ring. 
Their’s are the tongues of fire I’m forced to swallow 
then bring back knotted, one continuous string 
igniting long-pent silences, and going back 
to Adam fumbling with creation’s names, 
and though my vocal cords get scorched and black 
there’ll be a constant singing from the flames.255 
 
The idea of fumbling with names that are original to his class echoes “The Ballad of 
Babelabour” in which the Ur-language of the labourers is seen to remain a resentful 
“ur-grunt”256  It has not been able to develop because poetry has failed to encapsulate 
the actual condition of the working class: 
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                                Ur-crappers tongueless bardless nerks  
                                Your conditions shitty 
                                No time for your Collected Works 
                                Or modulated pity257 
 
Again we are reminded that the leap that is needed would involve making poetry a 
much less bourgeois medium.  In “Working” this idea of forging a more representative 
language is developed further, but pessimistically: 
 
You strike and plenty, but can’t see. 
You’ve been underneath too long to stand the light. 
You’re lost in this sonnet for the bourgeoisie.258  
 
This poem expresses a desire to break the silence of neglected workers; like the 
worker called Patience, to whom the poem is addressed.  The fire where the image of 
Patience’s skull is seen to shine echoes the urge in “Fire-eater” to ignite “long-pent 
silences”.  However, Patience herself is lost in those sparks and a closer engagement 
with her experience comes when you close your eyes to the fire: 
 
                         […] that makes a dark like mines259 
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I interpret the words “the job/‘s breaking the silence”260 in this poem as expressing a 
lack of confidence in the poet’s ability to penetrate that darkness rather than as an 
affirmation of the poet’s role.  In “Cremation” the resentment that marks Harrison’s 
background and class forms an impenetrable grudge.  In this poem the coal miner 
expresses his contempt for the contingencies that have shaped him.  He has contracted 
a fatal disease from his time in the mines.  There are no words spoken, but between 
him and his wife their emotions are expressed in gesture and an almost telepathic 
sensitivity to each other’s moods.  Their suffering is private, silent and bitter: 
 
                 He hawks his cold gobful at the brightest flame, 
                 Too practiced, too contemptuous to miss. 
     
                  Behind the door she hears the hot coals hiss.261 
 
Although Harrison can elevate this situation to one of beauty through poetry, his hope 
that he can articulate the aspirations that these people might have seems to be a vain 
one.  The doubt about, and resentment towards, the contingencies that these people 
face run very deep.  They are closed off from a sense of solidarity that is spread any 
wider than their immediate community.  It is impossible to imagine a re-description of 
their situation that allowed them to be reconciled to the contingencies they are.  They 
cannot be offered a self-image that is not just a dignified recognition of their 
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suffering.  The liberal author’s recognition that we are all susceptible to suffering 
offers little consolation and does not necessarily promote solidarity. 
The “Divisions” sequence marks the start of Harrison’s treatment of this 
cultural crisis.  The first poem in the sequence is a portrait of an unemployed, 
skinhead football hooligan. Tattoos, graffiti and violence constitute the signs of his 
self-expression: 
 
             Brown Ale and boy’s bravado numbs their fright –  
             MOTHER in ivy, blood reds and true blues 
             Against that North East skin so sunless white. 
 
             When next he sees United lose a match, 
             His bovvers on, his scarf round his wrist, 
             His rash NEWCASTLE RULES will start to scratch, 
             He’ll aerosol the walls, then go get pissed […]262  
 
Here the contingencies that shape this man have generated a willfully cruel and 
vandalising threat. In “v.” the graffiti motif appears again as an impoverished form of 
self-expression. Rather than articulating their resentment in accessible forms, vandals 
take to aerosolling obscenities onto grave stones: 
 
          This graveyard stands above a worked out pit. 
          Subsidence makes the obelisks all list. 
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          One leaning left’s marked FUCK, one Right’s marked SHIT 
          Sprayed by some peeved supporter who was pissed.263 
 
The aggression behind this damage comes to the fore when a skinhead appears as 
Harrison’s alter ego in “v.”.  Rather than being a non-intellectual he is an anti-
intellectual: 
 
                    Don’t talk to me of fucking representing 
                    The class yer were born into any more. 
                    Yer going to get ‘urt and start resenting 
                     It’s not poetry we need in this class war.264 
 
The reference to a football team “UNITED”265 sprayed on one stone, is taken by 
Harrison as an unintentionally ironic statement of exactly what is missing from this 
relationship.  The difficulty in engaging with this alter ego’s ingrained animosity 
personifies and dramatises the conflict at the heart of Harrison’s project.  Harrison can 
only wish that something positive could come from the grudging relationship between 
his role as poet and the content he is trying to capture in it: 
 
             I wish in this skin’s words deep aspirations,266 
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             Aspirations, cunt! Folk on’t fucking dole 
            ‘ave got about as much scope to aspire 
             above the shit they’re dumped in, cunt, as coal 
             aspires to be chucked on’t fucking fire.267 
 
Harrison’s poetry becomes impotent in the face of the kind of vandalism that says all 
you need to know about the resentment and the lack of aspiration fostered by those 
who have committed it.  Rorty says that he wants to confine irony to intellectuals and 
he wants liberal authors to promote solidarity but he does admit that nominalists and 
historicists cannot “claim that adopting [their] re-description of yourself or your 
situation makes you better able to conquer the forces which are marshalled against 
you.”268  They can only offer “recognition of a common susceptibility to 
humiliation.”269  Recognition of this common danger is supposed to promote solidarity 
between us.  But if the danger is already realised in the contingencies that you happen 
to be, and there is no shared power for ensuring your freedom from it, you may be 
more likely to be resentful and unlikely to feel any solidarity.  
According to Rorty, there is nothing stopping us from using metaphors as tools 
for “grabbing hold of causal forces and making them do what we want, altering 
ourselves and our environment to suit our aspirations.”  We can encapsulate the 
idiosyncratic contingencies that shape us and by re-describing those contingencies we 
can bring our circumstances into line with our aspirations.  In the course of his 
writings Rorty has tried to bring our circumstances into line with “a lightly sketched 
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future”270 in which individuals are able to appropriate their idiosyncrasies and create 
autonomous selves.  It is also a future in which our resistance to difference is relaxed 
and in which we are not too obsessed with our private projects of self-creation.  It is 
from the social theory of Roberto Unger and Cornelus Castoriadis that Rorty gains 
confidence in our ability to overcome descriptions of ourselves that deflate these 
aspirations: 
 
For all who participate in such an undertaking, the disharmony 
between intent and presence must be a cause of rage.  We neither 
suppress this rage nor allow it the last world, because we do not give 
the last word to the historical world we inhabit.  We build with what 
we have and willingly pay the price for the inconformity of vision to 
circumstance.271 
 
Every constraint on our private and collective projects of self-creation is just “the 
fossilized product of some past act of imagination”272.  Loosening those constraints is 
a matter of digging up those fossils and mobilising them again.  But in our 
consideration of some actual struggles to bring some circumstances into line with 
Rorty’s aspirations, we have seen how difficult it is to loosen such constraints.  As a 
result we have seen what it means to pay the price for “the inconformity of vision to 
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circumstance.”  
Sylvia Plath found it difficult to work against the resistance of her inherited 
femininity in trying to articulate a sense of alienation that was incompatible with that 
femininity.  Rorty’s idea that we can take a relaxed attitude towards the disquieting 
beliefs and desires that comprise our unconscious was found to be difficult in Plath’s 
case.  Plath’s project is particularly pertinent to Rorty’s because the desire to attend to 
the needs of others is not insignificant to Rorty but it would have had to have been 
less significant for Plath if she was going to relax her resistance to her sense of 
alienation.  As a result, Plath became deeply troubled by the conflict between her 
romantic poetic aspirations and the deferral of autonomy that was necessary for her 
sense of devotion.  Solidarity became a false substitute for self-creation and simply 
reminded her of the difficulty of that project. 
Rorty describes the attainment of autonomy as requiring the attainment of “the 
full glory of humanity”.  This is something that comes from seeing yourself “steadily 
and whole”.  This is “the kind of coherence and integrity we think of as characteristic 
of full persons”.  Even when two quasi selves are in a stand-off, Rorty says: 
 
Rather than feel that splits are tearing them apart, they can see tensions 
among their alternative self-descriptions as, at worst, necessary 
elements in a harmonious variety in unity.273 
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As an example of the possibility of this kind of self-creation Rorty uses the example 
of Adriene Rich’s description of her situation: 
 
She was, she says, “split between the girl who wrote poems, who 
defined herself as writing poems, and the girl who was to define 
herself by her relationship with men.”274 
 
This is a description of a woman trying to create herself in her own terms and thus 
doing what men have done throughout history.  For Plath, however, the hope of a 
gradual development of autonomy conflicted with the deferral of autonomy that was 
necessary to her sense of devotion.  That deferral turned into resentment because her 
desire for autonomy was frustrated.  Her poem “Stillborn” points to her fears about 
her distraction from her children.  Managing this split by maintaining a “harmonious 
variety-in-unity” was not possible for Plath.  Her doubts about her emancipatory 
project show a genuine problem with the attempt to separate a realm of private self-
creation from our social selves. 
In Tony Harrison’s poetry the distinction between the intellectual and the non-
intellectual appears as a form of exclusion and elitism.  This creates a problem with 
the poet’s attempts to articulate solidarity and offer it to people who feel excluded 
from the means to self-create.  There remains a close-knit (and often resentful) 
communal sympathy for a particular set of contingencies.  Such contingencies are 
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unmoved by the poet’s attempt at re-description.  Although Rorty does not want to 
give the last word to the historical circumstances that we inhabit, sometimes the 
historical world we inhabit takes the last word. Rorty’s attempt to treat our self-
descriptions as merely metaphors that we can re-describe in line with our aspirations 
is shown to be highly problematic.   
Having highlighted some of the difficulties involved in the political aspect of 
Rorty’s anti-representationalism, I would now like to turn back to the question of how 
to conceive of an alternative to Rorty’s position.  I will do this by considering the 
various positions that Putnam has adopted over the course of his philosophical career.  
The intention is to conceive of a form of representationalism that avoids absolutism 
while also doing justice to our realism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  176  
Chapter 5 - Corresponding to Reality 
 
Identity Thinking 
 
Over the course of my discussion of Rorty’s work I have repeatedly criticized him for 
founding his anti-representationalist philosophy on too narrow a conception of what 
realism can mean.  Much of what I have said is an attempt to pursue the idea that there 
is more to say about the possibilities within realism and representationalism.  Rorty 
rejects the practice of representation because he associates it with a concept of 
mirroring that demands a single identical “copy” of reality.  In opposition to this I 
have sought an alternative understanding of the concepts of representation and 
realism.  Rorty regards himself as an exponent of the pragmatist tradition in 
philosophy.  He regards his position as continuous with William James’ attempt to 
depart from the notion that our concepts “copy” reality.  James’ pragmatism sought to 
change the way that we conceive of our relation to reality so that a concept could be 
considered true provided it was an expedient way of dealing with reality rather than 
an accurate way of “corresponding” to it.  James was attempting to account for the 
way in which our concepts are not simply a copy of reality but a man-made formula 
that is shaped by human interests.  Rorty’s brand of pragmatism takes this course to 
the point of rejecting altogether the notion of representation.  According to Rorty, 
language has no representational relationship to reality.  Language is more like a tool 
than a representation.  We cannot assure ourselves that any one of our representations 
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“corresponds” to reality absolutely and so the epistemologist’s attempt to provide 
such assurance is a lost cause and it is better to abandon the concept of representation 
altogether.  In opposition to this I have argued that our inability to assure ourselves 
that we possess an identical “mirror-like” copy of reality does not require us to 
abandon representationalism and realism.  In this chapter I would like to say more 
about the alternative concepts of realism and representationalism that I have been 
developing. 
 One philosopher who has also expressed the belief that there is more to say 
about the possibilities within realism is Hilary Putnam.  He is another exponent of the 
pragmatist tradition who has come to agree with Rorty that our concepts are 
irrevocably shaped by human contingency and that the conception of realism that 
demands a single and neutral “God’s-Eye” view of reality is untenable.  Despite this, 
Putnam’s approach differs from Rorty’s precisely because he has striven to remain a 
realist.  Putnam shares Rorty’s aversion to metaphysical realism and its attempt to 
pare our different forms of description down to a single neutral one and yet he does 
not see the need to abandon realism.  Putnam agrees that it does not make sense to try 
and conceive of the nature of reality independently of a particular conceptual context 
but he denies that the truth of our descriptions must therefore be considered a matter 
of mere convention.  Putnam argues that once we choose a mode of description the 
truth of our descriptions is determined by the way reality is.  For example, if I choose 
to describe the room I am in by counting the number of chairs that are in it the truth of 
my description is determined by the number of chairs that are really there.  I may have 
chosen to describe the room using a set of concepts that does not include chairs (for 
example the language of particle physics) but given my choice of concepts the truth of 
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my description is determined by the nature of reality.  In The Many Faces of Realism 
Putnam advocates his “internal realism” in opposition to what he calls “seventeenth-
century objectivism”, which he defines as the belief that our concepts of ordinary 
objects (such as chairs) are false projections onto the microphysical reality that is 
described by modern physics.
275
  Such objectivism is a form of the same reductionism 
that Rorty associates with realism.  It is an expression of the desire for “a single 
language sufficient to state all the truths there are to state”.  In response, Putnam 
argues that it is possible to realistically represent reality in different ways depending 
on the set of concepts that is used. 
 Seventeenth-century objectivism (and reductionism in general) holds that only 
one among our various forms of description “cuts reality at the joints”.  I have argued 
that it is possible to conceive of reality as having numerous sets of joints for our 
descriptions to cut it.  An important thing to note about Putman’s argument for 
internal realism is that he finds such talk of joints problematic.  In his “Truth and 
Convention” Putnam takes issue with what he calls the “cookie cutter” conception of 
realism.  He uses an example from logic to claim that different logical doctrines can 
provide incompatible conceptions of reality that are equally correct.  One logical 
doctrine might state that a world containing three individuals contains three objects.  
According to Lezniewski’s doctrine of mereology, however, for every two individuals 
there is an object which is their sum and therefore a world containing three 
individuals actually contains seven objects.  Putnam argues that, instead of making 
sense of the phenomenon of conceptual relativity, the “cookie cutter” metaphor 
actually denies the phenomenon: 
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It is to say that there is a single world (think of it as a piece of dough) 
which we can slice into pieces in different ways.  But this “cookie cutter” 
metaphor founders on the question, “What are the parts of this dough? If 
the answer is that   ,   ,   ,   +  ,   +  ,   +  ,    +  +  ,  are all the 
different “pieces,” then we have not a neutral description, but rather a 
partisan description – just the description of the Warsaw logician!276 
 
It has to be said that Putnam’s use of such examples is confusing in this context 
because it is not clear that such logical doctrines require a realistic interpretation in 
the first place.
277
  Nevertheless, the above quote illustrates one of the key assumptions 
at play in Putnam’s argument.  The problem with the cookie cutter metaphor is that it 
implies that there must be a “neutral” conception of reality that describes those parts 
that are intrinsic to reality.  Putnam associates the idea of capturing reality’s intrinsic 
nature with the idea of having a single and neutral God’s-Eye view of it.  He shares 
the concept of reality’s intrinsic nature with the concept that Rorty employs when he 
rejects the “Platonic quest [to] get behind appearances to the intrinsic nature of 
things”.  That concept conceives of reality’s intrinsic nature as something that belies 
its varying appearances.  Putnam prefers an approach that eschews the question of 
reality’s intrinsic nature: 
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Internal realism says that we don’t know what we are talking about when 
we talk about “things in themselves”.  And this means that the dichotomy 
between “intrinsic” properties and properties which are not intrinsic also 
collapses - collapses because the “intrinsic” properties were supposed to 
be just the properties things have “in themselves”.278 
 
Putnam defines the intrinsic nature of reality as a metaphysical reality that is alien to 
our concepts and concludes that we ought to do away with the notion altogether.  He 
argues that the dichotomy between the intrinsic and the extrinsic must collapse in such 
a way that the intrinsic is eliminated.  
In this regard Putnam’s argument is very similar to Rorty’s.  Rorty defines his 
pragmatism as an attack on the distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic in which 
the intrinsic drops out of the picture.  To illustrate the similarity between Rorty’s and 
Putnam’s arguments compare the following quotes.  The first is from Putnam’s The 
Many Faces of Realism and the second is from Rorty’s Philosophy and Social Hope: 
 
The deep systematic root of the disease [the disease being metaphysical 
realism] lies in the notion of an “intrinsic” property, a property something 
has “in itself”, apart from any contribution made by language or the 
mind.
279
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For pragmatists, there is no such thing as a nonrelational feature of X, any 
more than there is such a thing as the intrinsic nature, the essence, of X.  
So there can be no such thing as a description which matches the way X 
really is, apart from its relation to human needs or consciousness or 
language.
280
 
 
Putnam’s argument in the first passage is virtually indistinguishable from Rorty’s in 
the second passage despite Putnam’s attempt to define himself as a realist.  When they 
both state that the notion of an intrinsic property must be disposed of it becomes hard 
to tell the difference between the two (Rorty himself expresses puzzlement over 
Putnam’s attempts to distinguish his position during this period).281  The problem 
seems to be that Putnam shares Rorty’s reductionist and absolutist conception of an 
intrinsic property and thereby agrees with Rorty that all properties must be regarded 
as extrinsic (or at least not intrinsic) to reality.  Despite his assertion that the truth of 
our descriptions is determined by the nature of reality Putnam denies that our 
descriptions of reality capture its intrinsic nature.  By jettisoning the notion of reality’s 
intrinsic nature Putnam seems to undermine his own realism.
282
 
 It is true that the existence of some of the properties that we ascribe to objects 
depends on the existence of the subject.  Those properties are relative to the subject 
and are in large part extrinsic to the object.  One example of such a property is “hard-
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to-moveness”.283  The existence of this property depends more on the incapability of 
the subject that is trying to move the object than on anything inherent in the object.  
However, Rorty and Putnam argue that this kind of extrinsic nature is typical of all 
properties.  To illustrate the difference between this position and realism consider two 
different properties that we refer to using the term “red”.  We use the term “red” to 
refer to a property of certain objects that reflect specific wavelengths of light.  We also 
use the term to refer to the colour of the subject’s experience of that light.  Objects 
would continue to reflect specific wavelengths of light without any subject to 
experience the corresponding colour.  In order for the quality of the subject’s 
experience to exist a subject capable of having the experience needs to exist.  The 
existence of the first property referred to by the term “red” does not require a 
contribution by the subject and the second one does.  The tendency of objects to 
reflect specific wavelengths of light is intrinsic to reality in the sense that it does not 
require any extrinsic contribution by the subject in order to exist.  Putnam might 
object that there would be no such thing as a “property” or “the tendency to reflect 
light” without our concepts of them but in order to maintain realism it is important not 
to allow the distinction between reality and our concepts to collapse in such a way that 
reality’s intrinsic nature drops out of the picture.  It is true that all our concepts require 
a contribution from us in order to exist but the reality that they supposedly represent 
does not.  Part of the problem with Putnam’s internal realism seems to be his failure to 
distinguish between the idea that a property is a concept and therefore extrinsic to the 
reality that it describes and the idea that a property is whatever the concept describes 
that is intrinsic to reality.  Failing to make that distinction implies that reality either 
does not have an intrinsic nature or that its intrinsic nature is irrelevant to our 
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descriptions.  It is hard to equate Putnam’s position with realism given that he agrees 
with Rorty that there is no intelligible way to preserve the idea that any property is 
intrinsic to reality.
284
  The fundamental issue between Rorty’s position and realism 
seems to be the question of whether there is any intelligible way to preserve that idea. 
 It should be said that Putnam has more recently distanced himself from the 
argument of his internal realist period.  In a piece written in the early 90’s called “The 
Question of Realism” Putnam resolves “not to state my own doctrine as a doctrine of 
the dependence of the way things are on the way we talk”.285  Putnam concedes that 
previous statements of his may seem to express a kind of linguistic idealism that fails 
to clearly understand what is meant by reality’s independent existence.  He tries to put 
this right by clarifying his thought: 
 
That the sky is blue is causally independent of the way we talk; for, with 
our language in place, we can certainly say that the sky would still be blue 
even if we did not use colour words (unless, of course, we affected that 
colour in some ordinary causal way, say, by producing more smog).  [..] In 
any sense of “independent” I can understand, whether the sky is blue is 
independent of the way we talk.
286
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Despite this clarification, however, Putnam sticks by his earlier definition of an 
intrinsic property.  He continues to argue that in order to regard a property (or set of 
properties) as intrinsic to reality it would have to be “the one description that captures 
the intrinsic properties”.287  He still shares Rorty’s reductionist and absolutist 
conception of reality’s intrinsic nature and argues that the occurrence of conceptual 
relativity renders the idea that we capture reality’s intrinsic nature redundant: 
 
[...] what is common to all versions of this more metaphysical realism is 
the notion that there is – in a philosophically privileged sense of “object” 
– a definite Totality of All Real Objects and a fact of the matter as to 
which properties of those objects are the intrinsic properties and which 
are, in some sense, perspectival.
 288
 
 
 
Putnam continues to assume that the concept of reality’s intrinsic nature cannot be 
divorced from the kind of reductionist and absolutist realism that demands a single, 
neutral God’s-Eye view of reality.  According to Putnam, the notion of reality’s 
intrinsic nature is inextricably linked to the idea of a metaphysical reality that belies 
our various representations.
 
 
Rorty insists that there is no intelligible way to preserve the distinction 
between a concept and whatever that concept represents.  The relation of 
correspondence that supposedly exists between them is opaque to us because we can 
only describe this “whatever” by using further concepts.  On this basis Rorty argues 
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that reality can quite easily drop out of the picture.  Rorty’s conception of what 
remains once the dichotomy between the intrinsic and extrinsic collapses calls to mind 
the last stage of “How the ‘Real World’ at Last Became a Myth” in Nietzsche’s 
Twilight of the Idols.  In that piece Nietzsche famously describes a series of stages in 
which humanity casts off the idea of a remote reality that belies appearances.  He ends 
with the following thought: 
 
We have abolished the real world: what is left? The apparent world 
perhaps? … But no! with the real world we have also abolished the 
apparent world!  
 
Nietzsche insists that if we abolish one side of the opposition between reality and 
appearances then we must abolish the other.  If the dichotomy between the intrinsic 
and the extrinsic collapses then neither must predominate.  The purpose of abolishing 
that unattainable “real world” is to replace it with a reality that is attainable.  The 
purpose is to overcome the problem of scepticism by treating reality not as something 
that stands apart from appearances but as something that does appear to us.  This is 
why “the apparent world” (conceived of as something false) must be abolished.  
Nietzsche suggests that what he calls “the longest error” will only be corrected once 
we have conceived of reality as something that is amenable to representation (and 
conceived of representations as something that can be realistic).  From Rorty’s point 
of view, the whole notion of the practice of representation must be abolished because 
the longest error is inherent in it.  Rorty argues that we cannot conceive of the practice 
of representation without opposing the way reality “really is” to our representations.  
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Rorty insists that the way reality “really is” must be conceived of as an intrinsic nature 
that belies our various extrinsic representations.  Rorty’s solution is to abandon the 
whole notion of reality’s intrinsic nature and treat all properties as relative to our 
descriptions.  The problem with this solution is that it eliminates one term of the 
opposition instead of reconciling both terms.  A genuine solution would have to 
maintain some sense in which reality’s intrinsic nature can appear to us otherwise we 
would merely be consigned to “the apparent world”.  
In my exposition of Nietzsche’s work I suggested that his own eventual 
solution was to uncouple the notion of reality’s intrinsic nature from the notion of a 
metaphysical reality that belies appearances.  In On the Genealogy of Morality 
Nietzsche agrees with the view expressed by Rorty and Putnam that we must guard 
against the idea that we could have a single, neutral God’s-Eye view of reality.  
Despite this, Nietzsche does not rule out objectivity.  He describes the dichotomy 
between the intrinsic and extrinsic collapsing in such a way that reality’s intrinsic 
nature does not drop out of the picture:  
 
There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival “knowing”; and 
the more affects we allow to speak about a matter, the more eyes, different 
eyes, we know how to bring to bear on one and the same matter, that 
much more complete will our “concept” of this matter, our “objectivity” 
be.
289
   
 
The phrase “that much more complete will our “concept” of this matter [...] be” 
suggests that there is more to an object than a single representation can capture.  
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Nietzsche suggests that we need not associate the concept of an object’s intrinsic 
nature with something that belies its various appearances.  An object’s intrinsic nature 
is something that can be captured from multiple perspectives.  This conception of 
reality satisfies Putnam’s requirement that we regard the macrophysical world of 
ordinary objects to be as real as the microphysical world of sub-atomic particles but it 
does not require us to deny that those worlds capture reality’s intrinsic nature.  We can 
suppose that reality’s intrinsic nature is captured by both.  In response to seventeenth 
century objectivism we can suppose that the difference between a microphysical 
description and a macrophysical description is merely one of perspective.  A 
microphysical description may be more accurate in the sense of being more finely 
grained (and more explanatorily basic) but that does not render the macrophysical 
description false or “mere appearance”.  They both capture the intrinsic nature of 
reality. They simply do so from different perspectives. 
 Nietzsche’s description of one and the same object being captured from 
different perspectives is reminiscent of the cookie cutter metaphor that Putnam 
discards.  We have seen that Putnam rejects that metaphor on the basis that there could 
only be one set of “parts” that are intrinsic to the reality being described.  It seems to 
me, however, that the cookie cutter metaphor need not founder on the question “what 
are the parts of this dough?” if we avoid the urge to find a single and exclusive answer 
to that question. Reality could be thought to have numerous sets of “parts” or “joints”.  
The key is to appreciate that each set only captures reality from one of a number of 
possible perspectives.  In this way a representation can be considered relative to the 
subject (and its perspective) without that extrinsic factor obscuring the intrinsic nature 
of the object.  The dichotomy between the extrinsic and the intrinsic can be collapsed 
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in such a way that neither is eliminated.  By conceiving of reality as something that 
exceeds any single representation of it we can appreciate the contingencies that 
accompany the practice of representation (such as perspective) without questioning 
our realism.  The fact that we cannot have a single neutral conception of reality need 
not be a problem if reality need not be reduced in that way.  Reality need not be 
opposed to its various appearances if reality is regarded as extensive enough to be 
present in those appearances.  If we conceive of reality as something that exceeds any 
single representation of it we can deny the need for a single and exclusive God’s Eye 
view.  We can deny that realism demands the kind of reductionism and absolutism that 
Rorty claims that it demands and undermine one of the main reasons behind his 
rejection of realism and representationalism. 
 The idea that one single and exclusive form of representation is capable of 
capturing all there is to reality could be seen as a species of what Theodor Adorno 
calls “identity thinking”.  Adorno defines identity thinking as the assumption that 
reality (the “non-identical”) can be reduced to or identified with the subject’s 
conception of it.  In Negative Dialectics Adorno’s criticism of identity thinking is 
primarily aimed at idealists, like Hegel, who “exploited the fact that the nonidentical 
on its part can be defined only as a concept”.290  Idealists do so in order to make 
subjectivity constitutive of objectivity.  However, Adorno’s criticism can also be 
applied to realists who suppose that reality can be reduced to or identified with a 
single representation of it.  They both fail to preserve the non-identity of the non-
identical and try to bring reality to identity.  The idea that reality exceeds any single 
representation of it gives us some sense of what it means for reality to be non-
identical to our representations.  If a representation is always limited by its particular 
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perspective then it cannot be identical to its object.  As Nietzsche says, it is only by 
combining perspectives that we can get closer to a complete conception of the object.  
As far as Rorty is concerned, contingencies such as perspective are fatal to realism 
because realism demands nothing less than the mind’s absolute identity to reality.  As 
a consequence, all contingencies that compromise this absolute identity tell against 
realism.  According to Rorty, the very act of representation compromises the realist’s 
fantasy of identity because the act of representation involves contingencies that 
diminish that identity.  Rorty argues that we should renounce the fantasy of absolute 
identity by giving up the concepts of representation and realism altogether.  One 
might say that Rorty’s anti-representationalist pragmatism is a radical form of “non-
identity thinking”.  He encourages us to believe that our concepts are so lacking in 
identity with reality that they should not be considered representations at all.
291
  They 
should be considered tools for coping with reality rather than representations that 
correspond to it.  However, Nietzsche and Adorno offer an approach that seems to 
suggest there is a middle ground between identity and non-identity that involves a less 
absolute form of realism. 
 I have argued that the conception of realism that Rorty rejects has roots in 
Platonism. Plato imagined us leaving the cave and confronting reality directly.  He 
imagined the mind casting off the contingencies of the practice of representation and 
achieving absolute identity with reality through contemplation of the Forms.  When 
Rorty describes realism he does so in terms that echo this ideal of absolute 
“correspondence”.  For representationalists, that ideal is supposedly captured by the 
metaphor of “mirroring”.  Representationalists may not claim that the mind becomes 
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identical to reality in the sense of becoming the same thing as reality, but, according to 
Rorty, they do claim that the mind becomes identical to reality in the sense of 
becoming an identical “copy” of it.  Where language is concerned, Rorty describes the 
requirement of correspondence as a requirement that our language is “something 
identical either with God or with the world as God’s project.”  As I pointed out in the 
first chapter, this is a very narrow conception of what a representation has to be like in 
order to correspond to its object.
292
  A representation need not be identical to its object 
in order to correspond to it.  The distinction between identity and non-identity (or 
perhaps between the way reality “really is” and the way it “appears”) is not a binary 
opposition.  There is a middle ground in which the practice of representation actually 
takes place.  In this middle ground, a representation might not be identical to the 
object it represents but that does not mean that it necessarily misrepresents the object.  
The contingencies that shape a representation (such as its form, its perspective or its 
practical purpose) might stop that representation from being identical to its object but 
that does not necessarily stop it from corresponding to its object.  The lack of identity 
that Rorty identifies between a representation and reality is not necessarily fatal to 
realism. It is only fatal to the ideal of the mind’s absolute identity to reality. 
 Rorty is right to question the ideal of the mind’s absolute identity to reality.  
He is right to point out that it relies on a notion of correspondence that derives from 
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an idealized conception of representation – one that imagines reality being reduced to 
or identified with a single “mirror-like” representation of it.  One of the supposed 
advantages of that ideal is that it promises to defeat scepticism.  It promises to 
eliminate the lack of identity that threatens to open up when the practice of 
representation is employed.  One of Rorty’s main objections to representationalism is 
that it makes scepticism a perennial problem.  Representationalism places us at a 
remove from reality and prevents us from assuring ourselves that our representations 
correspond to reality.  Without our mind’s absolute identity to reality the way reality 
“really is” becomes mysterious.  However, the ideal of absolute identity sets a 
standard that cannot be met because it requires us to reduce reality to a single 
representation of it.  The impossibility of attaining such an exclusive and identical 
“copy” of reality leads the realist to project that ideal onto reality so that reality is 
thought to comprise an intrinsic nature that belies our various representations.  This, 
in a nutshell, is the worn out dialectic that Rorty seeks to escape by abandoning 
representationalism.  Rorty assumes that realism and representationalism require the 
ideal of absolute identity and that the impossibility of attaining such identity renders 
them defunct.  He effectively concedes the argument to the sceptic and concludes that 
we need to change the subject.  However, there is no need for the realist to insist on 
the ideal of absolute identity, especially considering that it seems based on a 
misguided ontology according to which reality is able to be reduced to a single 
representation of it.  The realist is entitled to argue that we do not need the ideal of 
absolute identity if reality need not be reduced in that way.  Reality can be considered 
to “appear” in our representations through the relation of correspondence without that 
relation being one of absolute identity.  Our empirical experience of ordinary objects, 
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for example, can be considered to correspond to reality despite the fact that it is not 
identical to reality.  Our empirical experience is subject to all kinds of contingencies 
thanks to our “all too human” cognitive apparatus but that contingency only tells 
against realism if realism demands the mind’s absolute identity with reality.  In 
addition, the realist is not obliged to choose one form of representation and claim that 
it uniquely exemplifies what it is like to correspond to reality.  Although our empirical 
experience may correspond to reality the realist is not committed to reducing our 
conception of reality to that experience.  Realism can accommodate other cognitive 
resources and forms of representation that allow us to broaden, deepen and refine our 
conception of reality beyond our experience.  
 Giving up the ideal of absolute identity allows the mystery surrounding reality 
to dissipate. It is the ideal of absolute identity that makes reality mysterious by 
demanding a single and exclusive representation of reality.  Once we are reconciled to 
a less absolute kind of correspondence the sort of scepticism that is motivated by our 
lack of such an absolute loses traction.  Reality can be thought to appear in our 
representations despite our inability to absolutely identify reality with any of those 
representations.  Nor do we have to naively take a representation at face value as if it 
is identical to reality.  The lack of absolute identity that opens up when the practice of 
representation is employed remains.  Various contingencies determine our 
representations and compromise their absolute identity to reality.  Adorno argues that 
the point of preserving the idea that our concepts are not identical with reality is that it 
motivates a critical attitude towards our concepts.
293
  If our concepts are never fully 
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identical to reality then they are always open to criticism.  By eliminating this lack of 
identity between reality and our concepts we run the risk of settling for the status quo.  
In response, Rorty would argue that it is realism that threatens to sediment our 
concepts by insisting that some of our representations correspond to reality absolutely.  
According to Rorty, it is realists who claim that reality can be subsumed by our 
concepts.  Rorty insists that it is only when the intrinsic and the essential give way to 
the extrinsic and the contingent that our capacity for critique and transformation will 
be fully recognized.  As we have seen, however, the realist is not committed to the 
claim that any of our representations are identical to reality.  The realist can accept the 
contingencies that go into the practice of representation and can accept the need for a 
critical attitude towards our concepts.  The realist does not have to subscribe to the 
absolutism that Rorty insists that they must subscribe to. 
In response to all this, Rorty would ask how we are supposed to know that our 
representations are accurate?  Even if the realist argues that reality has numerous sets 
of intrinsic “joints” for our representations to “cut at” there is still the question of 
where those joints really lie.  How can we assure ourselves that our representations 
correspond to reality if we cannot transcend our representations and compare them to 
reality?  We have a history of changing our conception of reality and on Rorty’s view 
this poses a serious problem for realism.  So far in this chapter my treatment of the 
notion of representational relativity has concentrated on the problem of variation due 
to perspective and has not considered the problem of variation due to so-called 
“theory-change”.  It is this problem that I would like to tackle in the next part of this 
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chapter. 
 
Causal Realism Revisited 
 
How do we know if our cookie cutter cuts reality the joints?  In Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature Rorty cites the example of motion and points out that our concept of 
gravitation has changed dramatically during the course of scientific inquiry.  
Aristotle’s and Newton’s theories of motion are so different that it is hard to claim that 
they are talking about the same thing.  The notion that there is an intrinsic “part” of 
reality that we refer to when we use the term “gravitation” is problematic.  We cannot 
describe what we mean or what we are talking about without reference to a particular 
theory and our theories periodically change.  At times in Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature, Rorty’s response to this consideration is relatively commonsensical: 
 
Now in one obvious sense we know perfectly well – prior to any theory – 
that they have been referring to the same things.  They were all trying to 
cope with the same universe, and they referred to it, although doubtless 
often under unfruitful and foolish descriptions.  To discover, as a result of 
the next scientific revolution, that there are no genes, molecules, electrons, 
etc., […] would still not put us out of touch with either the world or our 
ancestors.  For we would proceed to tell the same sort of story of the 
emergence of better descriptions of the world out of false, confused, 
unfruitful, descriptions […]294 
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In this passage, Rorty seems to endorse a form of commonsense realism.  However, 
he argues that this kind of commonsense is not satisfying from a philosophical point 
of view.  Philosophy has to provide something more than commonsense.  The realist 
has to be able to refute the sceptic who claims that our dependency on theory does put 
us out of touch with reality.  The realist philosophical position that Rorty seeks to 
debunk at this point in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature was proposed by Putnam 
(building on the work of Saul Kripke) for that purpose.  Before Putnam developed his 
internal realism he advocated an approach that took the referent of many of our terms 
to be intrinsic parts of reality.  According to this “causal realist” approach, there is an 
external referent of our terms that remains fixed even though our internal (theory-
relative) conception of what we are talking about may vary and change.  This fixity of 
scope is created by an initial act of designation by which an intrinsic part of reality is 
referred to using a specific expression.  All subsequent uses of that expression are 
causally linked to that initial designation despite changes in our conception of the 
nature of the referent.  Putnam uses the example of natural kinds to illustrate how this 
principle works.  Terms like “water” and “gold” denote parts of reality that have an 
intrinsic nature.  Modern chemistry and physics have transformed our understanding 
of the nature of water and gold but the referent of the terms has not changed.  Crucial 
to this conception of meaning is the belief that when we assert that a piece of metal is 
gold (for example) we are not just asserting that it shares certain contingent 
characteristics with other things.  We are asserting that it shares the same essential 
characteristics as a specific part of reality.  We may be wrong about its nature but we 
are still taking about the same intrinsic thing. 
 There are two principles that Putnam lays out in order to further clarify his 
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theory of reference.  The first is The Principle of the Benefit of Doubt. This principle 
states that those who refer to a particular part of reality would accept reasonable 
modifications to their conception of what they are referring to. 
 
If I describe a quark as “the particle responsible for such-and-such 
effects”, almost certainly it is going to turn out that no particle is 
responsible for exactly the effects I specified; but that does not mean that 
there aren’t quarks.295 
 
This principle allows for a certain amount of imprecision in our conception of the part 
of reality that is referred to.  We may not cut reality precisely at the joints because 
often terms are introduced into the language with the aid of descriptions (and contexts 
of belief) that turn out not to be entirely accurate.  This is why it is difficult to claim 
that Aristotle and Newton are talking about the same thing when considering the 
different description that they gave of gravitation.  This imprecision does not mean 
that we are out of touch with reality.  It just means that our descriptions do not 
necessarily have total accuracy.
 296
  Such imprecision accounts for our continuing 
need to revise and improve our understanding of certain parts of reality.  The second 
principle is The Principle of Reasonable Ignorance.  This principle states that “a 
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speaker may “have” a word in the sense of possessing normal ability to use it in 
discourse, and not know the mechanism of reference of that term, explicitly or even 
implicitly.”297  The meaning of a word like “gold” depends on the nature of the 
referent and not on the speaker’s potentially ignorant conception of the referent.  This 
is the “contribution of the environment” to the meaning of our terms.  Both principles 
complement each other by allowing the mechanism of reference to keep us in touch 
with reality’s intrinsic nature despite the fact that we refer to that nature “often under 
unfruitful and foolish descriptions.”   
 Causal realism is intended to do justice to the realist intuition that truth is an 
extra-theoretic notion.  It is meant to explain how our descriptions are of “some fixed 
realm of theory-independent entities” so that what is true remains independent of what 
is warranted within a particular theory.  For realists like the early Putnam, it is the 
existence of this ontological realm of theory-independent entities (the full nature of 
which is not immediately apparent to us) that explains the need for our ongoing 
scientific investigation.  Rorty dismisses causal realism in Philosophy and the Mirror 
of Nature because he regards it as unnecessary.  Rorty argues that trying to pinpoint 
what we are really talking about across different theories is always just “a matter of 
“placing” the relative ignorance of the person being described in the context of the 
relatively greater knowledge claimed by the speaker”.298  What we are talking about is 
always relative to our current best theory and that theory may still completely fail to 
correspond to reality.  A classic example of a failed theory is phlogiston theory which 
posited a chemical element that turned out not to exist.  According to Rorty, in light of 
such failures, the positing of a mechanism of reference that keeps us in touch with the 
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intrinsic nature of reality throughout changes of theory is just a philosophical ploy 
designed to refute the sceptic.  At the end of his discussion of Putnam’s theory of 
reference in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature Rorty remarks approvingly that 
Putnam has largely renounced his earlier position.  As we have seen, Rorty’s and 
Putnam’s reasons for dissatisfaction with causal realism go deeper than a belief that 
“reference” is merely a term of philosophical art used to refute the sceptic.  They both 
come to doubt that it makes sense to think of reality as having an intrinsic nature in 
the first place.  The later Putnam argues that we cannot think of reality as being 
divided into intrinsic parts because we can have incompatible conceptions of reality 
that are equally correct (what he calls “equivalent descriptions”).  It might be possible 
to believe that it is “a property of THE WORLD itself that it admits of these different 
mappings” but: 
 
 The problem – as Nelson Goodman has been emphasizing for many, 
many years – is that this story may retain THE WORLD but at the price of 
giving up any intelligible notion of how THE WORLD is.”299 
 
If standards of correctness are theory-relative then the idea that they correspond to 
reality’s intrinsic nature does not make sense.  Talk of these theories as descriptions of 
reality’s intrinsic nature is empty.300  As I have stated, Putnam tends to use examples 
of descriptions that do not necessarily require a realistic interpretation.  His examples 
tend to come from logic, mathematics and quantum mechanics.  Nevertheless, the 
above quote shows that Putnam adopts this position in sympathy with Nelson 
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Goodman. In his book Ways of Worldmaking Goodman describes the practice of 
“worldmaking” as one in which unique versions of the world are continually 
generated according to rules that have no regard for reality’s intrinsic nature.  
Goodman associates the notion of reality’s intrinsic nature with the notion of a neutral 
God’s-Eye conception of it and argues that our inability to avoid the practice of 
representation renders the notion of reality’s intrinsic nature redundant.  Goodman 
argues that we ought to abandon the idea that there is a “way the world is” apart from 
the versions that we create.  Once again our inability to achieve a neutral God’s-Eye 
view of reality that is free of the practice of representation forces reality’s intrinsic 
nature to drop out of the picture and we are consigned to the apparent world. 
 Putnam’s endorsement of Goodman’s argument marks a radical departure from 
his earlier causal realist position because it completely undermines the idea that there 
are intrinsic parts of reality that remain constant referents of our terms throughout 
changes of theory.  It effectively eliminates the contribution of the environment to the 
meaning of our terms.  There is no fixed realm of theory independent entities that we 
are in touch with via a mechanism of correspondence.  What we are talking about is 
always relative to our current best theory and that theory may turn out to be complete 
fantasy and fail to correspond to reality at all.  In Putnam’s earlier work, natural kinds 
are thought to exemplify the sorts of theory-independent entities in question.  In Ways 
of Worldmaking Goodman insists that there are no such things.  There are only 
“relevant” kinds: 
 
Induction requires taking some classes to the exclusion of others as 
relevant kinds […] The uniformity of nature we marvel at or the 
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unreliability we protest belongs to a world of our own making.
301
 
 
Similarly to Nietzsche in “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense”, Goodman 
portrays nature as lacking any intrinsic structure.  It is us who create that structure 
through the practice of worldmaking.  We classify things independently of any 
intrinsic order that they may have.
302
  Kinds only exist by virtue of our attempt to 
classify.
 303
  There is no intrinsic structure that we are attempting to accurately 
represent.  We saw that the early Nietzsche was led to this conclusion by assuming 
that in order for us to capture reality’s intrinsic nature we would need to transcend the 
practice of representation.  We would need to stop representing things and allow 
reality’s intrinsic nature to confront us in an absolute sense.  This assumption also 
seems to be at play in Goodman’s argument: 
 
We cannot test a version by comparing it with a world undescribed, 
undepicted, unperceived […] all we learn about the world is contained in 
right versions of it; and while the underlying world, bereft of these, need 
not be denied to those who love it, it is perhaps on the whole a world well 
lost.
304
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Goodman argues that reality’s intrinsic nature can only be conceived of as something 
that belies our representations.  It is something that can only be known by 
transcending the practice of representation in familiar Platonic fashion.  The problem 
is that we have no way of achieving such transcendence (assuming the notion makes 
any sense) and so reality’s intrinsic nature is “a world well lost”.  It is this conviction 
that unites Rorty, the early Nietzsche, Goodman and the later Putnam. 
 The idea that our representations could all turn out to be complete fantasy and 
fail to correspond to reality is telling because in order to argue that one would have to 
assume that reality’s intrinsic nature does not already appear in our representations.  
This is a thought that Putnam captures in his claim that “the most important 
consequence of metaphysical realism is that truth is supposed to be radically non-
epistemic - we might be “brains in a vat” and so the theory that is “ideal” from the 
point of view of operational utility, inner beauty and elegance, “plausibility”, 
“simplicity”, “conservatism”, etc., might be false.”305  Realism depends on reality’s 
independence from our representations and this independence raises the possibility 
that our representations might completely fail to correspond to reality.  Putnam’s 
internal realism is an attempt to overcome such doubts by challenging reality’s 
independence from our representations.  He prefers not to make a distinction between 
our representations and reality and claims that the notion of reality’s intrinsic nature 
ought to be disposed of.  A similar disposal is at work in Goodman’s ambiguous 
concept of “worldmaking” in which reality is not distinguished from the worlds that 
we make.  But why would we doubt that our representations are able to correspond to 
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reality’s intrinsic nature in the first place?  Rorty argues that Plato can take a lot of the 
blame for this because he chose to use the concept of representation in order to 
describe our cognition.  At least the assumptions behind Plato’s attitude to our 
representations can be blamed (assumptions that Rorty repeats and reinforces).  Those 
assumptions hold that the contingencies involved in the practice of representation cast 
grave doubt on the idea that our representations correspond to reality’s intrinsic 
nature.  This doubt is fuelled by the idea that our conception of reality’s intrinsic 
nature ought to be an absolute conception.  This idea gives traction to the sceptic’s 
claim that any contingency or fallibility in our representations is cause for concern.  
Such scepticism is compounded by the realization that the demand for an absolute 
God’s Eye view of reality is untenable.  Our representations cannot attain the kind of 
absolute identity with reality that such a demand requires.  The intrinsic nature of 
reality is not available to us in that way.  The way reality appears to us is relative to 
our representations.  As I have argued, however, the fact that reality appears to us 
relative to our representations does not mean that reality’s intrinsic nature necessarily 
fails to correspond to those representations.  A representation does not need to be 
identical to its object in order to correspond to it.  Reality’s intrinsic nature need not 
be thought of as something that is misrepresented by our representations.  The 
uniformity of nature need not be thought of as “something of our own making” even 
though it only appears to us through our representations. 
 So where does this leave Putnam’s realism?  We have seen that his earlier 
causal realist position was intended to explain how it is that the intrinsic nature of 
reality need not be thought of as something that is misrepresented by our 
representations.  According to causal realism, reality comprises a fixed realm of 
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theory-independent entities that we refer to while our conception of those entities may 
vary and change.  As a result, the meanings of our terms are not relative to our current 
theory.  The later Putnam, however, argues that the intrinsic nature of reality is 
something that can only be misrepresented by our representations.  He argues that we 
require a single, neutral and absolute conception of such a nature and the fact that we 
describe reality in different ways means that the notion of it having an intrinsic nature 
makes no sense.  For example, the fact that I can choose to describe reality either from 
a microphysical perspective or a macrophysical perspective casts doubt on the claim 
that those descriptions capture reality’s intrinsic nature.  I have tried to show that a 
better alternative is to challenge the notion that we require a single, neutral God’s-Eye 
conception of reality’s intrinsic nature.  By avoiding that wrong turn we can preserve 
the idea that reality comprises a fixed realm of theory-independent parts that 
correspond to our representations.  The fact that we represent reality as having 
different sets of parts is not necessarily a problem if we accept that reality’s intrinsic 
nature is extensive enough to comprise those parts.  We can accept this by recognizing 
the fact that no single representation captures reality absolutely.  In order to get a 
complete conception of reality we need numerous different representations or “right 
versions” in Goodman’s vocabulary.  The fact that we have lots of right versions does 
not mean that we are consigned to an “apparent world” from which reality’s intrinsic 
nature is absent. 
I began this part of the chapter by asking how we can know if our cookie 
cutter cuts reality the joints?  I would argue that it is a loaded question.  It implies that 
we have a reason to suspect that we may be “brains in a vat”.  This is a concern that 
Rorty reinforces even while dismissing it: 
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To discover, as a result of the next scientific revolution, that there are no 
genes, molecules, electrons, etc., but only space-time bumps, or hypnotic 
suggestions from the Galactic hypnotists who have manipulated our 
scientists since the time of Galileo, or whatever, would still not put us out 
of touch with either the world or our ancestors.
306
 
 
Here Rorty denies that we are out of touch with reality while using a bizarre 
counterfactual hypothesis to claim that the existence of genes, molecules and 
electrons could still turn out to be false.  I have tried to show that such extreme 
scepticism is unwarranted.  Where our ongoing inquiries are concerned, the fact that 
our descriptions are fallible is no reason to suppose that they may all completely fail 
to correspond to reality.  The virtue of Putnam’s earlier causal realism is that it shows 
how such fallibility need not be an encouragement to scepticism but an 
encouragement to revise and improve our representations.  Our fallible theories might 
sometimes fail to refer to an intrinsic part of reality (like phlogiston theory) but that 
does not make scepticism inevitable.  Cases like phlogiston cast doubt on the idea that 
there is mechanism of reference that always keeps us in touch with the intrinsic nature 
of reality.  Not all of the things that we talk about are necessarily intrinsic parts of 
reality, but that is not a reason to worry that all of them are “mere appearance”.  The 
virtue of Putnam’s causal realism is that it conceives of reality as a fixed realm of 
theory-independent parts that is not completely mysterious.  Reality is not a mystery 
in the sense of being something that belies appearances.  It is a mystery in the sense of 
being something that is not fully apparent to us.  This explains the ongoing need to 
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test, revise and multiply our representations so that we can better understand reality. 
 It seems to me that our attempt to understand “the relation between 
representation and represented” is a crucial part of the ongoing attempt to better 
understand reality.  Rorty’s aversion to such theories of representation is rooted in his 
dogmatic conception of the kind of account that such “epistemology” strives to give.  
On his reading, epistemology tries to offer a “neutral scheme […] which would make 
Aristotle and Newton, for example, commensurable”307  Such a scheme would offer a 
neutral view in which proponents of different theories can describe reality so that (in 
Thomas Kuhn’s words) “what changes with a paradigm is only the scientist’s 
interpretation of observations that themselves are fixed once and for all by the nature 
of the environment”308  The problem with attempting to provide such a scheme is that 
there is no neutral God’s Eye view.  The proponents of different paradigms “see 
different things” and “though the world does not change with a change of paradigm, 
the scientist afterward works in a different world.”309  In Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature Rorty is careful to distance himself from an idealist or anti-realist 
interpretation of such claims: 
 
[Kuhn] let his notion of what counted as a “philosophical paradigm” be 
set by the Kantian notion that the only substitute for a realistic account of 
successful mirroring was an idealistic account of the malleability of the 
mirrored world.
310
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Despite Rorty’s intention to distance himself from this philosophical paradigm, 
however, we have seen that his argument often emulates it.  His decision to 
dismiss realism on the basis that we cannot attain a neutral God’s-Eye view of 
“the thing in-itself” is typical of that philosophical paradigm.  It leads him to 
argue that something like idealism is necessary because the only substitute for a 
realistic account of “successful mirroring” is an anti-realist account of the 
malleability of the “linguistic world”.  I have tried to argue that a better 
alternative is to deny that realism requires the absolutism that Rorty claims that 
it demands.  It is possible to have a nuanced approach to realism that accepts the 
impossibility of transcending the practice of representation.  We can appreciate 
the contingencies that characterise our representations without having to deny 
that reality appears in those representations or that more accurate forms of 
representation should be one of our goals. 
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Conclusion 
 
In the introduction I stated that the main concern of my thesis would be Rorty’s anti-
representationalism.  The main concern would be to examine the arguments that Rorty 
offers in support of his rejection of the concept of representation.  I have argued that 
Rorty’s argument relies on a particularly narrow conception of what 
representationalism must entail.  Rorty interprets representationalism as an attempt to 
provide a guarantee that our representations correspond to reality.  This “unintelligible 
kind of certainty” (to use Putnam’s phrase) would be a “God’s-Eye” view of reality 
that provided us with an independent confirmation of the accuracy of our 
representations.  It is unintelligible because it would require a form of representation 
that transcends the contingencies involved in the practice of representation.  It would 
require a form of representation that is identical to reality in an absolute sense.  On 
Rorty’s reading it would be a single and exclusive form of representation that 
rendered all other possible forms of representation false or “mere appearance”.  It 
would reduce reality to a single conception of it and would privilege that conception 
as if it captured the “essence” of reality.  This is not something that we can have 
because the mind is not a mirror that simply reflects reality without imposing a 
particular form, perspective, history or practical interest.  In William James’ famous 
words “the trail of the human serpent is over everything”.  Indeed, Rorty’s rejection of 
the concept of representation can be seen to derive its inspiration from James’ 
rejection of the idea that our thoughts “copy” reality as if our best science had 
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“deciphered the eternal thoughts of the Almighty”.311  When Rorty seeks to debunk 
the idea that our language corresponds to reality he often argues along similar lines to 
James - as if language would have to be “identical either with God or with the world 
as God’s project” in order to correspond to reality.  As far as Rorty is concerned, our 
inability to “copy” or “mirror” an independent reality in this identical fashion rules 
out realism from a philosophical point of view.  As a result, a philosophical demand 
for such realism can only leave us dogged by scepticism and the concern that our 
minds might not correspond to reality at all.  Representationalism locks philosophy 
into an interminable struggle to refute scepticism through the provision of an 
impossible certainty and the only way out is to reject representationalism.  
 From within representationalism and realism, Rorty never questions the 
philosophical need to refute scepticism through the provision of an independent 
guarantee.  He often deploys a form of commonsense (or perhaps “naïve”) realism 
that eschews the need to refute scepticism.  However, he tends to regard this ordinary 
discourse as uninteresting from a philosophical point of view.  Rorty’s conception of 
what realist and representationalist philosophy entails is very dogmatic.  Putnam 
identifies Rorty’s attitude towards such philosophy as being “scornful”.  This is 
something that Putnam perceives to be a fundamental difference between him and 
Rorty: 
 
I do not think our reaction to the failure of a philosophical project – even a 
project as central as “metaphysics” – should be to abandon ways of 
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talking and thinking which have practical and spiritual weight.  […] And I 
think that what is important in philosophy is not just to say, “I reject the 
realist/antirealist controversy,” but to show that (and how) both sides 
misrepresent the lives we live with our concepts.
312
 
 
Putnam argues that the failure of our philosophical attempts to provide an independent 
guarantee of our realism should not lead us to abandon realist or representationalist 
philosophy.  It should be an indication that our philosophical understanding of realism 
and representationalism needs to be rectified.  This is something that Nietzsche seems 
to have understood as he was motivated to conceive of a form of realism and 
representationalism that does not require the kind of absolutism that realism seemed 
to him (early on at least) to require.  After articulating his misgivings about such 
absolutist realism in “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense” Nietzsche gradually 
re-thought the appearance-reality distinction.  His perspectivism is a theory of 
representation that attempts to formulate a less absolutist form of realism – one that 
challenges the Platonic dichotomy between appearance and reality.  In Adorno’s 
terms, it conceives of reality as something that exceeds any single representation of it 
and shows why the ideal of a single identical “mirror-like” representation of reality is 
unintelligible.  Reality’s intrinsic nature is not something that can be absolutely 
identified with a single representation of it.  We can have numerous different 
perspectives and forms of representation that capture reality’s intrinsic nature.  Given 
the contingencies involved in the practice of representation there may be an 
inexhaustible number of ways that the nature of reality could be captured.  We see this 
in contemporary statistical analysis, for example, in which data is selected and 
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presented in myriad different ways in order to illustrate different trends.  There is no 
single absolute reflection of what is going on.  The point is to avoid restricting our 
conception of what a realistic representation is to the kind of mirror imagery that 
implies that the correspondence between a representation and reality requires that the 
representation “reflects” or “copies” reality in an absolute, exclusive, neutral or 
passive way. 
 One of the things that characterises the practical and spiritual weight of 
realism is that it provides a counter weight to solipsism and idealism.  Realism 
captures our sense that the world is not identical to our minds or our language.  The 
world is something that we can be wrong about and that we have to get right in order 
to be successful.  We have seen that there are a number of parallels between Rorty’s 
anti-representationalism and idealism.  There is no sense for Rorty in which reality is 
something that we have to get right.  This standard of correctness or accuracy goes 
when realism and representationalism go.  In the field of natural science or in the 
exploration of our own personal identity there is nothing to get right in this sense, as 
far as Rorty is concerned.  There are just conventional “language-games” that can be 
changed if need be.  I have argued that Rorty is wrong to throw out the language of 
realism and representationalism on the narrow terms that he does.  The fact that we 
cannot transcend our minds or language in order to get independent confirmation of 
their accuracy is not sufficient reason to abandon accuracy as a standard.  It just 
requires us to re-conceive that accuracy using something other than an idealized 
notion of correspondence.  There is fertile ground within representationalism for the 
development of forms of realism that do not rely on the terms that Rorty sets for it.  
One of the examples that I have given is Roy Bhaskar’s realist theory of science.  
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Bhaskar eschews the need to assure ourselves that any part of our science corresponds 
to reality absolutely.  For him, realism simply involves an acknowledgement that the 
purpose of science is to represent reality accurately.  Hilary Putnam’s early causal 
realism also eschews the kind of absolutism that Rorty associates with realism.  He 
asserts the existence of a “fixed realm of theory-independent entities” that our 
language is intended to refer to while his principles of Benefit of Doubt and 
Reasonable Ignorance both acknowledge the potential fallibility of our current 
conception of those entities.   
 Rorty might argue that the problem of scepticism will remain a problem no 
matter how we pursue representationalism.  It will always place us at a remove from 
reality and raise the concern that our representations might completely fail to 
correspond to reality.  However, scepticism is more problematic the more inevitable 
we make it.  The problem with Rorty’s account of realism and representationalism is 
that it makes scepticism unavoidable.  Rorty restricts realism to a demand for an 
independent guarantee of correspondence.  This is not just an attempt to make sense 
of the relationship of correspondence.  According to Rorty, without an independent 
God’s-Eye view we must give up on realism.  The inevitability of scepticism then 
provides impetus for Rorty’s rejection of the whole notion of representation.  In 
contrast, I have tried to show that if we adopt a less absolute form of realism then 
scepticism loses traction.  Reality can be thought to appear in our representations 
despite the contingency of those representations.  The key is to avoid thinking of 
reality as something that needs to be reduced to a single, absolute representation of it.  
The notion that realism must either demand an absolute representation of reality or 
concede the argument to the sceptic is not the fait accompli that Rorty insists that it is.  
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The contingencies involved in the practice of representation need not cast doubt on 
our realism.  This is not just a question of naively ignoring scepticism but of 
developing a better comprehension of “the relationship between representation and 
represented”.  This is a comprehension of that relationship that does not rely on a 
narrow notion of representation (or correspondence) as a form of “mirroring” in 
which reality is “reflected” in a neutral or non-perspectival way.  It is a form of 
representationalism that has learnt the lessons of pragmatism (for example) without 
abandoning ways of thinking and talking that are spiritually and practically important 
to us.  In Rorty’s own words, it aims at “a still better, more luminously convincing, 
more transparent philosophical account of representation.” 
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